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ANTHONY SCOTT*
GEORGINA COUSTALIN

The Evolution of Water Rights
ABSTRACT

This article looks at the evolution of water rights since early
medieval times in England, North America and Australia. Different
water rights characteristicssuch as quality of title, exclusivity and
transferability are traced. Bases of two water regimes-types are
identified: riparianland ownership (community of users) and actual
use of the streamwater(priorityof use). We identify periods in which
one or the other of these types of regimes prevailed and suggest a
"twists and turns" pattern of alternation between them. Aspects
common to all periods, such as prescription and seniority, are
described. Finally, after looking at the dynamics of changefrom one
base to another, we project into the future a new property regime
which could respond to increased and more varied demands to use
water, conserve it and protect the water shed.

PART I: INTRODUCTION
A water right can be widely defined as the right to use or enjoy the
flowing water in a stream. It may emerge from a person's ownership of
land on the banks of the stream ("riparian ownership"), or from a person's
actual use of the stream. It may be administered and controlled by a
government agency, or it may not be administered at all, and be subject to
enforcement only in the courts. A water right can also be created indirectly
through a contract with a rights holder.
Some water rights are quantitative, applying to a fixed amount of
water, measured by rate of flow. Others set no limits so long as the holder
does not reduce or pollute the flow available to other water right-holders
on the stream. Some continue only as long as the holder continues his
specific water use, while others continue whether he uses the water or not.
In different parts of the world, even among countries which have
the same system of law (for example, the common law countries), and even
* Anthony Scott is emeritus professor of economics at the University of British Columbia.
Has specialized in the economics of natural resources and of institutions. Georgina
Coustalin, B.A., LI.B., is in practice with Steeves and Co. Vancouver. She has specialized in
history of law.
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within a single country, the regimes of water rights can be found to be very
different. Demand and supply play a role here. Furthermore, over time,
there have been "evolutions"of water rights. Comparative evolution is the
theme of this study.
Two questions suggest themselves: (1) Is a water right a different
type of right than a land right?; and (2) Is a water right a 'property' right?
We answer both questions in the affirmative. An affirmative answer to the
first question gives us a reason to look at water rights separately from land
rights, and an affirmative answer to the second question gives us a basis for
comparing them through the mechanism of their "characteristics."
The physical attribute of water in rivers and streams that distinguishes it most from land for the purpose of a study of rights is its fluidity.
The individual drops of water flowing in a stream are always in motion,
and travel from one right-holder's location to another's. Hence the holder's
right is more than to identifiable drops-it extends to theflow, as represented by the stream's velocity, its level and its quality at any particular instant.
This is a modem view of the water right; in early medieval times the law
had tried to ignore the fluidity of water and to treat the right as if it were
over land.
What finally sets off a water right from a freehold, leasehold,
profit-A-prendre or any other type of land holding, is the fact that the
exercise of the right has "external" effects beyond those felt by the
right-holder himself. Conversely, his right is vulnerable to challenges by
others on the stream, just "his" flow is vulnerable to variations caused by
others' uses. This interdependence among water users, which has led
economists to dub such a stream a "common property" is far, far greater
than among landowners or land users. The "common property" feature
means that a water right has far less exclusivity than has a land right.
Certain land rights also lack some exclusivity, but water rights lack so
much more exclusivity as to warrant separate study.
Is a water right a "property" right? A lawyer would say that only
if the right derived directly from a grant of land, could it be called a "real
property" right. Anything else would be a "personal right" and outside the
scope of a study on natural resources property. An economist would not
limit the definition in this way, but would call a property right any one
which gave its holder powers to use, manage or alienate a thing or to drive
profit from it. A contractual right regarding the use of land would therefore
be a type of land property right in the eyes of an economist but not of a
lawyer. What they would both have to agree on as a minimal requirement
for a land property right, however, would be social recognition, enforcement and protection of the holder's powers given under the right. This
minimal and broad definition gives us a basis of comparison of various
water rights regimes. The points of comparison will be the extent of six
"characteristics" of property rights:
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duration or permanence;
flexibility;
exclusivity or specificity;
quality of title or security;
transferability or assignability; and
divisibility.
The changing regulation of water-rights holders by statute and by
the several branches of the common law: criminal, tort, property and
contract, has worked to alter the amount of each of the six characteristics
oaf their right. The ability of legislators and courts to make these changes
has itself been subject to change according to the prevailing powers of
Parliament and the forms of legal action in use at the time. Different forms
of action had, for example, different requirements regarding 'standing' of
a plaintiff to sue, and the burden of proof. In proposing a reconciliation of
the ideas of economists and lawyers with regard to property rights, we
have been guided by the following
1. If a person has a legal entitlement to something that can be
enforced and protected, he has a "right."
2.
If a person has no legal entitlement to do something, but
others have no means of preventing or blocking him from
his use or enjoyment of it, and he has the legal means of
protecting his action from harm from others, what he has
is tantamount to a "right." He can use the thing unimpugned and unhindered.
3.
The corollary of I and 2: If a person has a legal or technical
entitlement which the court will not enforce, then he does
not, practically speaking, have a "right," for any other
member of the public is in as good a position as he is with
regard to the use and enjoyment of the thing.
The first statement is not controversial and would be accepted both
in the courts and in economic analyses. Courts have parted from economists over the second statement. They have strenuously resisted calling
what is "tantamount to a right" a legal entitlement, because the instances
of it have no roots in land or water ownership but only in the power of an
individual to prevent others from doing something.' Yet for hundreds of
years these same courts protected, through their procedures, the quasi-legal
1. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance and comments they have
received form nay persons. Among them they would mention: Richard Campbell, Sandy
Clark, Ronald Cummings, Anthony Dorcey, Mason Gaffney, David Getches, Mischa Gisser,
Linda Hannah, Charles Howe, Elizabeth Kirk, Arthur Maass, Ben Marr, Mary McGregor,
Christopher Mowlin, Peter H. Pearse, Christine Riek, Ruth Picha, Murray Rankin, Bernadette
Stale, Jennifer Steward, Andrew Thompson, Stephen Wisenthal.
See Mason v. Hill, 110 Eng. Rep. 692 (K.B. 1833), discussed in Part IIl.C., infra.
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right of "prior-use" water diversion which was founded on this precept
formed the basis of a huge network of contracting and industrial development on the rivers of England.2 The third statement may appear controversial, but was recognized by the courts in the eighteenth century case of
Ashby v. White. 3 In that case, which concerned voting rights, the court
resolved that "want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal," or without
a remedy, there is no right.4
Thus we propose as a further definition of a property right: "The
ability to do something which is recognized directly or indirectly in law, to
the extent that the law can be expected positively to protect that ability or
negatively to prevent others from interfering with that ability."
An evolution in water rights has indeed taken place in the common
law world, if one considers "rights" in the sense of the above broad
definition. The rights have shown different types and amounts of "characteristics" over time and have been built on shifting foundations. We have
noted the six characteristics above. As for the foundations, we will see that
they are: land ownership and water use.
Our study has considered the following places and periods of time
in which one or the other of the two foundations has acted as the basis for
water law
Medieval, post-Conquest period in England (1066-1600)
Early industrial revolution in England (1600-1850)
Mid and late industrial revolution in England (1851-1900)
Industrial period in New England (Eastern United States)
(1827-1900)
Settlement and development period in Western United
States (1850-1900)
Modern period in United States and English (1900-present).
To the above we have added a short consideration of Roman law
regarding water. Roman law was not merely a precursor of English water
law; its principles and practices continued to form a backdrop in later
periods, sometimes starkly visible and impossible to ignore.
What becomes evident in our comparative and evolutionary study
is that from one of these periods to the next there is a pattern of alternation
between the two foundations of the water right (land and use). We identify
some of the factors which may have been associated with the changes and
alternations.
Let us look briefly at the main features of the two types of water
rights. The basic premises of land-based or riparian rights are the following

2. See infra part JI.B.
3. Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703).
4. Id. at 136.
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only the owner of the stream banks has rights in the flow;
rights are to the undiminished, unaltered flow of the
water;
the owner may use the flow at any time, in any way, and
in any quantity, provided he does not cause damage to
other owners along the stream (that is, alter or diminish
the flow to them);
rights are relative and impose corresponding obligations
amongst the riparian community. The rights and obligations of each riparian are equal, regardless of how much
land he owns;
full riparian rights can be transferred only by transferring
title to the riparian land.

In contrast, in the alternating use-based periods, water rights have
the following main features
rights exist only as long as water use exists. Land ownership is not essential provided there is legal access to the
river;
rights are specific as to quantity and type of use;
the first user has the strongest rights. A seniority system
provides ranking of rights;
Rights-holders (users) can enforce their rights only against
those lower in seniority (later in time);
the usufructuary rights are fully transferable to any
person.5
A particular branch of the common law is called upon for
enforcement of each of the two types of water law. The law of property
protects land-owners and their land-based water rights to the flow through
a riparian-rights action. The law of tort protects any individual using the
flow through a personal, nuisance action. One might expect overlap for
owners of riparian land who were also active users of the flow: they would
have their choice of action and corresponding remedies. But we shall see
that this was not always the case. For example, at certain times in history,
while the law of tort flourished to protect water rights, the law of property
was represented only by the cumbersome feudal actions and was virtually
unused. At other times, the applicability of tort law to protect streamflow
was greatly narrowed among users. It followed that riparian land owners
who did not use the flow and users of the flow who were not riparian land
owners were at different periods of time without remedies when the flow
5. Both types of water right are present today in North America in statutory form. The
land-based right has become in many eastern North American jurisdictions a water-taking
permit. The use-based right has, in many western states and provinces, become an
appropriativeright or license.
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was altered. The structure of our work belies our attempt to understand
this conundrum.
In Part II we detail our scheme of "characteristics" of water rights,
criteria by which these rights can be measured and compared. We explain
what these characteristics are and how they can apply to various water
regimes. Before undertaking this study-we expected to find that, in spite of
the confusion created by the alternation of land-based and use-based
principles, the characteristics of typical interests in water would become
stronger over time.6 But water rights have not developed so smoothly.
Instead, our examinations showed times of retrogression as well as times
of progression in such key characteristics as exclusivity and transferability.
We decided-perhaps discovered would be a better word-that as the
foundations of the rights were alternating, the characteristics were
fluctuating.
In Part III we present our overview of the evolution of water law,
as outlined above, throughout Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and North
America.7 Coincidentally, the image that we feel best describes the way
water rights have developed is that of a typical river or stream. We see this
as being neither purposive or teleological, nor aimless, for any river clearly
has direction. Our evolutionary river ultimately winds its way toward a
large, complex pool of water uses and users and a system of water rights
that depends on a delicate balancing of land-based and use-based
principles. (See Part VI.)
Moreover, we will employ the language of surface currents and
undercurrents to emphasize what we see as the multi-layered structure of
water law development. The visible, surface currents are reflected in the
distinct, doctrinal changes that occur throughout water rights case law. As
we will see, over the course of British and North American water law some
doctrines recur and reassert themselves in response to deeper, more
permanent obstacles that present themselves occasionally and perhaps
unexpectedly from out of the river's bedrock. Technological developments
which occurred during the Industrial Revolution, for example, brought
about increased congestion of water users along English rivers and a return
to a kind of land-based principle of water law similar to that which had
governed water use in medieval England but which had become obsolete
by the beginning of the seventeenth century. And following a period of

6. See Anthony Scott, The Market for Characteristicsof Property Rights, in The Competitive
State (Albert Breton et al., eds., 1990) (showing that such steady development can be shown
to have happened with interests in land).
7. We have provided a diagram of this evolution at Appendix A. The pattern of
alternation between the two foundations of the water right is represented in Figure I by an
undulating curve. Our "estimate" of the proportion of total water rights which is use-based
is depicted below the curve, while the proportion which is land-based is depicted above it.
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rapid industrialization in the early nineteenth century, eastern United
States, cattle ranchers and gold miners across the western United States
instituted systems of appropriative water rights which resembled water law
regimes practiced during pre-Industrial Revolution England. From a
standpoint along the shores of the evolutionary river, these surface
recurrences may appear as broad, backward swirling motions.
We want to emphasize that any legal regime attached to a river is
infinitely more complex than the sum of private rights in water. A deep,
strong, and persistent undercurrent is manifested by the endurance of two
important legal principles-prescription and seniority. And a whole
network of contracts, indeed a market in water rights, overlays the private
rights system at any point, its importance determined primarily by the
economic laws of supply and demand. Carried along with the flow are
public rights, such as rights of navigation and fishing, and rights to the
foreshore, and the government's right of expropriation. All of these rights
together form the body of the "stream."
As ecological concerns grow, demand for such attributes as water
quality has turned public attention to pollution of "private" land or water,
subjecting its use to administrative and, in some instances, criminal
sanctions. Market forces, as well as public controls and rights, are aspects
of water regimes which control the flow of the evolutionary river. We shall
touch on them only briefly in our discussion, but have not indulged in
specifics.
Above we have described the tendency of one or the other (rather
than both) forms of law (property or tort) to be used to enforce water rights.
There was never, however, specialization of one type to the complete
exclusion of the other at any time. This was because of two concepts which
have endured throughout all phases: prescription and seniority. A
discussion of the two concepts forms the basis of Part IV. Prescription is the
result of the hardening of actual use into a right of use. This right becomes
a right of the land next to which the water use takes place. Prescriptive
water rights were recognized in all common law periods until abrogated by
statute. Seniority, which gives chronological priority to rights based on use,
was enforced by the remedy of damages for harm caused to a prior-user.
It was never completely eradicated even in periods of strict land-based
water law enforcement, although the group with access to the remedy was
smaller during these times.
Prescription and seniority had an influence on water law almost
regardless of the legal doctrine or set of principles being affirmed in the
cases at any given time. The continuing importance given to seniority of
use, and the accumulating domain of prescriptive titles had their effect
mostly on the quality of rights-holders' titles (the sum of their "characteristics"), which could be said to have increased over time.
It is true that critics, especially American critics, have decried the
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uncertainty that the latter-day common law doctrines of prescription and
seniority imposed on water users. We discount this literature. First, we note
that most of the legal authors seem to be carrying a brief for parties and
interests in the recurring American debates about state systems of water
law (common law vs. appropriative law). Second, we note the simplicity of
their position drawn from elementary economics: uncertainty discourages
new investment, and that is a bad thing. Our response is that the weight of
seniority and increasing domain of prescriptive rights made court rulings
on rights disputes predictable and certain. While water users under
nineteenth and twentieth century common law have never had a 'quality
of title' to equal that of freehold land users, their title has been found to be
surprisingly robust. Evidence for this is found in the periodic reforms of
water law in common law states and provinces. Whatever the main
purpose of these reforms, it hardly ever seems to be to improve the security
of title of the user.
Third, we believe that the criticisms ignore the general strengthening of the individual-ownership aspects in all branches of the English law
of real property. By the beginning of the nineteenth century common
ownership of land had been almost entirely replaced by freehold or
leasehold titles. Feudal dues and tenures had become unimportant. These
developments were conducive to accepting the idea of individual ownership of the use of other resources: watercourses, fisheries and game. In
water law, the twists and turns of the evolutionary "river" hardly weakened
the security of existing water users, who were also, after all, capitalist
holders of freehold or leasehold rights to adjoining sites on land. The
prevailing climate was that all such holding should be enforced by law.
The main body of literature on water rights does not acknowledge
that a seniority system of water rights was in place throughout English
history. This is because many writers assume that the single basis of
English common law on water throughout time has been an equal right of
all riparians to the "natural" flow of the water. Naturally, this theory of
equal, land-based, property rights has seemed to them incompatible with
any notion of seniority of rights among users. We submit, to the contrary,
that a system of priority or seniority of water rights must have been
recognized by law (either expressly or implicitly) throughout all the
periods which are under discussion here, even in periods in which the
equality of land-based water entitlements was being judicially emphasized." In the alternative individual-based periods, seniority was not only

8. Indeed, one of our chief motivating factors in writing this essay is to rectify the
misapprehension articulated, for example, in Arthur Maass & H.B. Zobel, Anglo-American
Water Law: Who Appropriated the Riparian Doctrine?, 10 Pub. Poly 109 (1960). In this
influential article the authors deny that there were periods when English water law was
based solely on seniority of use. They claim that there was and is no legal basis for any

Fall 19951

EVOLUTION OF WATER RIGHTS

recognized but reinforced by the law of nuisance and the concept of
damage. To make this point we shall examine the persistence of priority
and seniority within each land-based and use-based period outlined above.
In Part V we move further away from our river metaphor to look
at the dynamics of change in water law through the forces of supply and
demand. The suppliers of evolutionary change in water law are the courts
and the legislatures. They respond in varying degrees of participation to the
"derived demands" that is, to producer and business demand derived from,
say, increases or decreases in the availability of new technologies or from
new attributes of the river system.
Water draining a basin in a stream or lake can have many
'attributes.' These can provide opportunities for different "uses" or
"purposes." The extent to which any person actually takes advantage of
any opportunity is primarily an economic question. The attributes that are
the subject of this essay are usually referred to as the "levels" and "flows"
of a stream; they give rise to various possible uses, notably power
production and irrigation. There are other watercourse attributes and these
can provide opportunities for other specific uses, such as navigation, waste
removal, fishing, wildlife habitat and landscaping.
At the Conclusion of Part V we summarize some of the features of
each section along our evolutionary river and draw in an assessment of
changed characteristics from one section to the next. We then attempt to
explain the "why" of the evolutionary patterns and project our analysis into
the future. This projection is then laid out in more detail in Part VI.
PART II: CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AS
APPLIED TO WATER: A BASIS FOR COMPARISON BETWEEN
REGIMES
1. Introduction

In comparing the different systems of water allocation at different
times and places, it is useful to consider the property-like "characteristics"
of the water rights central to each system. We have listed the various
We now offer a
characteristics of "property" in the Introduction (Part I).

English water law regime other than riparianism, which has always been the common law
of water, and they make their point by pointing to prescription. Prescriptive rights require
"adverse use" to the landowner's use so, according to their logic, the landowner must have
had the water rights in the absence of adverse use.
9. See Alan Randall, Property Rights and Social Microeconomics, 15 Nat. Resources J. 729
(1975) (giving other treatments of the characteristics of property rights, or property systems).
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brief outline of each as it applies to water. For our purposes, the most
important characteristic and the one which most distinguishes water rights
from land rights is "exclusivity." Our analysis of the development of
modern water rights highlights the interplay between this characteristic
and all the others: duration, divisibility, flexibility, and quality of title. It is
important to note that "characteristics" are a quantitative, rather than a
qualitative concept: one speaks of "increased" characteristics rather than
"enhanced" or "strengthened" characteristics.
2. Explanationof the Characteristics
Exclusivity: Consider the two extremes of exclusivity in the rights of a water
user at a particular time and place. Water rights are absolute if no action by
others affects the owner's uses, plans, or profits. They are close to zero if
independent use is impossible without multilateral control, agreement or
combination, upstream and downstream. We may use these extreme
conditions as the basis of a measure: the exclusivity of a stream user's rights
at a time and place is expressed by the inverse of the number of other users
with whom agreement must be reached to attain an independent regime of
levels and flows. Of course, even complete exclusivity in the legal sense
does not guarantee certainty to a user because levels and flows are also
changed by seasonal and other natural changes in supply beyond the user's
control.
One should not expect any water rights system to give great
exclusivity to water users, for dependence on those upstream for flows and
those downstream for levels is unavoidable. The word "spillover" as a
popular synonym for "externality" catches one part, but only one part, of
each user's dependence on others. Neither the English riparian nor the
American appropriative systems of rights provide exclusivity to all holders
all the time. Each system provides some exclusivity in the way it adjusts to
changes in the natural flow (e.g., in periods of drought). The former assigns
to all users undefined and variable "reasonable" shares of the existing flow.
The latter assigns fixed amounts to some users and highly-variable shares
See also Eirik Furobotn &Svetozar Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights (1974). There
are several differences. Our lists differ as we classify the elements of property somewhat
differently. Second, their lists are of the ideal or necessary aspects of property as deduced
by thinking about the requisites of an efficient market system. Thus, "perfect exclusivity"
is required not only to avoid the interdependence of overlapping ownership but also to
avoid criticism of their listing that it is an all-or-nothing requirement. It provides no place
for amounts, numbers, ratios, etc. It does not help in comparing property rights under actual
alternative systems, since no actual system is ever ideal or complete; and it is uninformative
and a waste of time just to proclaim that a system is incomplete or attenuated. The theory
of the second best applies. Numbers are needed. Natura non facit saltum.
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to others.
Transferability: In the literature of water law transferability has two
meanings, and we must cope with this source of confusion. It can mean the
rights of the holder of an interest in water to grant away some or all
entitlements to use, divert, receive and sell water. This may be measured
by the potential number of parties eligible to acquire such a right. Or, the
same word can refer, more narrowly, to rights to physically transfer water
away from its natural course, perhaps into another basin. The riparian and
appropriative systems differ in both these senses, particularly in the second,
for some versions of riparian law have seemed to ban out-of-basin transfers
altogether. As a general rule, increased transferability of the water right
decreases the exclusivity of the right in the stream-wide group of users. It
does this by widening the user group and the extent of the various uses,
thereby relinquishing some of the checks and boundaries. However, it frees
up the value of the land by exposing it to the market forces of supply and
demand.
Flexibility: The flexibility of the individual right in a particular system of
water law refers to the extent to which the holder may change the mode or
purpose of water use without forfeiting the right. Can a landowner, having
water rights for domestic uses, begin to take water for intensive irrigation?
Can a mill pond be converted into an urban water source? The flexibility of
rights to permit these changes is often seen as an aspect of transferability:
an inflexible right cannot easily be granted to a new kind of user.
Divisibility:The divisibility of a water system's rights can be measured by
the individual's freedom to break an interest into several of its component
rights with respect to ownership, share of rent, or extent of using the
stream's various physical attributes. One of the problems of the riparian
system is its almost excessive divisibility: when riparian land is subdivided,
new water rights are automatically created. Appropriative and governmental systems differ in the extent to which amounts or uses can be split from
the parent entitlement. The amount of this characteristic available in a
system governs how automatically it adjusts to new economic and social
circumstances. The divisibility of a right can increase or reduce the
exclusivity of other users' rights because of its ability to change the
available flow through the numbers of users of the right.
Duration: In each system of water law, the expected duration of an
individual user's right is measurable in years or other temporal units. The
permanence or shortness of rights can influence their transferability and
value; sometimes the power to make a short water lease or loan is actually
more valued than the right to grant it permanently.
The duration of a riparian right is indefinite, although the ability
to use the right depends on how long and how frequently the natural flow
is available. Under the riparian system all of a river's users are affected
equally by freshets and droughts. Under the appropriative system the
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holders of "senior" rights have longer seasons of use than "junior" water
users. Under government license and permit systems, rights often have a
specified span and a detailed method of rationing flows in dry periods.
Quality of title: This characteristic measures the ease or difficulty of
establishing ownership for purposes of enforcing the other characteristics,
or rights to income. Quality of title to water is always somewhat unsatisfactory because the levels and flows must inevitably be shared, are naturally
variable and uncertain, are expensive or unfeasible to measure, and cannot
be satisfactorily defined by relying on a spatial or territorial matrix. The
common law riparian system attempts to solve this by linking the
unmeasured water right to the adjoining visible and measurable land area.
Only when coupled with the prescriptive process could this provide a type
of water title robustly enforceable against all the world. The appropriative
system's seniority concept ideally requires actual metering both of river
flows and of individual claims. When coupled with a well-recorded
registry, it too could provide a title good against the world.
Governmental systems of water rights can provide a quality of
title better than or similar to that of the appropriative system, particularly
when rights are regularly monitored by a dedicated bureau. On the other
hand, such systems provide instruments of unpredictable government
water-policy changes that can easily upset and erode the "quality" of
individual licenses and permits.
Concluding Remarks: The orthodox view of the history of property has
been that as a system of rights to any natural resource evolves, it tends
to provide the individual right holder with more of each of the six
characteristics. It is therefore generally assumed that this cumulative
process is at work in systems of water rights. If so, however, it is
painfully indirect and slow, and subject apparently to temporary reversal
or variation, as we shall see.
The development of any system of rights to water faces this
challenge: can the user be given a better quality (or more secure) title
which reflects the previous levels of exclusivity while maintaining levels
of the other four characteristics? On land, principles of territoriality and
possession allow the user secure ownership without sacrificing exclusivity
and the rest. But on water, security must be traded for other characteristics. For example, in any system of government water licensing, increasing individual ownership can mean reducing government protection of
independent water use. In a system of common law rights, strengthening
rights over the water flowing by a property has meant greater interdependence among riparians and thus less exclusivity. And, in a system of
appropriative rights, strengthening the rights of diverters in order of
seniority has meant reducing the exclusivity of the rights of junior
diverters. In brief, the amounts of the various characteristics in any
system have been negatively related. Increasing one of them has resulted
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in reducing another.
This negative correlation of effective characteristics seems to be
partly responsible for the undulating or cyclical development of systems
reported below. In England and North America, the changes in the
systems of water law have been the work of the courts and the legislatures. The courts, through their judgments about disputed rights to river
levels and flows, have gradually amended existing versions of the system
of water law. At the same time, governments (legislatures) through
statutes, orders and the creation of regulatory bureaus, have gradually
modified court-made property law, in some jurisdictions supplementing
it with government ownership and control. Within the group of "court"
providers of new characteristics of water rights, there has been a certain
amount of competition in supply. Similarly, within the group of
"legislative" and bureaucratic suppliers there has also been both
specialization and rivalry. When we look back at the systems they have
created, we see that none of them has succeeded in advancing any system
steadily on all fronts. Instead, as each has been tinkered with by the
courts and the legislators it has overtaken or been overtaken by other
systems. This has not resulted in one system eventually overpowering the
others: instead they seem to have alternated, in the manner of "twists and
turns" to be described in the next Part.
PART III: THE TWISTS AND TURNS OF WATER LAW
A. ROMAN LAW
1. Introduction
By "Roman law" we are not referring to the Roman military
occupation of Great Britain, which took place from 43-280 A.D. and in
fact left little permanent mark on its civilization and character."0 The
only traces of Roman law in English law which remain from the period
of the invasion are those which were expressed in the traditions of the
Church. The "Roman law" phase of water law refers, rather, to the
continental system of law and philosophy which was in place before
English feudalism. It saw brief expression in England in its early form
and continued its independent evolution. Its importance in our study lies

10. Great Britain was not even considered by the Romans as an integral part of the
Empire, but an "outpost." When, in the fourth century, the massive invasions of barbarians
which had first cut Britain off from the rest of the Empire forced the departure of the
Romans, Roman speech and customs vanished. See Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise
History of the Common Law 6 (5th ed. 1956). See also Frederic W. Maitland & Francis C.
Montague, Sketches of English Legal History 21 (1915).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

in the influence it had in shaping the common law.
2. Roman law Influence
Codifications of Roman law compiled after the period of British
occupation by Rome (but before the English feudal period), such as the Corpus
JurisCivilis, undoubtedly influenced the common law. Although they did
not form the basis for the English legal system as they did for continental
European systems, they gave it some structure. In all periods of English
and American history, common law jurists have turned to the Roman or
Civil law when they sought legal theory to fill a gap in their own legal
reasoning, because the Corpus Juris Civilis was coherent and logical.
The common law was inherently neither coherent nor logical and
was built on the concept of following legal precedents rather than legal
theory in arriving at a judgment. Because of the common law philosophy
that like cases had to be judged similarly, the system was very dependent
on procedures. These were devised to ensure fairness in the application of
precedent. They would specify which types of cases could be brought to
court and how they had to be argued or pleaded before precedent could
be applied. The common law was based on the precept that "the law had
always been thus"; Roman law helped answer the question, "Why?""
The twelfth and thirteenth centuries show a great deal of
influence. This was the period of two great English theorists, Glanvill and
Bracton, who compiled treatises on the common law incorporating the
customs of the country and the various legal procedures which were
practiced in the English courts. They looked to Roman law to bring order
to their works and to provide a unifying theory which was lacking or
insufficient in their system. Seventeenth century writers such as
Blackstone, seeking natural explanations for the law in its origins, looked
11. See Jackson's Machinery of Justice (J.R. Spencer ed., 8th ed. 1989) [hereinafter Jackson's
Machinery of Justice) (explaining that judges have not always slavishly followed precedent,
that initially there were no written records of cases and that later there was an unsophisticated, "bare bones" manner of reporting that often yielded conflicting versions of the same
case by different reporters and that usually lacked any clear explanation of the legal
reasoning).) See also Carleton K. Allen, Case Law: An UnwarrantableIntervention, 51 Law Q.
Rev. 333,333-34 (1935) (stating that the early view was "that precedent is evidence, the best
possible evidence, of rules of law but not more than that; and that if the law which precedent
purports to embody is erroneous, unreasonable or even intolerably inconvenient, the
precedent may be disregarded.") See also Jacksons Machinery of Justice, supra, (saying that
this attitude lasted until about the middle of the 19th century, when a further hardening
took place and our courts adopted a theory of "absolutely binding precedent.") See also
Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution 132-64 (1983) (describing classical influences on legal
reasoning). See also J.C. Smith, Law, Language, and Philosophy 217-18 (1968) (noting that
"throughout the entire history of the development of the English legal system there was a
continual borrowing from Roman Law, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly.")
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to Roman law along the way. The Americans also turned to Roman law
after the Declaration of Independence in 1776, seeking to give coherence
to the mass of scattered judicial opinions which constituted their early
law. Canadian judges have also cited the civil or Roman law on several
occasions.
Yet, as Lord Denman said in the famous English water law case
of Mason v. Hill: "... . Roman Law... however, is no authority in ours.
"" Roman law was not considered legal precedent; it merely filled in
.'.
the spaces between precedent. But it is important to recognize that a
philosophy or rationale can change the way a judge interprets a precedent-setting case, as can the economic, social or political conditions of
the time. These interpretations then become precedent. Thus Roman law,
with its early origins, can be seen as a part of the common law, having
influenced thinking at various later stages.
Roman law has had some direct influence in North American
water law, independent of its transmission through the common law.
While this influence was strongest in mainland European countries, in
North America it spread to Mexico with the Spanish discoverers in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It later found its way directly into
the southern or southwestern United States, finally achieving expression
in the "prior appropriation" doctrine. 3
3. Roman Water Law
Because the Roman law was created at the time when the Roman
Empire was rapidly expanding (although its compilation under Justinian
was in the period of decline), it was initially directed towards newly
conquered territories. For this reason, there is a noticeable focus on
personal property, possessions and agreements, and much less of a focus
on privately-owned real property (land). 4 It is not surprising to see that
in Roman law, all "perennial" rivers were considered res publici ("things"
owned by the public) but subject to the authority of a centralized
administration."5 The "universitatis", or state, owned the bed of the river
12. Mason v. Hill, 110 Eng. Rep. 692, 701 (K.B. 1833).
13. See Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars; A Survey of the Evolution of Western
Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 Nat. Resources
J. 347-49 (1989); Wells A. Hutchins, The Community Acequia: Its Origins and Development, 31
Sw. Hist. Q. 261, 261 (1928).
14. Later refinements did adjust the focus, but never entirely changed it.
15. Roman Law distinguished between rivers which flowed perennially and "torrential"
streams; i.e. freshets which flowed only in periods of high rainfall or thaw. The latter were
considered privately owned by the persons whose land they crossed. If a freshet formed the
boundary between two pieces of property, the owners of the land "owned" it to its midway
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as well as its banks, and public rights of navigation, fishing and access
were emphasized. The right to divert water was also available to the
public, subject to state regulations. Nevertheless, a private right could be
acquired from the public domain, which resembled somewhat the later
English "prescriptive" right (a "squatter-like" property right acquired after
prolonged, unchallenged use). Individuals diverting water with this right
of "usucapio"could not be prevented by the state, after a certain period of
time, from continuing to do so as long as they did not change the flow
of the river from that of "the previous summer."
An "Interdict" or prohibition from the "Praetor" or governor laid
down the rules regarding water diversion, with the penalty of "restitution" for disobeying them. 6 Because the diversion of water in perennially flowing streams was open to the public, and because the banks of
these streams were publicly owned but the land behind them was not,
"praedial servitudes" were also recognized. These were private rights,
comparable to "easements" in land, by which a person had a "way"
through the land of another. The servitude of "aquaductus" was, as its
name suggests, a right to lay a conduit over the land of another to bring
water from the river to one's own land.
In the overall classification of "Things," flowing water itself was
viewed differently from publicly-owned or privately-owned streams. It
was said to be res communes, a thing which, by its very nature, could not
be the subject of ownership. As Glenn MacGrady has explained, all
flowing water, whether in private or public rivers, is by its physical
nature res communes, because it is incapable of ownership. As soon as one
user finishes his use, the water is released back into what is called the
"negative community," to be used by someone else. 7 For the short
period of its use, then, flowing water belonged to the person who was
using it, then it returned to a kind of "communal pool." In things
classified as res communes, therefore, there could only be usufructuary
rights.
All users of water were required to respect a "good neighbor"
principle of land use. They could not use it in such a way as to inflict
damage on someone else's use or on someone else's property. A general
damage law, the Lex Aquilian, and its equivalent in the later Institutes of
Justinian, provided for compensation to those who had suffered damage

mark. The state or public had no claim to "the banks" of these private rivers, which were
probably not well defined in any event.
16. Presumably this meant that the right was forfeited and the diversion had to stop.
17. Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in Civil and Common Law: Historical
Development, Current Importance,and Some Doctrinesthat Don't Hold Water, 3 Fla. St. U.L. Rev.
511, 517-34 (1975), citing R. Photier, Trait6 du Droit de Proprikt6 (circa 1762), translatedin
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1895).
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at the hands of others.'"
4. Recap of Roman Water Law
The important features of Roman water law for the purposes of our
analysis are the following:
a)
b)
c)

d)
e)

f)

g)

All "perennial" rivers (other than freshets) were publicly
owned and administered by the state;
The banks of such perennial rivers were publicly owned,
as was the riverbed;
Running water itself belonged to no-one and to everyone, and the only interest a person could acquire in it
was a temporary usufructuary right which lasted only as
long as the specific use continued. The right was irrespective of an individual's ownership of land. To experience it, however, he would have to have, or acquire,
legal access to the banks;
Damage law stated that one must not impede another's
use of the water, nor harm his property. Existing uses,
therefore, took precedence over later uses;
A "prescriptive' right to divert a certain quantity of
water from one year to the next could be acquired by
prolonged and unchallenged action over a period of
years. After this time, the state could no longer challenge
the right as long as it remained the same;
It was permissible to transport water out of the stream
inland. The law recognized "easements" ("servitudes")
whereby a person granted another the right to lay pipes
across his land to access the river and draw out water;
Rights to divert in a temporary or "torrential" river were
private, belonging to those who owned the land on either
side. The owners were considered to own the streambed
to its midway mark. They also owned the river banks.

B. THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD OF WATER LAW: 1066-1600
1. Introduction
In our study Roman law is a phase of influence rather than
practice. The first of our water law regimes to actually take place in
England is the Medieval regime. We date it from the Norman Conquest
of 1066 up to the eclipse of the feudal system at the end of the sixteenth
18. De Legge Aquilia, in The Institutes of Justinian 492 (Thomas C. Sanders ed., 5th ed.
1876).
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century. This is a very long period in which many changes took place,
both in the law courts, and in society."
2. Context for the Medieval Law of Water: The Feudal System and the
Importance of Land
The years following the Conquest in Norman England were
characterized by a pervading sense of the threat of overthrow by
invaders. Loyalty of the subjects to William Iwas crucial for the defense
of the realm but was far from guaranteed, for there existed amolig the
conquered Anglo-Saxons strong animosity towards the Normans and
resentment of the new language and customs imposed upon them lby the
conquerors.
The King found a way to resolve this problem in the system of
land tenure. He seized nearly all the land previously owned by the
Anglo-Saxons for himself, and then proceeded to divide it among his
lords and barons in exchange for their loyalty and for military service
when required. The lords and barons in turn divided their land among
vassals and others lower in the social hierarchy, who may have done
likewise. All land-owners owed duties, not only to their immediate lords
and their overlords but also to the King.'
The resulting hierarchy of land tenures was characterized, then,
by obligations for taxes, and by military and social duties locked to rights
in land. In spite of the strong emphasis on military strength, society was
largely agrarian, with most farming being on the "common" fields and
pastures of manors. Incidental to agriculture were limited manorial rights
to use the rivers' attributes for ferries, navigation, fishing and water
power. The few water mills there were operated mainly to saw wood, to
grind corn, to full yarn, or to pound ore and metal.

19. The knowledge we have of the water right, particularly in the earlier part of the
period, is imperfect, and has been patched together from an appreciation of the system of
land ownership or "tenure" as well as a study of the various competing courts and the
remedies they offered. We have also mentioned that during the period Glanville and
Bracton wrote on the common law, and that they incorporated some of the elements of
Roman Law into a reporting of somewhat scattered precedents from all levels of courts.
They created a "doctrine" of the common law, complete with flaws that later centuries
would have to address and resolve. See Ranulf de Glanville, The Treatise on the Laws and
Customs of the Realm of England Commonly Called Glanville (G.D.G. Hall ed. & trans.,
1993); Henry de Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England (Samuel E. Thorne trans.,

1968).
20. This process of progressive division and conditional granting of land is now called
"subinfeudation." It continued until the King's statute Quia Emptores of 1290 authorized the
free alienation of land.
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3. Early Water Law: the Focus on Suitable Sites
There are not many medieval records of disputes between stream
users. Presumably, competing uses were few, the demand for water being
easily satisfied by the abundant flows. It was users' claims of navigation
and fishing that gave rise to the earliest known disputes. Nevertheless,
it is entirely possible that competing power cases also arose during this
time, even without the large scale diversions and impoundments that
characterized the later industrial period. The number of mills on a stream
was not high, but there must have been rivalry or conflict over sites that
would place as few demands as possible on the early technology and
limited transportation system. Prime locations would have been near or
in boroughs, or by falls. New mills may easily have crowded existing
ones and reduced their power.2 The documentary evidence of legal
redress is sparse. Within the manor the court over which the lord
presided did rough justice, with no written record made or surviving. As
between neighboring localities, in the larger feudal or King's courts, the
early reporting of cases was also very informal, often done by students
rather than professionals, and yielding scant and often conflicting
accounts of the legal reasoning and results. A report from the Year Books
gives an example:
"The assize comes to recognize if Nicholas Sonka has unjustly
and without judgment diverted a certain watercourse in
Crowlas... to the damage of the free tenement of Gervase
Blohicu in the same town within the assize. The jurors say that
[Nicholas] has diverted it. Judgment: Let Gervase have seisin,
and Nicholas is in mercy. Damages, two shillings."2
The "assize" or traveling court came to town to hear the plaintiff,
Gervase Blohicu's case. The case is that the defendant, Nicholas Sonka
has diverted a watercourse in Crowlas and deprived the plaintiff of
water. The plaintiff is a freeholder or landowner. The defendant
presumably is not, for he has no justification for the diversion. The
twelve "jurors", after examining the situation, swear that the diversion has
taken place, that the plaintiff has been "disseised" or dispossessed of the
right to the watercourse, and that it is he who has the better right;
therefore his possession or "seisin" is to be restored. The defendant must
cease his diversion activity and pay damages to the plaintiff.'

21. 1 Selden Society, Select Civil Pleas,A.D. 1200-1203, at 82 (William P. Baildon ed., 1890).
22. Id.
23. Gervase Blohicu's case is especially relevant to our analysis to the extent that it
illustrates the general importance of the possessory right of seisin throughout the evolution
of water rights. Paraphrasing Maitland, Berman, supra, note 12, at 313, states, "seisin was,
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4. The Concepts behind Water Rights
As can be seen in the case above, the medieval common law conceptualized a stream as it would land--as static. Rights were not attached to a thing
flowing by land, but were a feature of land. In relation to the owner's vertical
cylinder of land, stretchingfrom the center of the earth to the heavens," water
was like a pond "situate" on the surface like a wood or field. The landowner
"owned" the watercourse,or his portion of it, and technically had full rights to
do with the water what he wished. If the riverformed a boundary of his land, he
owned one-half of the bed (to the mid-way mark of the stream), the owner of land
on the opposite banks owning the other half. Thus the miller who constructed an
upstream diversion and deprived a downstream mill of its water or power, took
away the downstream landowner'sproperty, or, in feudal terms, "disseised" him
of his property. The land-based water right, then, was initially based upon
ownership of the bed of the river. It was not defined in terms of flow, so it did
not have relevance to the banks of the stream except that in private rivers, the
owner of the bed was, naturally,also the owner of the banks.
As early as 1215 with the Magna Carta, a distinction was made
between private and public rivers, based on the presence of tidal
influence. King John dedicated to the public all rights of fishing in public
rivers as in the seas and estuaries. Even though the banks of these public
rivers may have been privately owned, the Crown owned and never
granted their bed, and riparians had no rights over the public rights to
the river or the river water.
Moreover, the concept of personal damage overlapped with "land
ownership" at these times. We have seen that as early as 1200, courts
were awarding indemnification to injured, successful plaintiffs for
unjustly caused harm, as well as restoration of the right of which the
plaintiff had been deprived. As the medieval phase progressed, the old
feudal land rights faded, but the duty not to cause "damages" to land
took on greater significance in the courts and achieved increased

in effect, a legal right to continue in a factual situation, which right was derived from
previously having been in that factual situation." See also Frederic W. Maitland, The Mystery
of Seisin, 2 Law Q. Rev. 181 (1886). It was a right of possession independent both of
ownership and contract-a concept unknown either to Germanic law or to the older Roman
law. This idea of "possessory right"-not possession but right of possession-has persisted

in all Western legal systems to this day. It is particularly strong in English and American
law. Berman, supranote 12 at 313, explains that "[the] concept of seisin was a product partly
of the feudal concept of divided ownership and partly of the canonist concept of due
process of law, with its antipathy to force and self-help. A person seised of land, goods, or

rights could not be ousted by force even by the true owners."
24. The commonly used phrase to describe this was the Latin maxim: cujus est solum ejus

est usque ad coelum etad infernum.
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articulation in English theory books.'
The right corresponding to this duty-that is, the right to the
integrity of one's land-was a "natural" right which accompanied land
ownership. The "assize" or traveling court enforced it. If one was not
already a freeholder one could not bring action for harm caused to one's
land or water use, and one had no means of enforcing an individual
usufructuary right except by a claim of prescription.
5. Prescriptionand the PrescriptiveEasement to Use the Water
a) Prescription
Prescription is an ancient doctrine which creates a property right
from long-term unchallenged use. The doctrine has undergone refinement
since its early beginnings but it has retained to this day its central theme
of "adverse possession clothing fact with right" except where abolished
by statute.
To the outside observer, prescription is a form of "squatting,"
where persons maintain possession of property not originally theirs for
long enough that they are acknowledged as legally owning it. Their
ownership is in spite of the fact that the original owner has not granted
the property to them and although they were originally intruders.
In technical terms, the basis of the modern prescriptive title is the
presumed acquiescence of the owner of property to a newcomer's
occupation or use of it. The owner's acquiescence is presumed from the
time that he knew (or could be expected to have known) of the other's
adverse use (against his interests), and could have stopped it, yet did not
do so. It is important to make the distinction between presumed
acquiescence and consent. If the owner consents to the occupation, his
consent reinforces his own ownership under the law. But if he merely
fails to object, the law is able to infer that he may have granted away his
rights long ago. Later, if a dispute about ownership between the
"squatter" and the original owner comes before the court, evidence to
show unchallenged use for the period of time required under the
common law or under statute will lead the court to confer upon a
newcomer a legal right to continue his occupation. It is then the original
owner who is ousted.
The prescriptive right may be challenged or "traversed" by
25. Bracton, in his major work Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae of 1230, was one of
the first to explain the concept of damages as being a "servitude" or obligation of each
freeholder not to harm another's land or impede his use of land. This philosophy was a
carry-over from Roman law: sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas was the phrase used most
often to describe the right and obligation regarding harm.
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proving that it was not acquired in the lawful way-that is, one of the
necessary conditions was not fulfilled or the conditions were such that a
grant could not possibly have been made, as, for example, in the case
where someone else possessed and exercised the right. The main
conditions in England were that the use be uninterrupted and unchallenged for the required number of years and that it be "nec vi nec clam,
nec precario" (from Roman law: not by force, secrecy or permission but
as of right). A British statute of 1832 formalized the law of prescriptive
rights and set the period of continuous use necessary for their establishment at twenty years.2 ' Between twenty and forty years of use could be
challenged in court, but once the user had forty years of unchallenged
use, his right became absolute unless someone could give written proof
of past consent.27
Indeed, the user's claim to a prescriptive title became increasingly
difficult to challenge the longer the use continued uninterrupted, because
with the passage of time, evidence of original ownership or occupation
became more elusive. Once established, the title gave the holder virtual
freedom from legal action by others and also allowed him to sue any
other parties who interfered with it successfully. It is not surprising that
Judge Tindal said in 1840: "Immemorial enjoyment is the most solid of all
titles."
As we shall see, since the early nineteenth century, prescriptive
rights have been cut back considerably by statute law on the one hand
and by private systems of water allocation on the other. While in some
jurisdictions they have been abolished altogether, in many they still
survive and have even been facilitated by the shortening of the required
period.
b) Prescriptive Easement to Use Water
The right to use water, established by prescription, has been
called the "prescriptive easement." The term is misleading, because this
type of easement is much more comprehensive than a land easement and
in fact gives the holder a higher quality of title (or greater security) than
any other formal interest he might hope to achieve by grant, contract or
license. This is because it may be asserted against "the whole world"-not

26. Prescription Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, Ch. 71 (Eng.).
27. Some writers claim that the drafting of the English Prescription Act, supra note 27,
which had been intended to clarify and codify the common law, created new confusion. See

Sir William S. Holdworth, A History of English Law 338, 343-49, 352 (photo. reprint 1966)
(1956); Theodore E. Lauer, The Riparian Law as Property, in Water Resources and the Law 131

(1958); Robert Megarry &Henry W.R. Wade, The Law of Real Property (5th ed. 1984).
28. In re. Serjeants at Law, 133 Eng. Rep. 93, 94 (C.P. 1840).
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just between the grantor and grantee. The scope of the right extends not
only to the acquiescing owner (equivalent to granter) and his successors
in title but to all other users of the streamflow, upstream or downstream,
past, present, or future. It applies to a certain quantity of water, although
the exact location of the diversion on the property and the specific
installation and mode of use have been held to be somewhat flexible.2
The prescriptive easement has certain things in common with a
land easement: the right goes with the land from which it is exercised,
not with the particular user. It is transferable with that piece of land.
Unlike a land easement it is not taken away from another property. It is
capable of becoming extinguished by deemed intentional non-use over a
period of time (usually the same period is needed as to acquire it).
Although there is no grant to evidence the right, the law presumes a
grant, presumes it has merely been lost, and acts accordingly.
The early prescriptive easements to use the water were of a
different nature than their later counterparts. They were purely usufructuary rights, granted by a lord to his tenant (e.g. to use the stream to turn
a mill). After a certain number of years of granting the rights, the lord
was no longer entitled to withdraw them. From a relationship between
two parties the prescriptive easement expanded to be effective against the
other stream users. An explanation for this evolution may be found in the
court procedures of the times. In the seventeenth century, landowners
who had established a prescriptive use of streamwater would enforce
their water rights on the basis of prescriptive use in the King's courts
rather than on the basis of disseisin of property before the Assize. The
action was cheaper and easier to plead, because it threw the burden of
proof on the challenging party. As a result of the increasing dependence
on prescriptive entitlement to enforce water use rights, the usufructuary
right (established by long unchallenged action) often superimposed itself
upon the right of ownership of the stream (by virtue of, at that time,
ownership of the bed). This caused some confusion in the reasoning of
the courts. Further confusion was to follow with the increasing popularity
of personal legal actions for damage to riverside land, and, by extension,
to water use. To have standing in such an action, the plaintiff did not
have to be a landowner. It was enough if he could assert a prior-use to
the defendant's use, and this was often in the form of a prescriptive
easement. The old prescription as between lord and tenant was scarcely
heard of after 1650, this relationship becoming increasingly covered by
29. Hale v. Oldroyd, 153 Eng. Rep. 694 (Ex. 1845).
30. In the doctrine's early days, before the law regarding easements was refined, it would
seem that individual users who did not own land (for example, lessees) could also acquire
prescriptive rights. Lessees or tenants for life could not "grant" them, however-the original
right had to have come from a landowner.
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the expanding law of contract, as the feudal system faded into obscurity.
6. Growth of the "Action on the Case"
In the middle of the thirteenth century a crucial development in
the law took place with the introduction in the King's Court of the
personal action in "trespass."3' Although the subject of some trespass
cases may have concerned damage to property, their early focus was the
actions and interactions of individuals which caused public disturbances.
The remedy was compensation to the victim for the wrong, and possibly
a punishment of fine and/or imprisonment as well for the disturbance.
To institute legal action, a person whose land had been damaged
by the entry upon it of strangers, had the sheriff issue a "writ" requiring
the defendant to explain in court "whereby he had used force" (against
the "King's peace") in encroaching on the plaintiff's land. When the
alleged trespass was connected to a dispute about land ownership, the
subsequent inquiry into the trespass would also reveal who had a better
claim to the land. This latter inquiry had been the function of the feudal
Assize.
Actions of trespass became common in the early fifteenth century
because they were cheap and quick. Some of the writs became standardized but others needed to be drafted specifically to accord with particular
circumstances. These detailed writs were described as being "on the case,"
and included circumstances outside the typical trespass action, such as
situations where the damage had originated on property other than that
of the victim, without any direct encroachment onto the victim's property
and without any disruption or violence. Actions "on the case" were well
suited to cases in which the plaintiff's water use had been interfered with
by an upstream neighbor, or in which his land had been flooded by a
downstream neighbor. In such cases, a successful action would lead to an
award of damages for lost income or repair, rather than to arrest or
outlawdom, as in earlier trespass actions. It would not give the award of
restoration of property or abatement of the nuisance-causing action as
would the successful Assize action. Actions on the case were grounded
on the precept: "thou shalt compensate thy neighbor for damage thou
hast caused him." Any relationship to "land" was secondary.32 The action
on the case as it applied to water law was, then, a type of hybrid action
combining elements of property law and personal law. As such, it was
used with increasing frequency over the old feudal Assize for disseisin
and for "trying title." We shall go into possible reasons for this increasing
31. The Writ of Trespass was first seen around 1253. Cecil H.S. Fifoot, History and
Sources of the Common Law: Tort and Contract 54 (1949).
32. Actions on the case were the forerunners of the modem tort actions in nuisance.
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popularity in the next section.'
The next two hundred years saw a gradual increase of use of the
"action on the case" for unwarranted water diversion. By the beginning
of the seventeenth century, any user of the water could bring legal action
this way if he had legal entitlement to occupy land or use water. Rights
were enforced as between persons, and were translated into rights of
non-interference with use. The concept of the flow of the river, coming
from another property, and able to be impeded from another property,
became the backdrop for the rights. This was a shift from the seisin
concept of the presence of the water on land owned. It set the stage for a
shift away from the land-based water right into an entirely use-based,
individual water right.
7. Actions on the Case Supersede Real (Feudal)Actions
It is easy to see why the action on the case as a mechanism of
enforcing land and water rights grew in popularity towards the end of
the medieval phase to the point where it had virtually replaced the feudal
"real" actions. Not only was it simpler for the courts to dispense, it was
cheaper and quicker for the litigants and brought in a wider variety of
litigants (leaseholders as well as freeholders). Sheer numbers of cases
made for further efficiencies in operation, decreasing the courts' costs
further, and increasing the courts' profits. Everyone benefited.
Plaintiffs found the new action a cheaper means of enforcing their
rights than the old Assize. There are several reasons for this. First,
transaction costs of bringing legal action were lower. Plaintiffs needed
only to have a "writ" filed in order to initiate action. There was no need,
as with the Assize, to locate and assemble a twelve man "jury" to do fact
finding and to establish who had the better right to possession and
non-interference. Now the onus was on the defendant to justify his
disruptive actions. The cost implications of this factor alone could have
easily explained the new popularity of such actions.
Other transaction costs of rights enforcement were lower with
actions on the case. These were indirect, having to do with speed of the
action, and the efficiency of providing remedies. The Assize was slow.
Formality required that the "jury" determine the questions of entitlement,
factual allegations, and assessment of damages before any judgment
would be given. Litigants wishing a quick determination of their title to
33. The "real" or land-based assize for seisin of a stream continued to be also available
to freeholders until 1833, when Parliament abolished it in the Real Property Limitation Act,
3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 27 (1833) (Eng.). See Frederic W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at
Common Law, A Course of Lectures (1909). But it was very rarely used. We have found no
evidence of its use after 1600.
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the water would often waive damages just to speed up the process of
gaining possession or a declaration from the court. The action on the case
did not involve a jury but usually a lone judge or sometimes a panel of
judges. It looked into the question of damages first, the right to possession being inferred from the resolution of this question. Because
judgment and damages were awarded together in the King's court,
plaintiffs were more likely to receive their compensation quickly. This
appears to have been an incentive to this form of action.
The apparent disadvantage of the action on the case, that is, of
not awarding a remedy of "rights restoration" (e.g. an order for the
defendant to cease his activity), was clearly not a deterrent to litigants.
But why wasn't this limitation the subject of complaints from established
millowners? It would seem to have allowed a new mill to capture water
from an old mill merely at the cost of paying "actual damages." The
answer must lie in the amount of the expected damage award. If we
imagine a newcomer comparing this expected penalty with the cost of
developing an equivalent site elsewhere, the former must have been so
much higher than the latter as to prevent his interfering with the
established mill. One can guess at the reasons for this. First, the cost of
new sites may have been relatively low. We have no evidence about this,
nor about the extent of the technical changes that were apparently
making it possible to enlarge mills on old sites rather than increase the
number of developed sites. Second, "damages" may have implied
repeated suits by the plaintiff, and multiple damages. This suggestion
would be more credible to the extent that the transactions (litigation)
costs for repeated or follow-up suits were low; certainly proving the case
would be easier (and cheaper) each time.
The action on the case was available to enforce various forms of
land use and enjoyment, not only land ownership. Its ability to "try title"
indirectly was functionally less important than its ability to award
compensation for damage suffered., This meant that leaseholders, an
increasing group of water users, could now directly enforce their rights
against the perpetrators of the harm, instead of being able to enforce
them only against their lessors. Clearly this was an advantage that would
attract litigants to the action on the case. Increasingly, millers had become
tenants on lease.M
History books are replete with anecdotes about competition
between the various courts in England. We know that the more "business" a court had, the more power it had, and the more money poured
into the coffers of its establishing authority. We have seen that through
34. We do not know how leasing of water rights had increased relative to other rights,
but there was an absolute increase. See John Langdon, Watermills and Windmills in the West
Midlands, 1086-1500, 44 Econ. Hist. Rev. 424, 438 (1991) (providing trends).

Fall 19951

EVOLUTION OF WATER RIGHTS

the process of subinfeudation, barons and overlords came to be very
powerful and to distance the King from his people to a degree, both in
finances and in general allegiance. The King was struggling through this
period to keep his finances afloat. Feudal courts had meant that it was
the lords (not the King) who were dispensing justice and making
determinations on land ownership. In addition, the King had obtained
financial results of this justice only in the indirect and lesser form of taxes
from the lords.' He therefore had incentive, especially where land use
enforcement was concerned, to use the court system in his rivalry with
the barons for jurisdiction, power and money.' Here, his subjects were
offered cheaper forms of action and superior remedies, and the privileges
of "royal justice" were extended to as many as possible. The "action on
the case" was a powerful tool for the King, which brought handsome
results. It was encouraged: its use was facilitated and expanded.
In addition to offering quicker judgments on actions on the case
the King began to offer litigants an alternative quite outside the common
law. He began systematically to accept petitions for his personal
intervention, especially from poor peasants. The Chancellor, a high cleric
at court, was authorized to hear these petitions and to make binding
decisions in the King's name.37
8. The Impact of the IncreasingDemand for Water
As long as the court system required ownership of land in order
for a plaintiff to have standing in court (as was the case under the.

35. The Magna Carta of 1215 was an example of the tension between the lords and the
King from the increasing power of the barons.
36. Although the "real actions", including the assize, were offered by the King, they were
administered on a local level in the context of the feudal system which was strongly
controlled by the lords or barons. Trespass and actions on the case were directly controlled
by the King.
37. The Chancellor dealt with petitions on an ad hoc, personal basis-as questions of
conscience. His only remedies were personal: for example, he could not restore land, but
could punish a party severely for not restoring it himself. Because the Chancellor was an
ecclesiastic, he had a broad knowledge of Canon or Church law, which he frequently
applied in reaching decisions. And as we have said previously in our discussion of Roman
law, Canon law contained some of the Roman ideas of personal obligations. Through the
Chancellor, the morality of using one's property in such a way so as not to damage one's
neighbour's property crept back into the English law of property and tort. The Chancery
became the later Court of Equity, one of the most powerful and popular courts in the
country. Equitable principles evolved with the advent of reporting in the late fifteenth and
early sixteenth centuries. In 1873 Equity was merged with the Common Law under the
Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873,36 & 37 Vict. ch. 66 (Eng.). In 1875 a companion act,
also called "The Supreme Court of Judicature Act," provided that where the rules of Equity
were inconsistent with those of Common Law, Equity would prevail.
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Assize), enforcement of water use rights was limited to the few landowners along the banks of the private (non-tidal) rivers. The recognition of
prescriptive rights (though attached to land) broadened the scope of those
with enforceable rights to include very long-term users. The personal
actions broadened it even more, to include leaseholders or contractees.
The widening scope of persons with enforceable water rights was,
without a doubt, a reflection of the quickly growing demand for water
in this early Industrial Revolution period and of the very limited water
supply. Landowners constituted a small minority of the water-using
community. The lords of the large estates rarely broke their land up by
selling portions off to wealthy industrialists but rather leased or made
other, often lucrative, arrangements regarding the water. The law adapted
to protect the growing body of those in mere occupation of land (or with
mere water rights, e.g. prescriptive), sheltering their industrial investments. The developmental pressure meant that enforceable water rights
could no longer be restricted to the few who owned land, as had been the
case in the days of the Assize.
Moreover, we have seen that medieval property law, with its
emphasis on seisin and land, did not encompass the idea of running
water. As long as the focus was on available sites for mills, the feudal
law could handle disputes which arose between landowners. But when
the lease became more prevalent, as rivers became more intensely used
for growing industry, the focus of water rights shifted to use rights.'
Static land law, or land law devoted to sites and areas, was incompatible
with the new notions of flow. The remedy of restoration of property,
provided by the Assize, was too inflexible to accommodate the great
variety of uses of the water held by prescriptive title and the notion of
competition between uses. This problem became more acute as competition intensified in early Industrial Revolution years and the feudal laws
began to disappear from lack of use.
9. Recap of Medieval Water Law
In the preceding pages, we have been discussing the gradual
transition from a purely land-based phase of water rights to a purely
use-based phase, and have been giving some plausible explanations for
the shift. Before proceeding to the next phase, it is important to recap the
salient features of the medieval phase, so that we can better compare it
to subsequent phases.
The medieval phase of water law, then, was characterized by the
38. See Richard Holt, The Mills of Medieval England (1988) (estimating that there had
been about 12,000 mills in England around 1300, most of them corn and fulling mills on or
near manors). See also Langdon, supra note 35.
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following features:
a)
b)

c)
d)
e)

f)

g)

h)

Non-tidal rivers were "private" rivers, capable of "ownership" by lords, or by others to whom the lords "granted"
land;
Persons who owned land by a river "owned the watercourse" to its midway mark. If the river crossed their
land, they owned all that portion of the watercourse on
their land;
"Owning the watercourse" meant they could use it as
they pleased and had the right to have it continue to
flow through their property as before;
In spite of his "ownership of the watercourse," a freeholder was vulnerable to legal action if he caused
damage to another freeholder's water use;
Freeholders (landowners) had the right to sue a person
who had "disseised" them (i.e. impeded their use of
property, for example, by interrupting or diverting the
flow). They sued them at the Assize;
Leaseholders and others with contractual rights to the
water, did not have enforceable rights to their continued
use of the water as against freeholders who were impeding it, because they were not entitled to bring action at
the Assize. They could take action only against their
lessors or other contracting parties under the lease or
contract;
Freeholders who were successful at the Assize received
restoration of their right of full use of the water (an
order issuing for the defendant to stop his harmful
activity) and damages for harm caused;.
Freeholders and leaseholders could obtain "prescriptive
easements" to continue using a certain quantity of flow
after unchallenged use "since time immemorial." The
easement was a part of the rights of the piece of land.

10. Changes in the Law
At this stage in the evolution of water law, we can pause and
look at the medieval "phase" as it passed into a new regime, and compare
the old law with what was emerging. There were two major differences.
The first was that under the new regime water users would not be able
to avail themselves of the action on the case to enforce a water right
which was not being exploited. The fact of riparian ownership, or
"ownership of the watercourse" alone, would not enable them to enforce
their future right to the use of the flow or their right to the mere
continuance of it. They would have to have suffered damage to an
existing use of the water in order to bring action unless they wished to
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go back centuries to the long and cumbersome route of the Assize. Their
predecessors, of course, had had the absolute advantage of "ownership"
of the water rights forever. Moreover, where "damage" had constituted
a part of the remedy during the medieval phase, we shall see that it was
to become the precondition for enforcing water rights. Previousentitlement
to the flow by virtue of ownership of riparian land or prescription would
no longer be required in order to bring suit.
The second difference, which was to flow from the first, was that
under the new regime all rightful users could be awarded compensation
for damage by suing the perpetrator directly. The remedy would give a
new right to non-riparians: the enforceable usufructuary right to the
water's flow. Leaseholders and other outsiders obtained a defendable
"title" to the use of the water, and the opportunity to challenge riparian
owners or other users interfering with that title, put them as it were, on
equal ground.
C. THE PRIOR-USE PERIOD OF WATER RIGHTS: 1600 to 1850
1. Introduction
To mark the beginning of this new phase, we have drawn an
indefinite line at the year 1600. That is when the "action on the case" had
been clearly established as the manner of enforcing water rights in court,
replacing the old feudal forms of property actions. The new phase was
characterized by an almost exclusive reliance on the law of torts, and in
particular, in cases about water, on the law of nuisance." The remedy
the courts offered was compensation for being hindered in one's use of
water rather than confirmation of one's title to water or land. With this,
seniority became all-important, because the plaintiff had to have been
using the water before the defendant in order to bring a legal suit.'
During the tort law phase, which we shall call the prior-use
period, the court forms of action procedures which directly enforced
property rights in the land were technically still available. However,

39. See Plucknett, supra note 11. In the general history of the common law the emergence
of actions on the case has been generally linked to damage resulting from a defendant's
omissions or neglect, including neglect of a duty to do something. The history of water law,
however, is less bound up with "negligence" in these senses than with "nuisance," such as
doing something which causes harm elsewhere.
40. To begin any action on the case, the plaintiff first had to show that he had sustained
damage to property or to use of property. One's use of the water cannot be hurt unless it
has already been taking place, otherwise one would have been assumed to have accepted
damage or the risk of damage. Bealey v. Shaw, 102 Eng. Rep. 1266 (K.B. 1805). Damages are,
at least until the last years of the prior-use phase, the only remedy available by this action.
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because of their cost, slowness, and procedural obligations, they were
virtually abandoned, especially for water cases."'
2. The Historical Context: the IndustrialRevolution and the growing
demand for runningwater
The new phase established itself in England's age of expanding
trade, production and technical change, featuring an explosive export
demand for corn and textiles such as wool and cotton.' Population, also
growing rapidly, tended to concentrate in newly-industrialized urban
areas and milltown districts. Energy and heat were provided by wood
and even coal, but to a large and growing extent running water provided
mechanical energy to blow air into mines, and for lead and iron-smelting
processes.' as well as to turn mill wheels. Mill after mill was set up on
"private" or non-tidal streams at suitable sites, such as near a fall. The
competition between mills in some places along the crowded streams was
intense. Disputes and litigation regarding water in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries were almost all about diversion, and mills competing
for the flow."
3. Clarification of Prescriptive Rights: Recognition of PriorRights
We have said that the old Assize had not fitted well with the
phenomenon of flowing water, because its goal was to restore seisin, and
seisin was not a usufructuary right. When it came to water power, mill
owners and others sought to have their rights of use rather than their
ownership protected in the courts, and the courts attempted to adapt to

41. See Christopher Hill, The Pelican Economic History of Britain, Vol.2, 1530-1780.
Reformation to Industrial Revolution 146 (1975). By an act of Charles II in 1660, feudal
tenures had been abolished and land previously held in "seisin" was now held in "freehold"
with no duties or obligations to the King and Lord attached to it. In addition, freeholders
could acquire written title to their land, good against any other party. Copyholders were not
included in the freeing of the land-they still were completely dependent on their landlords.
42. See G.D. Ramsay, The Wiltshire Woollen Industry, 22 (1965) (writing that "[tihe
remarkable expansion of the market for English cloth in the Netherlands and Germany
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries led to an extension of the frontier of the
industrial broadcloth area at home; it advanced down the Wylye valley and in the course
of the sixteenth it finally engulfed Salisbury. As a potential centre of the broadcloth industry
Salisbury and its neighbourhood had many advantages to offer-there was a plentiful
supply of water-power and a large population versed in spinning and weaving. . ").
43. See John R. Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850 (1988) (explaining that such
processes included blowing air into bloomeries through bellows, hammering impure iron,
and heating blast furnaces through bellows).
44. See G.N. von Tunzelmann, Steam Power and British Industrialization to 1860 (1978)
(pointing out that after 1780, industries increasingly used water for steam power).
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the demand."
The prescriptive right was both a right of use and a right of
ownership. In this period, the courts began the clarification of what it
was and how it came into being. In their process of definition they also
came to recognize the lesser but significant personal right, the prior-use
right, as establishing a basis for a plaintiff's action. This was a right based
solely on use of the water for any period longer than the opposing
party's.
Specific cases highlight some of the steps the law took towards
definition of the prescriptive right and separate recognition of the prior
right:
Shury v. Piggot" is perhaps
the most frequently cited water
47
rights case of its time. It has been interpreted in very different ways,
some scholars even claiming that it.is authority for a land-based, riparian
right to riverflow.' The case concerned itself with explaining the
difference between kinds of easement. A right to use water, called a
prescriptive easement, was found not to be the same as an easement of
passage on land (called "a way" in the case). Therefore, the rules applying
to the latter did not apply to the former. What is interesting in this case
is the reasoning of the various judges: a main point in common was that
water ought to continue its flow. In our view this sets the stage for a rule
that the prior-user's right was to continue to have water as before.
Piggot, the defendant, had built a wall which cut off the flow of
a stream into a pond at which the plaintiff had been watering his cattle.
The plaintiff sought damages for the interruption of the flow. The
defendant argued that the plaintiff's "right to the flow" consisted merely
of an easement which, under the law of easements, had been automatically extinguished when the plaintiff had come into possession both of the
pond and the property now held by the defendant. 49 None of the judges

45. Many seventeenth century cases about water diversion dealt with procedural requirements and the standing of plaintiffs to plead actions on the case. This preoccupation with
correctness, sometimes at the expense of justice between the parties, is, we suggest,
testimony to the shift from feudal land law to

the newer King's law.
46. Shury v. Piggott, 81 Eng. Rep. 280 (1625).
47. In the earlier Lutrell's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1065 (1625), an owner of two fulling mills
with prescriptive rights to water replaced them with two corn mills. The court held his
prescriptive rights were still valid as long as the alternation to the mills did not substantially
affect the stream or further affect another user. The case defined the prescriptive right as
quantitative.
48. See Maass & Zobel, supra note 9.

49. Where two adjoining properties, one with an easement across the land of the other,
come under the same possession or ownership, the easement is no longer considered
necessary and so is, by law, extinguished. As one of the judges in the case said, "the greater
benefit (ownership of the whole land) shall drown the less (ownership of the easement)."
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agreed with the defendant's submission. Instead, they said, because the
water once flowed it should continue to flow. The phenomenon of flowing
water came from nature Cex jure naturae"); therefore it made no sense
that the right to use it should be extinguished simply because of some
technical rule applying to easements over land. Justice Whitlock said:
... [A] water-course doth not begin by prescription, nor yet
by assent [i.e. granti, but the same doth begin ex jure naturae,
having taken this course naturally, and cannot be averted.5°

And Justice Jones remarked:
This water-course is not extinct by the unity of possession, the
same being a thing which ariseth out of the land, and no
interest at all, by this claimed in the land, but quod currere
solebat this way, and so to have continuance of this.'
In our opinion, because neither land ownership nor prescriptive
rights 2 are mentioned as necessary ingredients by the judges, this case
does not establish or re-affirm a land-based or riparian right to water.
Instead, it establishes a seniority right: in a dispute, earlier enjoyment or
use of the river gives the better right. This finding was to assist in
establishing precedent in the courts of prior-use as the main basis for
asserting or defending a right to the water.'
In two Anonymous cases a few years later, the plaintiffs did not
plead a prescriptive right to divert water, but merely that they had
already been diverting it and that another user had cut off the flow. In
both cases, the court decided in the plaintiff's favor. The year after that,
in a case called Sands v. Trefuses I the plaintiff was unable to show any
entitlement at all to use the water (prescriptive or otherwise), but the
court said it was enough that he be "lawfully" using it.
In 1673 the case of Cox v. Matthews 5 gave an opportunity for

Shury, 81 Eng. Rep. at 281.
50. Id. at 281.
51. Id.
52. It had been the practice at this time, in court, to plead a prescriptive right to divert
water as the basis for an action or a defense.
53. The landowners' right to the river flow was not to a pristine state unchanged by any
uses whatever, but to a maintained state of the river's levels and flows as the owner found
them when he became owner of the banks-that is, to the river with its existing uses
maintained. Because the "ancient river" was very little affected by its few uses, these two
standards were in most cases the same. Two statements referred to the same thing: "A's"
new upstream works reduced the flow at "B's" mill from its natural level; A's new works
reduced the flow that B used before A's arrival. Either way, disputes were few and the
superior rights of an existing user (prior-use rights) were assumed.
54. 79 Eng. Rep. 1084 (1638).
55. 86 Eng. Rep. 159 (1673).
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a judicial statement by one of the great theorists of his time, Sir Matthew
Hale.' In a case about the stopping of light, he gave the analogy of a
watercourse, saying that an action for diversion might be brought by a
mill-owner without pleading an "ancient mill" (antiquummolendinum)-i.e.
prescriptive rights, and the only defense to it could be that the defendant
was using the water before the plaintiff.Even if the plaintiff had a new mill
(i.e. arrived later than the defendant), unless the defendant was already
usings7the water himself, he had no justification for cutting off the miller's
flow.
This series of early cases demonstrates the emerging recognition
in the courts that a person who is "in possession" of the water (i.e. who
is using or diverting it) may sue someone who interferes with its flow
and does him damage, and he does not have to plead that he has a
prescriptive right to use the flow or that he owns land by the river. He
need merely plead that he was using the water first, and that he had
legal access to the river. ' The new, purely possessory or usufructuary
right, articulated above, was only a relative right: as between two users,
the one who had used the water first would win. In the resulting regime
of water rights the seniority rights are anchored to the land only by the
occasional prescriptive usufructuary right originally acquired from a
landowner.
4. Blackstone and ownership of the river
It is curious that during the eighteenth century, a time of rapidly
increasing congestion and expansion of use of English rivers there are
few recorded court cases to document how the new possessory or prior
right was working. This is probably a testimony to its success. Records
show that arbitrators could in most cases find a compromise or solution
between the parties without the dispute going to court. We know from
economic studies of river systems that there was a great deal of contracting or negotiating for privileges in water, and that these were built upon
original possessory or usufructuary rights as well as on prescriptive
rights.
Although the water regime of prior-use seems to have worked,

56. Id.
57. The fact that the law cited in this case is both hypothetical and ambiguous has meant
that it has been used to support both the old land-based law and the new "prior-use" law.
Our view is that Lord Hale's analogy with sunlight supports the view of interference-i.e.
the miller could succeed in a lawsuit because his prior-use was interfered with and not
because the defendant had merely diminished the flow.
58. We already know that the action on the case did not require him to be a freeholder
of land in order to sue.
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as a system of entitlement it lacked theoretical foundation. Of course,
Bracton's thirteenth century Roman idea about the "good neighbor
principle" of land use (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas) still applied as
between persons. But was this principle the foundation of a property
right? One of the greatest legal theorists, Sir William Blackstone, seeking
in his treatise the origins of property, looked at water as one of the
elements of nature which, like the air, was incapable of private ownership, and capable only of temporary "appropriation." Appropriation was
open to all persons. Blackstone reached back into Roman law, where
flowing water had been "res communis" (a thing owned by all), subject to
personal law respecting the first comer, and observed:
But after all there are some few things which notwithstanding the general
introduction and continuance of property must still unavoidably remain
in common, being such wherein nothing but a usufructuary property is
capable of being had and they still belong to the first occupant during the
time he holds possession of them and no longer. Such (among others) are
the elements of light, air and water which a man may occupy by means
of his.. mills. . .
All these streams so long as they remain in possession every man has a
right to enjoy without disturbance, but if once they escape from his
custody and he voluntarily abandons the use of them, they return to the
common stock and any man else has an equal right to seize and enjoy
them afterwards.'
Blackstone's work was published in 1789. There followed a period of
40-50 years when judges probably continued to apply the principles of
this natural law (recognizing the prior right) to the growing number of
cases on diversion. Few were recorded, however, for various reasons.
One of the significant recorded cases that was seen to espouse the
prior-use theory of water law is Bealey v. Shaw.' Briefly stated, the facts
of this case were that "A," an upstream riparian, built a mill and diverted
water for it for over twenty years (thereby gaining a prescriptive right to
continue doing so). "B" later built a mill downstream and used most of the
surplus water from "A's" mill for it, for a period of less than twenty
years. "A"then enlarged his mill and diverted more water, depriving "B"
of the necessary flow. The court held that "B" had established a right to
the surplus water (although not a prescriptive right) and that "A"could
not now deprive him of it and hinder his existing operations. This right
came from "B's" priority of use of the surplus water. Lord Ellenborough,
the leading judge in the panel of five judges, gave an explanation of the

59. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England Book 14 (1789).

60. Id.
61. 102 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1805).
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law as he saw it:
The general rule of law as applied to this subject is, that,
independent of any particular enjoyment used to be had by
another, every man has a right to have the advantage of a flow
of water in his own land without diminution or alteration. But
an adverse right may exist founded on the occupation of
another .... [If] the occupation of the party so taking or using
it have [sic] existed for so long time as may raise the presumption of a grant, the other party, whose land is below must take
the stream, subject to such adverse right.'
It is important to note that while the above quote by Lord
Ellenborough is about prescriptive rights, the case was about the surplus
water to which neither "A" nor "B" had prescriptive rights. Both had
rights to the flow based on their riparian ownership. But no property
action was available to either "A" or "B" to sue on this basis other than
an old feudal action of disseisin, by now out of the questions. "B"
prevailed over "A" because he had standing in tort law to sue "A", being
the prior user of the surplus water and having sustained damage.
Attempts at giving a legal foundation for the prior right were made in
two cases which took place some thirty years after Blackstone published
his Commentaries. The first was Williams v. Moreland,' where the
usufructuary prior rights in water were said to be "public rights" in that
anyone could acquire them subject only to the rights of those already
using the water. Judge Bayley referred this time directly to Roman law
as he said:
Flowing water is originally publici juris. So soon as it is
appropriated by an individual his right is co-extensive with the
beneficial use to which he appropriates it. Subject to that right
all the rest of the water remains publici juris
Seven years later, this rationale was again recognized in a
reported case, Liggins v. Inge,' wherein Lord Chief Justice Tindal said:
Water flowing in a stream, it is well settled, by the law of
England, is publici juris. By the Roman law, running water,
light, and air were considered as some of those things which
had the name of res communes and which were defined
"things, the property of which belongs to no person, but the
use to all." And, by the law of England, the person who first
appropriates any part of the water flowing through his land to

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1269 (emphasis added).
107 Eng. Rep. 620 (1824) (emphasis added).
Id. at 621.
131 Eng. Rep. 263 (1831).
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his own use, has the right to the use of so much as he thus
appropriates, against any other.'
A fallacy in these cases, conflation of the concepts publicijurisand
res communes, glosses over the distinction between private and public
rights to flowing water. In common law England, non-tidal rivers were
not res publicae, in the Roman law sense. Where "private rights" to
waterflow were concerned, prior-use principles could not be supported
by reference to the notion of res publicae. Res communes was the better
term and it harkened back to the natural law discussions of Blackstone.
5. Privileges and Contractingfor Water
We know that parties have contracted or made other arrangements to create water privileges of some sort since earliest times, and that
the tendency increases. In medieval times, contracting as it was known
later was rare, for water and mill sites were plentiful and demand was
modest. A miller who wished to turn his mill would generally have other
methods of procuring a water right than buying one from the owner of
the land by the river, methods which would be compatible with the
system of subinfeudination of manors. In any event, the common law had
not yet evolved to enforce the personal obligation. In the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, however, as the feudal system waned into obscurity,
the leasehold became an increasingly popular method of holding a site and
using the adjacent river water. This interest combined elements of both
property and contract law.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the rapid increase in
commerce increased the demand both for agricultural products and for
water power. As the number of unused sites (especially for power, where
the question was one of levels as well as flow) diminished, the price of
the water right increased. With the increase came an increase in the use
of contracts and other arrangements between owners of water rights and
those who wished to acquire all or part of them.
Thus, in the period of the Industrial Revolution water rights
achieved high values and increased the level of contracting. The contract
proved a way of expanding use while protecting original titles. Industrialists anxious to acquire water privileges became willing to pay both the
seller's price and the high transaction costs (of measurement, verification,
renewal of contract, et cetera). Often they could not purchase the water
right by purchasing land, because the land was tied up in large estates.
Many landowners did not wish to break up their estates, whose size was
a measure of their importance. Moreover, entail and primogeniture, and

66. Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
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later strict settlement, the common methods of bequeathing, obliged them
to keep their land in the family from one generation to the next. This
meant they were relatively short of capital. A contract for water rights
was almost as good as a lease of land with water attached. Since both
could be time limited and subject to various conditions and covenants,
both provided a good solution for all parties.' They kept the land with
its seniority of water right intact for reversion to the owner and
economized on both the landlords' and the industrialists' capital. A
statement by one of the judges in an 1866 case shows just how important
the system of water privileges (actual or supposed rights) had become:
The application and use of flowing water to work machinery
is as old as the law. Corn mills have existed from time
immemorial, and it appears, from old legal authorities, that
fulling and other mills worked by water for the purpose of
manufacture are of a very ancient date. Until the last century,
steam as a power was, if known, not much in use; and until
it was introduced, water power was very generally used, and
it is still the cheapest when available. The mill is sometimes
situated upon the bank of the natural stream, but more usually
at some little distance from it; the water is conveyed to it by
a goit or artificial cut, leading from the stream, and then, after
turning the wheel of the mill, flows away in what is commonly called the tail goit. So, also, water was and is very frequently conveyed from the natural stream in the same manner for
purposes of irrigation. And it is not too much to say, that the
67. Indeed, written judgments in water cases often described the plight of water users
who could not meet such conditions as occupying a riparian site, and/or being the first user
on a river, and/or having acquired a prescriptive easement, in extremely pessimistic terms.
They were seen as cut off from water use and in a desperate situation. However, it was
rarely so serious. Consider, for example, users who lost water rights suits. Having failed to
acquire or hold rights to use water without payment, they were now required to look
around for another source. If they were lucky, they might find a location, unoccupied, which
they could buy from the present riparian or user. In this way they would have adjusted to
the adversity of water law. Furthermore, if a user could not find or buy a site, they could
contract with the holder of a valid water right for the diversion or transfer of the desired
amount. The contractual rights gained thereby might not be valid against the world (as we
will see in Part III.D.I), depending on how secure and exclusive the holder's right was and
how robust the license, lease or easement he contracted to the user. In general, the more
secure a holder's right was found to be, the more anxious would a user be to acquire a
water "privilege" from him. Thus a change in the judicial theory did not necessarily change
who could use water but, first, who got water free and who must pay for it, and second,
the procedures and transaction costs of getting it and keeping it against other users or
riparians. In this respect stability was given to water use and even to user's rights by the
possibility of contracting. The existence of a kind of water market means that the changes
in water rights should be seen as leading to changes in who had powers to receive rent-like
incomes rather than to changes in how the river's attributes were used or in who made
actual use of them.
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value of actual or supposed water rights of this character
throughout England may be estimated by hundreds of
thousands, perhaps millions. The law has been supposed to be
well settled ....
[Tihe law favours the exercise of such a right; it is at once beneficial to
the owner and to the Commonwealth.'
In addition to their benefits to the parties, contracts and leases provided
a mechanism whereby new industries could be introduced on the streams
and larger mills could replace smaller or less efficient ones.
The demand for water was probably at its highest around the
year 1800, before steam power (which used less water) had become
generalized. It is not surprising, considering the large quantities of water
required, that contracting for water privileges was also most prevalent at
this time. The level of contracting is shown not by court cases-most
disputes were resolved by arbitrators or between the parties without
going to court-but by economic and other historical accounts of
interactions during this period.'
It was likely that the high level of contracting and leasing
contributed to the stability in the system of water use: the "quality of
title" of the water user was good. This was mainly because the existing
seniority system remained intact and, together with prescriptive rights,
provided a foundation for the network of uses. Prior-use rights were
quantifiable and moderately transferable. As long as the particular use at
a given site remained constant with regard to its impact on the level and
flow, any number of successive users could avail themselves of it without
losing priority over later uses of the water at other sites. An industrialist
wishing to construct a new mill larger than any existing ones might have
to buy privileges from more than one existing user in order to accommodate it. But if he could afford that, the law presented no special problem.
His water rights became as secure as those of their original owners had
been.7°

68. Nuttall v. Bracewell, 2 Exch. 1, 9-10 (Eng. 1866).
69. See Von Tunzelman, supra note 45, at 136-3. See also Richard L. Hills, Power in the
Industrial Revolution (1970).
70. After 1800, the variety of ways of getting and holding water increased. In particular,
the government, restricting and even expropriating riparian owners' rights in favour of
public uses, had recourse to water supply statutes and canal and railway incorporations. As
we shall see in Part D below, the courts restricted the scope of contracting, perhaps to return
to themselves the discretion to handle the swollen demand for water. Over the 19th century
they gradually formulated a concept of "community of the river." This approach tended to
exclude (at least for enforcement of their rights against proprietor-riparians), those parties
who merely contracted for water. Perhaps under these discouragements the level of
contracting decreased. Economic studies do speak of fewer, larger water works and
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At this point it is important to note that although there may not
have been a direct causal relationship between the regime of water law
which enforced mere individual or use-based water rights, and the
intense level of personal contracting of streamwater which took place in
the Industrial Revolution, the two facilitated and enhanced each other.
The emergence and expansion of the contractual water right enabled the
riverwater to be allocated to a wider group of users. It made reliance on
the old clumsy forms of action in land law. unlikely by necessitating
efficiencies of operation. The new streamlined forms of action thereby
indirectly brought equilibrium to the rivers and wealth to the country, by
keeping pace with industry.
6. Challenging the Prior-UsePrinciple
The invention of the steam engine in the mid-eighteenth century,
of course, accelerated the already rapidly rising use of the English
rivers." Some of the mills on the river which had been using water
power converted to steam power, which was often more economical and
certainly allowed for much greater production. Many expanded. Large
new factories sprang up, employing hundreds of people. Often these
were located a short distance from the river. The water to run them no
longer needed to be contiguous; it could now be piped inland via "goits"
to the factories and returned, used, often in a heated condition, to the
river a short distance downstream from the intake point. Arrangements
for the necessary water "privileges" would, of course, be made with the
riparian proprietor whose land the pipes crossed and, through him, with
others on the stream who had priority rights to the water. While the
number of mills located directly on the river may not have grown in
proportion to the increase in overall industry, use of the rivers became
more intense. The stakes were higher.
By the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the fierce competition for available water was translating itself into a large increase in the
number of cases coming before the courts. It is during this period that we
see the first indication in some of the judicial decisions that some form
of control was required. The existing "law," made up of priority
arrangements, had not been severely questioned because it had kept
peace on the river. Now, because of overcrowding along the rivers,
judges were forced to take a closer look at the legal basis of the law. By

enterprises, many of them government-owned, rather than a multitude of small private
ones. Perhaps this concentration is in turn partly explained by the judicial attitude.
71. See Pat Hudson, The Genesis of Industrial Capital: A Study of the West Riding Wool
Textile Industry 139-40 (1979) (suggesting that steam engines were in regular use as early
as the 1790s).
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probing into the judicial reasoning of some of the old.water law decisions
and, in some cases, by reinterpreting those cases, they revealed a
perceived need for a new water regime. Wright v. Howard,72 an 1823 case
with unusual facts, paved the way for this questioning.
In the year 1823 users of water who had established their use
earlier than their neighbor's could be confident of winning damages if a
dispute between the two went to court. Wright v. Howard arose in the
Court of Equity regarding a water lease, however, and had nothing to do
with damage.' The defendant, Howard, the prospective purchaser, had
planned to build a cotton mill, for which he would need to divert the
streamflow, and had found a suitable site along a little-used river in a
rural district. The price of the site included a 99-year water lease from a
downstream proprietor, giving him consent to make the necessary
diversion. But upon investigation, the would-be purchaser found that
there were two other parties downstream on the river who had not given
(or sold) their consent and who, he feared, might later sue him if he
diverted their streamflow.74 To justify his not wanting to proceed with
the purchase of the site, he argued that since there was no guarantee he
could in the future make the diversion without facing legal action, the
value of the land was only worth one third of what it would be worth
with a secure water right.
Blackstone's teaching would probably have been that once the
defendant had constructed his mill and made the necessary diversion,
downstream parties who were not using the water themselves would not
have any legal redress. The defendant would have become regarded as
a prior-user, his right to continue to use the water would be secure and
so he would have no excuse now for not carrying out the leasing
agreement. But the Vice-Chancellor, Sir John Leach, judge in the case,
agreed with the defendant and made a statement which was to "shake
up" the common law of water. He attributed ownership of property rights
to the waterflow to all of the riparian proprietors (those downstream as
well as the defendant if he purchased the land) whether or not they used
the water. Although he thereby identified a land-based water right, he did
agree that only those riparian proprietors who had suffered damage
could sue to enforce it. He was thereby recognizing a distinction between
black-letter law and enforceable rights:
"The right to the use of water rests on clear and settled

72. 57 Eng. Rep. 76 (1823).
73. The plaintiff was asking the court to oblige the defendant to go through with the deal.
He brought the case in Equity because he sought "specific performance," a remedy that was
not then available in the common law courts.
74. We do not know if the three parties were using the water or not.
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principles. Primafacie, the proprietor of each bank of a stream
is the proprietor of half the land covered by the stream, but
there is no property in the water. Every proprietor has an
equal right to use the water which flows in the stream, and
consequently no proprietor can have the right to use the water
to the prejudice of any other proprietor. Without the consent
of the other proprietors, who may be affected by his operations, no proprietor can either diminish the quantity of water,
which would otherwise descend to the proprietors below, nor
throw the water back upon the proprietors above . . . It
appears to me that no action will lie for diverting or throwing
back water, except by a person who sustains an actual injury
The new principle implied in this case was later to be called the
"natural flow" principle. Applied strictly, it could mean that any use of
the streamflow which changes its quality, quantity or manner of flow
(except a prescriptive use) is wrongful without consent from riparians
who might be affected by it, although only actionable by those riparians
who have actually suffered damage to an existing use. It defined water
rights uniquely in terms of land ownership. Although it did not
specifically deny that persons other than property owners could acquire
rights in the water, there was simply no room for them in the statement.
"Equality of right" amongst riparians certainly seems to exclude any idea
of "priority of right" amongst mere users. This case is said to demonstrate
how desperately the courts were seeking a solution to the problem of
excessive water use at that time. Lauer,76 for example, mentions that the
courts were unhappy about the extent to which both prescriptive and
prior-use rights were being pressed into service to settle disputes arising
when mills were enlarged. Prior use could protect a downstream user
against increased obstruction upstream. But how much would the concept
have to be stretched to protect the upstream user against increased
flooding by a raised downstream dam? Would not a prescriptive right be
necessary? There seemed no criterion by which to limit the application of
the priority idea. Lauer obviously believes that the judges must have been
worried that without such a limit, prior-use could "bring to a standstill"
the development of water resources by new entrants.7
Lauer's treatment, otherwise excellent, seems to give far too little
weight to the opportunities for the two parties to contract, once prior-use
had been established as an exclusive right.
75. Wright, 57 Eng. Rep. at 82.
76. Theodore E. Lauer, The Common Law Background of the Riparian, 28 Mo. L. Rev. 60,
99-104 (1963).
77. Id. passim.
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For the moment, few judges seemed to notice the conundrum
illustrated by the reasoning in this case. Wright v. Howard, being in the
court of Equity, was not binding in the common law courts. And since
it had nothing to do with actual damage, it was different from the vast
majority of cases which came before them. It was completely ignored in
England until ten years later. Thus until 1832 at least, water users relied
on their prior-use or prescriptive rights and contracted on these bases.
They sued in tort, and if successful they got damages. Despite Wright v.
Howard the prior-use phase continued.
As the system was working well, there was no reason to change
and to curb transferability of the water right by "attaching" it conceptually to the land ... that is until industry had increased so much that all
users were adversely affected by the overburdened and polluted rivers.
When that happened, judges reached back to 1823 and Wright for a way
to discontinue the prior-use principle and to justify recourse anew to
land-based riparian rights. This was the only alternative on offer. Not
until later would they reach across the Atlantic to Rhode Island and the
American courts for judicial reasoning which would make the new, more
restrictive and absolute rights work.
7. Lord Denman and a new interpretationof "precedent" cases
We have seen that at the heart of the common law is the rule of
"precedent"-judges are to be bound by higher court decisions and
strongly persuaded by court decisions at the same level of court, in cases
which have similar facts to the case being tried. Because they must follow
those decisions, the common law has both permanence and internal
consistency. Yet the common law has, by incremental changes, adapted
to new social and economic conditions without the assistance of
legislation. A single judge may, in some instances, effect a change in the
law even when faced with seemingly binding precedent, by a number of
techniques, 8 often presented in the argument of one of the litigant's
lawyers. Some of these techniques are noted here in connection with
Mason v. Hill," one of the most influential cases of water law history. It
arose in the "challenge" period between the prior-use phase and the
subsequent riparian-rights phase. A well-respected judge of the King's
Bench court confronted and set aside a fairly large body of case law
which up to then had been accepted as stating the law on prior-use water
rights. In so doing, he paved the way for later courts to apply an
enforceable land-based water law in the place of the former, individual-

78. Some of these are noted below.
79. 110 Eng. Rep. 692 (1833).
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based law. In four pages of the decision Lord Denman went through a
careful process to show that the early law was "misconceived," and that
cases which had reflected the misconception should no longer be
followedVs
The facts of the extremely complicated Mason v. Hill case which
are relevant to this discussion are the following: the plaintiff was a
downstream riparian owner ("A") who had been using the streamwater
for more than 20 years, although for different purposes and in varying
quantities. His upstream neighbor ("B") moved onto the stream and began
using the water after him, with A's permission, and A used the surplus
from B's operations. This was at first sufficient for A's purposes. Part of
B's use of the water, however, had been to divert water from certain
springs, which would have drained into the stream, into a reservoir. This
B did without A's permission. When A increased his operations, he did
not have enough clear water, and disputed, amongst other things, B's
right to divert the water.'
The crucial question in this decision was whether B had a right
to divert part of the stream and deprive A of streamwater which he
would later need, by virtue of using this streamwater. Lord Denman
emphatically found that B did not have the right to do so. In so finding,
he challenged the legal assumptions which had formed the law in the
previous centuries, that priority of use created rights in all the circumstances. Some of the techniques he used in this challenge to precedent
were the following:
i) Finding another basis for the precedent decision, on
factual circumstances of the case other than those which up to
then were assumed critical;
ii) Distinguishing a precedent case by showing that the
facts were not the same as those in the case being considered.
Narrowing the principles of the precedent case to its particular
facts and holding the principles not applicable to a broader or
different fact pattern;
iii) Interpreting what were once considered "dicta"
(judicial commentary not necessary for the decision and
therefore not binding) as relevant and explanatory rationale;
(iv) Interpreting what was formerly considered "rationale" as unnecessary "dicta" and no longer to be relied on in

80. Id. at 698-701.
81. "A" was able to prove "damage" (which gave him standing to bring his case to court)
because B had thermally polluted the stream with subsequent additions to his (B's) mill
(water was returned to the stream in a heated condition), and this had a negative impact
on A's existing operations. If it had not been for this proven damage, A would not have had
standing to come to court with only the above complaint, because he had increased his
operations after B had already diverted the spring water.
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the decision;
(v) Showing that because a judge relied on a certain case
for a certain broad principle which is now disputed or
narrowed, he must have intended to limit the application of the
principle to a narrow set of facts (even though he may have
stated it broadly), and that these narrow facts are not relevant
to the present case;
(vi) Showing that because a subsequent case relied
erroneously on a broad principle which should have been
limited to its facts, the case itself cannot now constitute
precedent at all;
(vii) Providing a plausible contextual rationale for the
new interpretation.
The lawyer for the defendant, (B), cited a body of precedent to
support his argument that priority of use gave rights of continued use.
This included Cox v. Mathews,' Williams v. Morland,' Liggins v. Inge,"
and Bealey v. Shaw.' Of these, the strongest was Bealey v. Shaw.
As already mentioned, Bealey has been frequently referred to as
espousing the "prior-use" theory of water law." A leading encyclopedia
of the day, Digest of the Laws of England," said the following under the
rubric of "River":
Semble, that the right to the use of the water of rivers is an
easement to lands contiguous to rivers, is a right of occupancy.
The first settler may use as much as he please; but, having
taken a certain quantity by a channel of a certain dimension,
and other person having settled lower down the stream, and
taken the use of water subject to the then definite use of the
water by the first settler, the latter is entitled to enjoy as much
as he can so occupy in a similarly definite manner, and though
the prior settler might have previously used all the water, he
cannot then abridge the use of the second settler and occupant.
In Mason, Lord Denman set out to destroy this formulation. He
first distinguished Bealey on its facts, because in Bealey the prior-user was
the party who had been damaged, while in Mason the prior-user was the
party doing damage and preventing further use by his downstream
neighbor. He limited the principle of priority rights in Bealey to the right
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

86 Eng. Rep. 159 (1673).
107 Eng. Rep. 620 (1824).
131 Eng. Rep. 263 (1831).
102 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1805).
See Section 4 of this Part.
John Comyns, Digest of the Laws of England (1st ed. 1762).
The reference is to Bealey, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1266.
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not to suffer damage, rather than the right to inflict it. He also took dicta
in Lord Ellenborough's quote above (because the case was not decided
on the basis of prescription) and called them important rationale to
support riparian and prescriptive rights. More importantly, he emphasized a different basis for the rights, A's ownership of riparian land and
B's lack of prescriptive title. Given such treatment, Bealey v. Shaw no
longer had any precedent value for supporting prior-use rights in
general. A quote from Lord Denman's judgment is illustrative:
"This decision [Bealey v. Shaw] is in exact accordance with the
proposition contended for by the plaintiff, that the owner of
the land through which the stream flows may, as soon as he
has converted it to a purpose producing benefit to himself,
maintain an action against the owner of the land above, for a
subsequent act, by which that benefit is diminished; and it does
not in any degree support the position, that the first occupant of a
stream of water has a right to it against the proprietor of land
below." W
Cox v. Matthews was given similar treatment. Williams v. Moreland
was confined to its particular facts (plaintiff's ability to prove damage to
the riverbanks from an upstream use which altered the flow of the river),
and all broad reasoning supportive of prior rights was called "dicta."
Liggins v. Inge was interpreted narrowly, and Lord Tindal was said to
have intended to express himself this way, even though he stated broad
principles. Saunders v. Newman 9' was discounted as being inapplicable.
A logical reason was given by Lord Denman for not recognizing
prior rights to divert or use water. He stated:
But it is a very different question, whether he [the prior-user]
can take away from the owner of the land below, one of its
natural advantages, which is capable of being applied to
profitable purposes, and generally increases the fertility of the
soil, even when unapplied; and deprive him of it altogether by
anticipating him in its application to a useful purpose. If this
be so, a considerable part of the value of an estate, which, in
manufacturing districts particularly, is much enhanced by the
existence of an unappropriated stream of water with a fall,
91
within its limits, might at any time be taken away ....
Mason made severe inroads into the theory of prior rights from a
technical and logical point of view. Lord Denman went further than this,

89. Mason, 110 Eng. Rep. at 699 (emphasis added).
90. 106 Eng. Rep. 95 (1818). This was a case on prescription which also discussed prior
rights, relying on Bealey v. Shaw, 102 Eng. Rep. 1266.
91. Mason, 110 Eng. Rep. at 698-99.
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however, and went on to attack the philosophical underpinnings of
"prior-use" law-namely, the public's use of river water.
This analysis began with a reinterpretation of Roman law. Lord
Denman first limited the Roman law principle (res communes) that the
water in streams belonged to everyone and to no-one (ideas reiterated by
Blackstone), to find that only water which is used for domestic purposes
was "public.'" Then, to be safe, he firmly announced that, in any event,
Roman law did not constitute binding precedent for English common
law. These findings were so crucial to the development of water law in
later years that we quote them in full:
It appears to us also, that the doctrine of Blackstone and the
dicta of learned Judges, both in some of those cases [Bealey v.
Shaw, Saunders v. Newman, Williams v. Moreland], and in that of
Cox v. Matthews... have been misconceived . . ..
From these authorities, it seems that the Roman law considered
running water, not as a bonum vacans, in which any one might acquire
a property, but as public or common in this sense only, that all might
drink it, or apply it, to the necessary purposes of supporting life; and that
no one had any property in the water itself, except in that particular
portion, which he might have abstracted from the stream, and of which
he had the possession; and during the time of such possession only.
We think that no other interpretation ought to be put upon the
passage in Blackstone, and that the dicta of the learned Judges above
referred to, in which water is said to be publici juris, are not to be
understood in any other than this sense; and it appears to us there is no
authority in our law, nor, as far as we know, in the Roman law (which,
however, is no authority in ours), that the first occupant (though he may be
the proprietor of the land above) has any right, by diverting the stream,
to deprive the owner of the land below, of the special benefit and
advantage of the natural flow of water therein."
Finally, Lord Denman supported his reasoning by referring to the
"luminous judgment" of the Master of the Rolls in the Equity case, Wright
v. Howard."
What prompted Lord Denman to reverse the "public rights"
theory of water law and to say that earlier pivotal cases on prior rights
had been "misconceived?" Certainly a concern for justice in the particular

92. We will see (in Section D.I.5 of this Part) that this idea resurfaces in later periods and
other regimes in the form of permitted "domestic" or "ordinary" use of river water, which
is also usually protected.
93. Mason, 110 Eng. Rep. 692 at 699.
94. Id. at 701 (emphasis added).
95. 57 Eng. Rep. 76 (V.C. 1823).
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case. There may have also been a broader, societal factor which the judge
considered. A clue comes in a case many years later, Ormerod v.
Todmorden Joint Stock Mill Co..' wherein Justice Cave in a lower court
said the following:
Owing, however, to the greater demand for water for manufacturing purposes, it has been found necessary in our law to
limit the right to running water, and as is pointed out in
Mason v. Hill, running water can no longer be said to be publici
juris in the original sense of those words.9'
8. The Transition to ReasonableUse
Lord Denman's judgment in Mason v. Hill began the transition to
what would be a new regime of water rights: the "reasonable-use" regime,
centered on land-based rights to water and a whole new philosophy of
the river. In it, as before, a plaintiff who had sustained damage by
diversion and thermal pollution caused by the defendant, had standing
to take his case to court. But Lord Denman, in advocating and supporting
a land-based water right, recognized that there may be cases where a
riparian proprietor would be powerless to sue. If the riparian had not
used the river he could not have sustained any damage to his use, and
therefore could not enforce his rights to the river's "natural flow." Lord
Denman commented that damage ought not to be necessary to bring legal
action. He saw that procedures in the law were not in accordance with
the land-based right he was espousing.
This comment was not determinative in the case and so did not
constitute binding authority for later courts. Nevertheless, it did not go
unnoticed in the judicial community and was reiterated in some later
cases. For example, in Bower v. Hill," Chief Justice Tindal found that the
plaintiff had indeed suffered damage to an easement through permanent
obstruction of it, but proceeded to say that even if he hadn't, he should
still have standing to sue because failure to do so would enable a prescriptive
right to accrue in the defendant, and this would give the defendant an unfair
advantage. Moreover, the obstruction impacted on the value of the
plaintiff's land. Chief Justice Tindal stated:
But, independently of this narrower ground of decision, we
think the erection of the tunnel is in the nature of, and, until
removed, is to be considered as, a permanent obstruction to
the Plaintiff's right, and therefore an injury to the Plaintiff,

96. 11 Q.B.D. 155 (Eng. 1883).
97. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
98. 131 Eng. Rep. 1229 (C.P. 1835).
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even though he receive no immediate damage thereby. The
right of the Plaintiff to this way is injured, if there is an
obstruction in its nature permanent. If acquiesced in for twenty

years, it would become evidence of a renunciationand abandonment
of the right of way. That is the ground upon which a reversioner

is allowed to bring his action for an obstruction, apparently
permanent .... The Plaintiffs premises would sell for less
whilst the tunnel is in existence, if now put up to sale."
The idea of suing to prevent prescriptive rights from accruing was
generally adopted as an "exception" to the otherwise strict requirement
of proving actual damage in the action on the case, and smoothed the
way for the theory that all riparians had an equal right to a natural
flow. 00
Fourteen years later the Court of the Exchequer picked up the
idea articulated in Bower v. Hill of "damage to right" (to receive the
natural flow of the river), and applied it to a pollution case. In Wood v.
Waud10' Chief Baron Pollock spoke of "damage-in-law" as opposed to
"damage-in-fact" (actual damage)."° From it, he said, the court would
presume that damage in fact, caused by the defendant, had been suffered.
An important thing about this reasoning was that it circumvented the
causation problem encountered under tort law in a case of pollution; i.e.,
how to prove that the defendant, in particular, had caused the damage
when many others were also contributing towards it?
These two judgments, Bower v. Hill and Wood v. Waud, and others
that followed them,"ss helped to open the way for a full rehabilitation
of the law of riparian rights. The cornerstone was the procedural ability
for riparians to sue without having suffered (actual) damage-in-fact, and
without having used the water at all, so that the priority of the other
party was now, for this purpose, irrelevant.
9. Main Features of Prior-UseWater Law

We conclude by noting the main features of rights in the
prior-use phase.1' °

99. Id.at 1231 (emphasis added).
100. It could also be compared with an early action against a trespasser in which it would
not be necessary to prove actual damage, only that the person was on the land without
permission.
101. 154 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Exch. 1849).
102. Damage in law was damage to the right.
103. See Sampson v. Hoddinott, 140 Eng. Rep. 242 (C.P. 1857); Pennington v. Brinsop Hall
Coal Co., 5 Ch. D. 769 (Eng. 1877).
104. Not all of these were mentioned in the sections above.
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Water rights were derived from the potentiality of a
successful nuisance action for a conflicting use or user (a
modernized action on the case);
The right to abstract or use water from the private rivers
was not limited to riparian owners but was open to all
who had legal access to the river;
Legal access could be granted in the form of contracts or
easements, and non-riparians thereby permitted to take
streamwater inland across riparian lands and return it by
artificial channels;
The only requirement of all water users was that they
not damage an existing use. If they did, they too were
liable for damages;
Because the requirement of not damaging existing uses
was the basis for all legal action regarding competing
uses, river titles existed on the basis of strict seniority of
use, and there was no basis for proportionate sharing of
the water in a drought;
Seniority was not specific to a single user but to a
quantity and method of water used at a specific location
and to the effect of the use on other users. A senior
"right" was transferable to new users;
Prescriptive titles to water remained the most important
form of water title, because they had the highest seniority and were explicitly attached to the land;
Until the transaction were denied in Bower v. Hill,
riparian owners who did not use the water but wished
to preserve the continuance of the flow (possibly for
future use) had no means of legal redress against nonriparian users who decreased the flow.

10. Who Gained in the Prior-UsePhase?
The extent of the swing to new categories of water users can be
gauged by examining how riparian proprietors were to gain from
non-riparians when the law was to move into its next phases of
natural-flow and reasonable-use. Even those not using the water would
now be able to enforce a right to a continued flow, subject of course to
the relevant tort or general damage law, including nuisance, that applied
to riparians and non-riparians alike. And although riparians would not
themselves have a right to obstruct others, they would gain the power to
prevent major diversions, obstruction and pollution. Riparians also would
not have to show in court that any use by them had been impeded.
Non-riparians, on the other hand, would lose the power given by
seniority to enforce their water use against others except as against a
riparian with whom they had a stream-access or other contract. To the
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extent that their water rights depended on property law they would be
excluded from the seniority system, which would now be confined to
riparians. And, like other users, many of them would lose their opportunities to acquire the coveted prescriptive rights, for non-using riparians
could now take legal action to interrupt the prescriptive period. These
changes were to result from replacing a basis in use with a basis in land
ownership, as we shall see in the next Section.
D. THE REASONABLE-USE PERIOD OF WATER RIGHTS
L The Modern Doctrine Of "RiparianRights" In England:1851
1. Introduction
We have set the beginning of the reasonable-use regime of water
law in England at the year 1851 because in that year a case was decided
which made first mention of the concept of "reasonableness" in the
context of water rights. That case was Embrey v. Owen.es In the earlier
part of the century, English courts had begun to recognize land-based
water rights according to a "natural flow" theory, wherein every owner
of land by a private river had equal rights not to its continued flow (this
was the prior rights theory) but to its natural (unused) flow."° The
natural flow theory may have appeared attractive for the purposes of
reducing pollution. However, it was never actually applied in England
to cases of water abstraction. It was simply not workable since, at best,
it would take rights away from those who previously had held them in
the prior-use phase and would put a new burden on an old industry-the cost of "buying out" the right to sue of all other affected
riparians on the stream. But it did form the basis for a new theory which
was workable. The new theory, a softening of the earlier one, would
protect the ordinary citizens' rights to domestic water, protect those
holding under a seniority system, clean up the rivers, yet allow achievement of the English version of the "reasonable" industrial uses to continue
and even to grow. This was the "reasonable-use" theory.
105. 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Exch. 1851).
106. If by "natural flow," Sir John Leach in Wright v. Howard had meant the river in its
continuing state, the implications would have been impossible. In this case, all existing uses
would be respected but no further uses would be allowed. This would create a hopeless
muddle of different water rights which conflicted with one another. Indeed, it is important
to note that the natural flow theory, for all its severity, still recognized the prescriptive
rights of users of the water. Such users did not have to be riparians to maintain their rights,
and the number of these rights was not inconsiderable. Prescriptive rights holders were
immune from any legal action regarding their particular use of water, as long as it remained
unchanged.
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The leadership given by the English cases changed with the 1827
American case of Tyler v. Wilkinson."° This case introduced concepts of
"reasonable-use" in water rights, well before they were accepted in
England. Some twenty-five years later in Embrey v. Owen,"° English law
made an exceptional gesture. It followed, or at least cited as part of its
reasoning, the American precedent. One must acknowledge the fact that,
because conditions in New England were different from those in England
around the same time (the problem of pollution was not nearly as
severe), the American courts' discarding of prior-use rights in favor of
land-based rights was for a different reason-namely, competing types of
uses. As a result, the water rights which came out of this period under
the name of "reasonable-use" showed some differences in the two
countries, which we shall expand upon in Section D.II, in a separate
analysis of the American experience.
2. Context for the Reasonable-UsePeriod in England:Population
Explosion, Heavy Industry and Pollution;
By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, industry in
England had crowded the rivers to their capacity. Cities, led by their
manufacturing districts, doubled their population in as short a time as ten
years. Demands on agriculture and even on irrigation increased with the
population. Where drinking and washing had once been small-scale,
direct uses of the water, there were now massive reservoirs and canals to
meet the demand. Where there had been goits, there were now pipelines,
diverting huge amounts of water out of the riverbeds. Mills were larger,
wheels were larger. Water was carried longer distances from diversions.
The use of steam for power modified dependence on water-power sites,
so that location became less important than the ability to abstract water.
On falling rivers, or near towns, however, industrial sites continued to be
packed together. More and more, any mill's change, in level, impoundment and releases could significantly affect several other establishments
below and above.
On the pollution side of things, the waterways of England had
become a dumping ground for wastes. Industry emitted new chemicals
and its steam power created thermal pollution. Sewage was routinely
dumped into rivers at the outskirts of the cities, towns and villages. So
serious was river pollution, and so extensive were the diversions, that the
small farms and other properties alongside the rivers were now
effectively deprived of the "benefit and advantage of the natural flow of

107. 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
108. 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Exch. 1851).
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water" by their property."
3. Early Reasonable-UseDoctrine:Reasonable Damage.;
In the 1851 English case Embrey v. Owen,"' Baron Parkes
pronounced that "the law as to flowing water [was] now put on its right
footing." This case followed American precedent regarding water use and
water rights, emphasizing both exploitation and protection from
damage."' It also referred to recent developments in English law which
had relaxed the damage requirement for standing in court. The judgment
proceeded along these lines: riparians were entitled to receive the natural
flow of the rivers, and to sue to protect those rights even if they had
suffered no actual damage because of an upstream or downstream
diversion or alteration of the flow. But if they had not suffered damage,
or had suffered only minimal damage, they might not win their suit. This
was because of a new emphasis on the rule that the law will not redress
trivialities: "de minimis non curat lex."" 2 It followed, from the point of
view of users of the water, that diversion (and presumably pollution)
might proceed if it causes only minimal damage.
The theory explicitly protected industrial exploitation of the rivers
to a certain "reasonable" extent. The extent, said Baron Parke, was entirely
a question of degree and depended on the facts of each case, including
the size of the river. Thus, while the emphasis in natural flow doctrine
had been on a riparian's passive right to continue to receive the flow in
its "natural" state, it now shifted more to protect the riparian user's active
right to divert a reasonable amount of water. Contemporary cases would
restate the importance of economic exploitation of property, as the

109. See Ruth Hatch, Social Studies, Globe & Mail, Sept. 16, 1991, at A18 (stating that
Charles Dickens in 1849 sent an article entitled "Dreadful Hardships" to Punch magazine
about the scandalous state of London's water supply); see also John Ruskin, Fors Clavigera,
in The Works of John Ruskin 21-29 (E.T.Cook & A. Wedderbum eds., 1970) (1871-84); John
Ruskin, Praeterita,in The Works of John Ruskin 35 (E.T. Cook & A. Wedderburn eds., 1908)
(1885-89) (commenting upon the air and water pollutant effects of modern industry in
England).
110. 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Exch. 1851).
111. See Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312); see also our
discussion in Part D.11.5.
112. De minimus non curatlex was the old Latin tag which purported to state the threshold
of legal action: "the law does not cure minimal damage." The de minimus principle was
clearly stated in Embrey v. Owen, 155 Eng. Rep. 579,587. Once the requirement of minimal
damage was cited by the courts, the riparian right to a natural flow in cases of diversion
became a dead letter. As we have said on previous occasions, the only way a person can
sustain physical damage to his use is if he has established it before the damaging party
arrives on the scene. Any form of legal action based on damage protects the prior-user.
Property actions had the same outcome as tort actions in this respect.
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following quotations illustrate:
The law favors the exercise of dominion by every one upon
his own land, and his using it for the most beneficial purpose
to himself.' and The great interests of society require that
the cultivation of every man's land should be encouraged." 4
The reasonable-use theory articulated in Embrey v. Owen was compatible
with the cautious encouragement of industry and agriculture: its parent,
natural flow, principle had no particular economic outcome. Yet because
of the requirement that some damage be suffered under the "de minimis"
rule, the seniority system was still protected and so was the riparian
whose rights had been substantially infringed.
5. The Balancing of Interests: What is "Reasonable?";
Embrey v. Owen and Tyler v. Wilkinson were cases about water
diversion, and they addressed part of the problem in the English and
American streams, which was to determine which uses were "reasonable,"
given the size of the river. However, they did not really take into account
the question of how much pollution was reasonable."' And they did not
protect the small landowners by the stream who were merely using the
water in a "domestic" way, such as for drinking or washing or feeding

cattle.
The interests of these parties were addressed specifically in Miner
v. Gilmour,"6 a Canadian case brought to the English Privy Council.
Lord Kingsdown, in words which were to be quoted many times
afterwards as the "riparian rights doctrine" said:
By the general law applicable to running streams, every
riparian proprietor has a right to what may be called the
ordinaryuse of the water flowing past his land; for instance, to
the reasonable-use of the water for his domestic purposes and
for his cattle, and this without regard to the effect which such
use may have, in case of a deficiency, upon proprietors lower
down the stream. But, further, he has a right to the use of it
for any purpose, or what may be deemed the extraordinaryuse
of it, provided that he does not thereby interfere with the
rights of other proprietors, either above or below him. Subject
to this condition, he may dam up the stream for the purpose
of a mill, or divert the water for the purpose of irrigation. But,
he has no right to interrupt the regular flow of the stream, if
113.
114.
115.
116.

Bonomi v. Backhouse, 120 Eng. Rep. 643 (Exch. 1859).
Chasemore v. Richards, 11 Eng. Rep. 140 (H.L. 1859).
Except, that is, to the degree that amount of flow influences pollution.
14 Eng. Rep. 861 (P.C. 1858).
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he thereby interferes with the lawful use of the water by other
proprietors, and inflicts upon them a sensible injury."'
What is interesting in this statement is that it gives "ordinary" users an
almost absolute right to their use, regardless of the effect it has on others.
It suggests that "ordinary" use is, per se, "reasonable." This came to be
one of the main tenets of the reasonable-use doctrine.
The right is, nevertheless, subject to the level of the streamflow.
This means that in times of low flow the ordinary users lower down on
the stream may not be able to fulfill all their requirements because of
upstream ordinary users. They will have no legal redress against
upstream ordinary users.
The idea of protecting the ordinary user in his domestic use of
the water was not new. It had been referred to ten years previously in the
case of Wood v. Waud, in a common sense remark:
Ilf the stream were only used by the riparian proprietor and
his family, by drinking it, or for the supply for domestic
purposes, no action would lie for the ordinary use of it; and
it may be conceived, that if a field be covered by houses, the
ordinary use by the inhabitants might sensibly diminish the
stream, yet no action would, we apprehend, lie, any more than
if the air was rendered less pure and healthy by the increase
of inhabitants in the neighborhood, and by the smoke issuing
from the chimneys of an increased number of houses.
Tort law, designed to protect individuals from damage or harm,
continued as before, although the degree of overlap with property law
decreased. Riparians who intended to use the rivers in some way, but
had not yet begun to do so, were blocked under a general damage law
(such as nuisance law), from suing existing users in tort. Although under
early reasonable-use doctrine riparians could bring an action because of
damage to their riparian right, their action would have few prospects of
success unless they could show they had suffered damage to their use
which was more than trivial. Had the law reverted to its prior-use stage?
In Sampson v. Hoddinott the court made it clear that conceptually, at least,
it had not. It said:
[AIIl persons having lands on the margin of a flowing stream
have, by nature, certain rights to use the water of that stream,
whether they exercise those rights or not; and they may begin to
exercise them whenever they will."'

117. Id. at 870 (emphasis added).
118. Sampson v. Hoddinott, 140 Eng. Rep. 242, 251 (C.P. 1857) (emphasis added).
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9 reiterated these thoughts 18 years
And the court in Holker v. Porritt'1
later:

It is established by many authorities, which are collected
and confirmed by Mason v. Hill [110 E.R. 692], that as soon
the owner of land on a stream has appropriated the water
a beneficial use he may sue for the injury done to him
respect of such a new use."

in
as
to
in

Nevertheless, vexatious or spiteful actions were strongly discouraged.
These sentiments were expressed at the Privy Council in a Scottish case,

Orr Ewing v. Colquoun "

It would require strong authorities to lead me to believe that

the law of Scotland does give the proprietors on the banks of
the stream a right to act the part of the dog in the manger to
such an extent as to hinder this."
Miner v. Gilmourhad explained that "extraordinary" (not "ordinary") users
of the flow would be subject to a requirement of reasonableness; i.e. they
would not be permitted to cause damage or hinder any other riparian's
reasonable-use of the flow.
It remained a fact, however, that certain uses were, by their very
nature, clearly detrimental or wasteful uses of the river-either they
destroyed its quality, killing the fish, or they failed to return the water
after it had been diverted, or they were merely unnecessary. The common

law moved swiftly to combine with the growing volume of statute law
discouraging these uses of water, by defining "per se unreasonable"
uses." Examples were polluting uses," wasteful or merely ornamen119. Holker v. Porritt, 10 Exch. 59, 62 (Eng. 1875).
120. id.
121. 2 App. Cas. 839 (1877).
122. Id. at 856. The practical implications of this case and the "dog in the manger"
objection were far-reaching to the extent that legal actions regarding diversion, brought by
non-user riparians against users to enforce the "natural flow", were never actually attempted
except perhaps in earlier cases such as Wright v. Howard, 57 Eng. Rep. 76 (V.C. 1823),
where there were very few users on the stream. At a time when water was highly
demanded, however, it was illogical to expect that all users would be able to contain their
use so that it did not affect the passing by the property of any other riparians, or that one
riparian owner might sue all existing users on the river, just to obtain his share of
streamflow, whether or not he used it. The latter kind of behaviour would be seen as
vexatious and frivolous, and we have not found a single case in which it was allowed. In
this respect the prior-user reaped the benefit of the court's scrutiny.
123. This did not mean that they were unlawful, not being proscribed by statute, but that
at the suit of another riparian, they would lose out, regardless of whether damage had been

proven.
124. Attorney General v. Birmingham Borough Council, 70 Eng. Rep. 220 (Ch. 1858);
Pennington v. Brinson, 5 Ch. D. 769 (Eng. 1877). We shall discuss these further separately.
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tal uses,'15 and uses which took the water out of the river basin or off
the "riparian tenement.""z ' A riparian who was engaged in such uses
was vulnerable to legal action (which would likely be successful) by any
other riparian at any time. In the first two instances, for example, he
could not justify harm or damage caused by a socially useful purpose.
Nor could he justify potential harm among other downstream users (not
only the plaintiff) in the third instance. Damage was assumed.
This new criterion further reduced the categories of uses left to
the English courts' discretion. But here the process stopped. None of the
other "extraordinary' or non-domestic uses were actionable as unreasonable unless they caused damage to other riparians. In the category of
extraordinary-use it was necessary to fall back on seniority principles.
These continued to be applied.127
There was one more recourse. The ordinary-use category might
be expanded. A few non-domestic uses were found customary or publicly
necessary in certain districts. There is authority to suggest that, as the law
had discouraged certain detrimental extraordinary uses by calling them
toper se unreasonable," so it encouraged and protected these necessary
uses by calling them "ordinary." The case of Ormerod v. Todmorden Joint
Stock Mill Co. offers the following comment:
The question whether the use of a river is ordinary or extraordinary use depends upon the development of trade in its neighborhood,
and upon the use to which it is put by adjoining owners."
Apart from this suggestion that flexibility may have been
exercised in the definition of "ordinary" uses of the water to give
protection to certain necessary uses, it is clear that by defining detrimental
uses as "per se unreasonable" the English courts were attempting to
narrow the scope of their discretion. This contrasts with the direction of
American courts which, as we shall see in the next section, were carving
out for themselves a role as agents of the society's interest by enlarging
the scope of their discretion.

125. Lord Norbury v. Kitchin, 176 Eng. Rep. 132 (Cr. Cir. 1862).
126. Wilts and Berks Canal Navigation Co. v. Swindon Waterworks Co., 20 W.R. 353 (Ch.
1872); McCartney v. Londonderry & Lough Swilly Railway Co., 1904 App. Cas. 301 (appeal
taken from Ir.).
127. Indeed, this reasonable-use innovation did not affect either the majority of water
users or the majority of river water used. Prior-use governed here. The reasonableness of
the other extraordinary uses was judged according to their impact elsewhere on the stream.
If they caused damage, the court would, as in the past, order the diverter to modify or stop
his activity or pay those who suffered from it. So the concept of damage, and the protection
of prior-users, continued to play a major role in the law. English reasonable-use judgments
did little to disrupt the security inherent in the system for most existing users and most of
the existing water.
128. Ormerod v. Todmorden Joint Stock Mill Co., 11 Q.B. 155, 167 (Eng. 1883).
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Standards of reasonableness, as they applied to the finding of
damage,
meanwhile, could be more clearly seen in pure nuisance
actual
or tort cases. In particular, the increasing number of air pollution cases in
which damage was not strictly quantifiable brought new attempts to
define standards against which to measure actionable nuisance. An 1851
case considered general and minimal standards of comfort and enjoyment, which were defined as being:
"not merely according to elegant or dainty modes and habits
of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions
among the English people."' 2
A later case suggested how the economic or social importance of the
activity, and the manner and location in which it was carried on,
influenced the standard:
"It may be that for the sake of trade in towns, or for the public
benefit, a nuisance is sometimes justified .... ",'
A subsequent case which reached the level of the House of Lords, St.
Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping,'3' refined the standard further, placing
a greater onus on industry. Here the plaintiff was suing a copper
smelting factory to recover damages for substantial personal discomfort
(air pollution) and for injury to trees, hedges, fruit and cattle on his
property. He won on the aspect of physical injuries, but personal
discomfort was considered a "trifling and small inconvenience" and not
actionable. Lord Wensleydale said:
"the law does not regard trifling and small inconvenience, but
only regards sensible inconveniences, injuries which sensibly
diminish the comfort, enjoyment or value of the property
which is affected." 32
It is certain that judges sitting on riparian rights cases were not unmindful of the parallel trends in negligence and nuisance law towards
"reasonableness," and that a spillover effect into water law occurred in the
definition of damage."'
129. Walter v. Selfe, 64 Eng. Rep. 849, 852 (Ch. 1851).
130. Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Exch. 1862).
131. 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (H.L. 1865).
132. St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (H.L. 1865).
133. That the two, English and U.S. water law, had more than the word "reasonable' in
common, and that both were pointed toward some extreme goal such as minimum damage
or maximum benefit, can be readily seen by considering an unreasonable-use. In America,
an unreasonable-use would be one that was less productive than its rivals. In England it
would be one that came low on the preference scale, such as manufacturing, unless it were
trivial (meaning a small user or the cause of small damage). To be unreasonable, yet trivial,
meant that the judge had to look at how trivial a use was. Thus the English judge would
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It is important to note, however, that even while there were
forces attacking pure damage concepts in property actions and countervailing forces mitigating their effects, nuisance actions continued as
before, untouched, throughout this period of land-based water rights.
These actions were available to all persons who had been interfered with
in their legal use or enjoyment of land outside of ownership. A riparian
owner had the option of suing either in property, on the basis of his
rights as owner of riverside land, or in tort, on the basis of his rights of
use or occupation. The fact that nuisance actions persisted is evidence of
their popularity, and of damage concepts, and with them, prior-use
concepts. In every period of English law, protection of property from
actionable damage at the hands of others has been recognized by law. As
we will see, even Justice Story in Tyler v. Wilkinson,"3 the 1827 American case which is said to have introduced the concept of "reasonable-use"
into the common law, agreed that "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" ("use
your land without harming your neighbor's") has always been part of it.
6. Pollution:Advantages of Natural Flow Theory;
Although natural-flow theory (no tolerance for any change in the
river) was unworkable in cases of diversion, requiring the application of
reasonable-use principles, it was used successfully in cases of pollution.
Here, the right to a clean river grounded the right of action and the focus
was on conservation rather than exploitation. Polluting uses, it will be
remembered, were deemed "per se unreasonable" under reasonable-use
doctrine. In the area of pollution, the two doctrines brought identical
legal consequences to a polluter. They had potential for sweeping clean
the fouled rivers of England in a way that tort or nuisance law simply
did not. We suggest that although diversion cases were the first to
articulate the new land-based theory of water rights, the main reason for
its ultimate success in England was that it could be used for curbing
pollution.
In his well-known article on nuisance law and the Industrial
Revolution, John McLaren reviews in detail the heavily polluted
conditions which prevailed in streams in the large industrial cities of
England in the early nineteenth century. 3 From Frederick Engels' "The
Condition of the Working Class in England," he quotes:

be looking for the same sort of comparative evidence as his U.S. colleagues, driven perhaps
to a similar type of compromise judgment. See, e.g., Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472
(C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
134. 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
135. John P.S. McLaren, Nuisance Law andthe IndustrialRevolution-Some Lessonsfrom Social
History, in Issues in Tort Law 313 (Freda M. Steel & Sanda Rodgers Magnet, eds. 1983).
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The view from this bridge.., is characteristic for the whole
district. At the bottom flows, or rather stagnates, the Irk, a
narrow, coal black, foul smelling stream full of debris and
refuse, which it deposits on the shallower right bank. In dry
weather, a long string of the most disgusting, blackish green,
slime pools are left standing on this bank, from the depths of
which bubbles of miasmatic gas constantly arise and give forth
a stench unendurable even on the bridge forty or fifty feet
above the surface of the stream. But besides this, the stream
itself is checked every few paces by high weirs, behind which
the slime and refuse accumulate and rot in thick masses.
Above the bridge are tanneries, bone mills and gas works,
from which all drains and refuse find their way into the Irk,
which receives further the contents of all the neighboring
sewers and privies. It may easily be imagined, therefore, what
sort of residue the stream deposits. 13
In the first half of the nineteenth century, when conditions were
their most deplorable, the available legal control of pollution lay in the
law of nuisance. Victims sued waste dischargers for damages. But
nuisance law information and enforcement were alarmingly costly and
difficult. For example, to establish that a certain party had caused specific
damage was almost impossible when fifty or so other polluters were also
contributing to the river's pollution. In addition, it was almost impossible
to set a value to clean water unless a plaintiff could measure it by the
yardstick of its deleterious effect on his own water use. How much were
living organisms, fish, et cetera, worth to a riparian who did not operate
a fishing business? As a result, under nuisance law alone, only wealthy
industrialists could push a legal action through to a successful conclusion.
Ordinary users or landowners had virtually no redress.
Natural-flow theory said all riparian landowners had equal rights
to clean water. For a person aggrieved, it provided a stronger, cheaper
and easier alternative to a nuisance action. The landowner could sue, in
a riparian rights action, any one of the many polluters and would not
have to show that this particular polluter was responsible for the specific
damage, nor would he have to quantify any damage, because the damage
was deemed to his riparian rights. It would then be up to the defendant
to prove that he had not caused the stated damage. The burden of proof
was thus shifted away from the riparian plaintiff, at the same time

136. Id. at 324.
137. See generally McLaren (showing the effective inaccessibility of nuisance law in the
mid-19th century to small landowning water users); see also Joel F. Brenner, Nuisance Law
and the IndustrialRevolution, 3 J. Legal Stud. 403 (1973); Morton J.Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (1977).
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decreasing his costs of action and increasing his likelihood of success.
Riparians were further assisted by a powerful remedy which had
been developed by the courts at the turn of the century: the injunction.
This discretionary remedy enabled the court to order an impugned
activity cease. It was an alternative to a remedy of damages, which would
be awarded if it was deemed "sufficient" to redress the harm done.
Injunctions were most frequently awarded to avoid plaintiffs having to
bring repeated damage actions against defendants who continued their
harmful operations. To determine which remedy to award, the court
would weigh the "balance of convenience"-that is, the benefit that
awarding an injunction would give to plaintiff against the detriment it
would give to the defendant. In pollution cases, the injunction would
invariable be awarded against the user-polluter defendant. Defendants
who wished at all costs to continue their operations could always try to
buy out the plaintiff-some did so, usually paying the plaintiff considerably more than he would have received in a damage action.
Individuals now had some power against rich and powerful
corporations and cities, and were on equal footing with them in litigation.
No accommodation was made for the "reasonableness" of pollution except
perhaps in the form of delaying the injunction to allow for some
negotiation between the parties. For example, in the well-known case of
Attorney General v. Birmingham Borough Council," the plaintiff individuals were seeking (via the intermediary of the Attorney General's office)
for an injunction to stop the City from carrying out drainage operations
which had the effect of killing the fish and preventing cattle from
drinking the water seven miles downstream. The City argued that if the
injunction were granted, an overflow of sewage would result and cause
pestilence by which 250,000 people would suffer. The court was
unmoved, and did not hesitate to grant the injunction, saying:
"[lit is a matter of almost absolute indifference whether the
decision will affect a population of 25,000 or a single individual carrying
on a manufactory for his own benefit ....
Now the Plaintiff's rights are these: He has a clear right to
enjoy the river, which, before the Defendants' operations
flowed unpolluted--or, at all events, so far unpolluted that
fish could live in the stream and cattle would drink of
it-through his grounds.., in exactly the same condition in
which it flowed formerly ....
If, after all possible experiments, they cannot drain
Birmingham without invading the Plaintiff's private rights,
they must apply to Parliament for power to invade his rights;

138. 70 Eng. Rep. 220 (Ch. 1858). This was a public nuisance action.
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and if the case be one of such magnitude as it is represented
to be, Parliament, no doubt, will take measures accordingly,
and the Plaintiff will protect himself as best he may."''
In Pennington v. Brinsop Hall Coal Co."0 the plaintiffs were owners of a
cotton mill and were suing a large colliery because it had dumped
sulfuric acid into the river, corroding the iron in their machinery. The
defendants argued that they had neutralized the acid as far as technology
allowed, and that the only way of preventing any acid in the water
would be to close the colliery, thereby losing £190,000 in capital and 500
jobs. The plaintiffs had suffered "a mere scintilla of damage," precisely
£100 which it would cost to clean their machinery. But the court granted
the injunction.
It is striking that cases such as the two above would probably not
have been brought to court if the only remedy had been damages. Thanks
to the injunction, they were successful in shutting down the offending
industry or activity.
7. Pollution Law as applied to Diversion;
Such important and precedent-setting pollution cases dominated
the courts in mid-nineteenth century England.'"' Pollution, however, is
not our subject. Our point is that the courts in their unconcealed efforts
to remake pollution law inevitably remade water diversion law as well.
Up to 1851, diversion cases in England had continued to be
argued on the basis of damage. We suggest that about this time the
American ideas about reasonableness and balance in water-diversion
cases, as they became known in pollution-ridden England, fell on
receptive ears. The American courts had declared that a balance must be
struck between the plaintiff's suffering and the defendant's exploitation,
and that society's good should be a factor to consider. Natural-flow
theory, which had been successfully used in cases of pollution, was too
severe where abstraction was necessary for diversions that provided
drinking water for cities, and for other beneficial social activities. The
idea that polluters must stop pollution made sense. The notion that
abstractors must behave more "reasonably" appealed to everyone.
While the English courts adopted the idea of "reasonable-use" in
water diversion largely from the American case of Tyler v. Wilkinson, they

139. Id. at 225-26.
140. 5 Ch. D. 769 (Eng. 1877). This was a riparian rights case.
141. See, e.g., Walter v. Selfe, 64 Eng. Rep. 849, (Ch. 1851); Hole v. Barlow, 140 Eng. Rep.
1113 (C.P. 1858). See also, Brenner, supra, note 139, at 410 (making it clear that competition
between the courts for supplying a new right or rule regarding pollution continued to be
active); McLaren, supra note 137, at 319.
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did not apply it in exactly the same way. Because they were addressing
what was now seen as an imbalance in the previous law which had
resulted in clear detriment to public welfare, they placed more weight on
the interests of persons who had been harmed than their American
counterparts. As will be seen in the next Part (D.II), the Americans had
been most concerned with maximizing the benefits from the rivers by
arriving at a compromise blend of the uses proposed by disputing
industrialists. But the English courts' oblique test of reasonableness,
which involved classifying a disputed use as ordinary or extraordinary,
can be seen as another approach to the American test-that is, whether
a particular use was better or worse than the alternative.
8. Licensing or Contracting of the RiparianRight;
We have noted that in all phases of water law, contracting
formed an important part of the overall picture of water use. In the
prior-use phase, it had been particularly prevalent, encouraged by the
system of rights enforcement which consisted of a personal action in
nuisance. 4 2 It continued throughout the reasonable-use phase, but was
cut back somewhat by developments which strongly favored the status
of riparians over that of non-riparian contractors.
When the law recognized a land-based right to the flow, it
recognized rights and obligations of the group of riparians toward each
other. Contractors were not part of this privileged "community" and were
not protected by riparian law. Nevertheless, land-locked industrialists did
continue to use the water through contractual arrangements with
riparians. And these contractors did have some rights over total strangers.
They could still sue, in a nuisance action, outsiders who interfered with
their water supply.4 3 They could use streamwater: i.e. it was permissible to contract for it and even to direct and use it off the immediate
riparian land, although not out of the watershed.'" But they were not
entitled to benefit from the reasonable-use rule which applied to
riparians, and they had no recourse to a riparian rights action. This
limitation affected the quality of their title in two ways: first, they did not
have the right themselves to use streamwater "reasonably." This meant

142. In the prior-use phase of water law, contractors had assumed the seniority of those
from whom they contracted. If they suffered damage they could sue others less senior in
use, whether or not they were riparians. In contrast, riparians had no advantage over other
users other than legal access to the water by virtue of their physical position on the stream.
143. Laing v. Whaley, 157 Eng. Rep. 639 (Exch. 1857), however, laid down the rule that
they had to first establish their own entitlement to the flow. A mere parole license would
not suffice in this regard.
144. Kensit v. Great Eastern Railway, 27 Ch. D. 122 (Eng. 1884).
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they could take it, but if they changed the flow in any appreciable way
they were vulnerable to suit by any riparian. Not changing the flow
meant returning the water to the stream before it left the property from
which they had abstracted it, in the same condition as they took it. This
4 Second, the contractors could not sue riparwas often a "tall order.""'
ians for causing them damage, even those who had used the water
unreasonably. The could sue only their contracting partner/riparian for
not delivering under the contract, thereby having to sue an 'unreasonable'
riparian indirectly through, and in the name of, their partner. The case of
Stockport Waterworks Co. v. Potter,'" set forth these newly defined and
limited rights in the most complete way. It held:
There seems to be no authority for contending that a riparian
proprietor can keep the land abutting on the river the possession of which gives him his water rights, and at the same time
transfer those rights or any of them, and thus create a right in
gross [personal right independent of land] by assigning a
portion of his rights appurtenant [land rights]. It seems to us
clear that the rights which a riparian proprietor has with
respect to the water are entirely derived from his possession
of land abutting on the river. If he grants any portion of his
land so abutting, then the grantee becomes a riparian proprietor and has similar rights. But if he grants away a portion of
his estate not abutting on the river, then clearly the grantee of
the land would have no water rights by virtue merely of his
occupation. Can he have them by express grant? It seems to us
that the true answer is that he can have them against the grantor
but not so as to sue other persons in his own name for an
infringement of them. 47
The above case shows that contractors of water rights, with the
exception of lessees of riparian land, were now in a very different
position from that of riparian owners who used the water. It was now
clear that a riparian could not transfer his full riparian right to them
unless he transferred his riparian land. He could not, in fact, even

145. In Ormerod v. Todmorden Joint Stock Mill Co., 11 Q.B.D. 155,170 (Eng. 1883), where
the contractors had returned the water slightly heated, Brett, M.R. said with regard to
reasonable-use, "[the law as to flowing water is part of the common law of England; but
it only exists as between riparian owners; it does not extend to those whose lands do not
abut on streams and rivers."
The obligation of contractors not to diminish or alter the flow at all is consistent with an
obligation of riparians not to take river water out of the watershed.
146. 159 Eng. Rep. 545 (Exch. 1864).
147. Id. at 556 (emphasis added). In the case of Holker v. Porritt, 10 Exch. 59 (Eng. 1875),
an exception to this rule was made for lessees of the entire estate, who assumed the riparian
rights of the lessor for the duration of the lease.
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transfer part of the right (e.g. the right to divert water) or "deduct," as it
were, any property rights from his riparian "bundle" because this bundle
was shared exclusively with the riparian community. He could, however,
authorize an inland party to draw water from the stream by giving that
party legal access. He would still retain full abstraction rights for himself
to the level of "reasonableness." His contracting partner would acquire
none of his rights to the flow vis-a-vis other riparians but only rights
under the contract. The riparian was confined, nonetheless, by his own
onerous obligations towards the rest of the riparian community, in
addition to the obligations he owed to his contractual partner.
Recall that the legal title of the inland contractor in the prior-use
phase had been very different. By the mere virtue of using the water, he
could bring a nuisance action against anyone who later interfered with
the use and caused him damage. He had needed only to establish his
priority in time, as his "quasi-right" equaled that of any of the stream's
other users in its enforceability. The fact that the courts, often at a high
level, now found it necessary time and again to redefine and limit the
contractual "right" to streamwater, is testimony that the basis of the right
must have shifted. The contrast with the prior-use phase is stark. Then
we found no court cases at all on the subject. They were not necessary
because any user had the same basic right. Now, they abounded.
Clarification by the courts of the riparian right and its transferability inevitably devalued the contracted water right. The contractor
could not buy as much security and other water rights characteristics as
in the previous phase. In addition, his transaction costs increased. To gain
any security in the continuance of the flow a contractor would want a
covenant inserted into the contract requiring the grantor to join the
grantee in a suit against another riparian to restore an interrupted or
altered flow. The riparian partner would also want to limit his risk by
insisting on a covenant whereby the contractor held him harmless against
flow interruption by other riparians, or took full legal responsibility for
his own actionable alteration of the flow. The costs associated with such
contractual safeguards could well have increased contracting costs above
the level of profitability, but we do not know that it actually resulted in
a decreased absolute number of contracts. It did result in more control of
the streamwater by riparians vis-a-vis non-riparians. This was, no doubt,
good enough for those whose demands were catered to in the making of
water law. For by the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the English
version of the reasonable-use theory was well established and widely
accepted. Its application was now much narrower than that of the water
law of the previous century.
Water power, its chief beneficiary, was increasingly yielding to
steam power. Other water uses, city water supply, and transportation and
sewage removal, were being placed under special statutory systems of
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charters. In particular, the courts which, it had seemed, were about to be
forced to develop new doctrines relating to water quality and river
pollution, were relieved of most of this responsibility by Parliamentary
regulation.' 4
Consequently, there were few new river users. Existing users
could defend their rights to particular water uses as being prescriptive,
or as based on survivals of prior-use or natural-flow theories, or as being
clearly "reasonable" according to categories of English judges. They and
those with whom they contracted were content and the English version
remains essentially unchanged into the twentieth
of reasonable-use
49
century.1
9. Recap of Reasonable-UseRights in England;
The period just described of reasonable-use rights in English
water law can be summarized by listing the following rights which had
emerged by the end of it:
a)
b)

Riparians, by virtue of their ownership of land by a
river, had the right to use or divert the flow, provided
they did so in a reasonable manner;
Riparians also had the right to continue to receive the
flow even though they were not using or diverting it.
They could not enforce this right aggressively or obstructively unless they began a use of the water and then
sued for impediment to it. They might also sue for
damages to their "right" to a continued flow by a
"sensible diminution" (a question for the jury); this

148. The British government was eventually induced to curb private rights to pollute. It
did so by enacting The Alkali Act, 26 & 27 Vict. c.124 (Eng. 1863). But see McLaren, supranote
137 (noting that this was only after every public figure and party had concluded that private
rights to use the river for waste disposal, and the seniority of these rights, could never be
used as the basis for private and public transactions to clean up water pollution). When it
was passed, The Alkali Act was impressive in principle but weak in effect. Seniority of rights
took priority over public legislation.
149. In the twentieth century, government regulation and ownership displaced, almost
entirely, individual water rights under judge-made law. The U.K. gradually introduced a
system of regional water authorities, taking in not only the granting and monitoring of
individual rights but also the provision of city water and sewage services. The role of
government thus expanded enormously. See Lyle E.Craine, Water Management Innovations
in England (1969) (describing developments before and just after the Second World War).
See W.R. Derrick Sewell & Lorna R. Barr, Evolution in the British Institutional Frameworkfor
Water Management, 17 Nat. Resources J.395 (1977) (describing later developments). Sewell
and various co-authors have written extensively in this area. See Harold D. Foster & W.R.
Derrick Sewell, Water The Emerging Crisis in Canada (1981) (giving a good bibliography).
In the late 1980s, the British government has denationalized many of the functions of these
authorities.
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c)

d)

e)

f)
g)

strategy would place the burden on the defendant, to
prove he had not caused the diminution or damage
against existing users. They could, however, begin to use
the water at any time and sue for impediment to this
new use.;
In most cases, a riparian could not sue an "extraordinary"
(commercial or industrial) user unless the riparian had
suffered more than trivial damage because of him or
unless the "defendant" (user) were otherwise using the
water in a manner deemed "unreasonable." Seniority
rights continued to operate as between riparians to some
extent;
"Ordinary" users of the river could take as much water
as they needed for domestic purposes without having
regard to the effect of their abstraction on others downstream. This meant that in times of water shortage the
ordinary user upstream might take all the flow without
having to share with other riparians and was immune
from legal action;
Certain uses of the water (other than domestic or "ordinary" uses) were deemed "unreasonable" whether or not
they caused actual damage. Examples were polluting
uses, uses which carried water off riparian lands and out
of the river basin, and uses which were of no utility,
such as ornamental or wasteful uses;
Any use might be made of the water until the user was
sued. Enforcement of the riparian "law" could be made
only by riparians, not the state;
Non-riparians could abstract stream water if they had
legal access to the river. But neither this nor a contract
with riparians now gave them any right as against other
riparians to alter or diminish the flow appreciably; for
example, they had no standing to sue an upstream
riparian for reducing the flow they used. Their rights
were now only against their contractual partners, or,
under the old tort law, against "wrongdoing" outsiders
who had neither riparian nor contractual rights.

SECTION D.II: REASONABLE-USE IN THE UNITED STATES
1. Introduction;
In this section we discuss how the reasonable-uSe doctrine
developed in the United States. Our purpose is to amplify what we have
written above by contrasting the English common law version of
reasonable-use with that doctrine in America.
At the beginning, we should make clear that our division of the
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development of England's common law of water use into various periods
runs counter to the ideas of many American writers. To several American
writers, England never got beyond the second stage: namely, natural-flow. These writers regard such a rule-of-thumb distinction as ordinary vs.
extraordinary-use as necessary in England, just to make the natural-flow
principle operational. But they do not regard it as a separate stage of the
law. American practice has continued to reject non-damaging use to
maintain an action.
2. History and Context of nineteenth century Water Law;
Throughout the Atlantic states, eighteenth century water law was
applied in the wake of early settlement requirements for grist mills and
sav. mills. These were seen less as forms of industrialization than as
adjuncts to local settlement, making ordinary rather than extraordinary
use of stream flow."s However, as industrialization took place along the
rivers best suited to the large-scale generation of water-power, the
magnitude of conflicts before the courts and appeals to the legislatures
increased. Mills were larger, requiring dams and diversions. There were
significant daily streamflow interruptions. These interfered not only with
other mills' use of water-power upstream and downstream, but also with
farmers' and homeowners' riparian uses. Furthermore, the mills were no
longer simple extensions of local land improvement, but enclaves of
industrialization where textiles, metals and wood were broken down,
concentrated, smelted and refined. They now were located less to serve
the local community than to take advantage of waterpower sites. In effect,
the waterpower itself became the localized staple that attracted raw
materials from outside and so transformed the fall-line and valley
economies."M In each valley a user or group of users assembled flows
and storage and traded water-use "privileges." Owners, operators of these
privileges, and local employers and suppliers, had much to gain by being
both political and litigious about water law.
In New England, during the Industrial Revolution, large users
appear to have reduced security and transaction costs by assembling
riparian rights by land*purchase, or by leasing prescriptive rights and
works with prior-use rights, contracting and licensing and building and
operating their own dams, canals and pipelines to form complexes that

150. Weston v. Alden, 8 Mass. 135 (1811); Anthony v. Lapham, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 175
(1827). See Maass & Zobel, supra note 9, at 139; Horwitz, supra note 139, at 42. See Sandford
D. Clark & Ian A. Renard, The Riparian Doctrine and Australian Legislation, 7 Melbourne U.
L. Rev. 475 (1969-70) (providing a similar view, from Australia).
151. Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860, at 156-76

(1966).
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would guarantee to the owners that along some miles of the stream they
could move or impound water as though they owned the stream itself.
The word "privilege" was used here, sometimes to refer to the whole
assembly of rights, sometimes to one local user's proportionate share in
the total water consumed or water-power delivered. 52 These shares
were assignable.
3. PoliticalIntervention;
In water policy, as with taxation and road building, the legislatures' aims reflected their constituents' high priority for the promotion of
settlement, investment and industrialization. The various localities feared
that if their governments did not pitch in and help economic development, it would never happen, or would happen elsewhere. This was a
different outlook from that in England where the government took a
detached, laissez-faire view of the industrial allocation of water.
Parliament rarely intervened except to assist with private bills on such
massive infra-structure projects as canal building.
We have said that Americans also perceived different obstacles
to their aims. This can be briefly explained by a rather sweeping
generalization about the chronology of river development. On American
rivers the original disputes were between water power and other uses of
the river: between mills and farms. Later, the main American issue
became conflict between adjoining water power uses. In Britain, as we
have seen, things happened the other way around. The developers of
mills and water power seem first, and for centuries, to have been
struggling with the owners of similar mills projects to make similar uses
of the rivers. Only later did the conflict with other water uses emerge.

152. See Charles H. Shinn, Mining Camps-A Study in American Frontier Government
(R.W. Paul, ed. 1965) (New York, Scribners 1884) (explaining that there was a year or so
during which miners cooperated on diggings rather than developing systems of individual
claims). See also John Umbeck, A Theory of ContractChoice and the CaliforniaGold Rush, 20 J.L.
& Econ. 421 (1977); Gary D. Libecap, The Evolution of Private Mineral Rights: Nevada's
Comstock Lode (1977). It seems likely that miners also cooperated on ditch companies. If
so, these would have been a fairly precise western equivalent of the eastern joint water
privilege. In particular, individual water users would have held contractual water rights,
good against the company and other customers or shareholders. They would not have held
individual appropriative water rights good against the world. This had been the norm with
the holders of water-power or water privileges. The ditch companies survived longer than
cooperative mining. "In 1855 the miners [of California's Columbia camp] were anxious to
aid the progress of a water-company's ditch; and three hundred or more of them took their
picks, and gave several weeks' work to the four miles of canal and fluming, and supplied
twenty-five square miles of mining ground." Shinn, supra at 246. In the 1850s in British
Columbia, ordinances implementing California water and mining law also made special
provisions for ditch companies.
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That conflict centered on the use of the river to carry away water versus
the use of the river to provide urban water. This difference has not been
developed elsewhere.
Thus, when the eighteenth century English courts continued to
preside over law suits between mills that were injuring each other, their
judge-made law did little to help the agricultural obstacles to industrialization on the rivers of America. The main American problem was
flowage, the flooding of upstream land and the creation of a still pond by
the construction of a dam for storage and head. To avoid the damages
payable under English nuisance or tort law, it became imperative for a
dam builder to compensate upstream landowners for loss of flowage."
Indeed, on a slowly-falling river he might have to compensate a large
number of them. As any one of them could hold out for high compensation, the dam-builder's problem was similar to that of any road or canal
building assembling land for a right of way.
When the costly solution to his problem was seen as a deterrent
to economic development, it evoked a helpful response from government.
As early, as 1713 the states had begun to legislate the mill, or milldam,
acts. These had encouraged the building of grist mills for local farmers
by giving millers power to expropriate upstream flowage very similar to
powers then being given to road and canal projects." Later, through
to the mid-nineteenth century, these mill laws were applied to assist not
just locally-needed grist mills, but large industrial mills."
As Scheiber says in a referenced study, the states gave these
investors the status of public utilities to arm them with the "power to
expropriate some of America's choicest water-power sites, such as those
on the Connecticut River, the Delaware, and the Merrimac. " The laws
were defended as preventing old riparians from blocking new industries.
They did that and more, transferring much of the economic rent of river
locations from landowners to the new mill builders.

153. The original remedy was damages. Later, injunctions became available. See generally,
Earl F. Murphy, A Short Course on Water Law for the Eastern United States, 1961 Wash. U. L.Q.

93, 111-14 (1961); Horwitz, supra note 139, at 47-54.
154. Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government:

1789-1910, 33 J. Econ. Hist. 232 (1973), reprinted in American Law and the Constitutional
Order 132 (L.M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber, eds. 1988).
155. See Jamie Benidickson, Private Rights and Public Purposes in the Lakes, Rivers and
Streams of Ontario 1870-1930, in 2 Essays in the History of Canadian Law 365, 369 (noting
that a mill law was also proposed to Ontario, or Canada West, in 1859, as a matter of public

importance).
156. Scheiber, supra note 156, at 136.
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4. Disputes Between Mills: Prior-UseRights Principlein America;
In our view of the chronology, the early conflicts between mill
developers were frequent but not serious. They were satisfactorily
resolved by the English common law, combining prescriptive rights with
prior-use rights. We believe that the rivers were sufficiently numerous
and large to provide sites for all. A short stretch could provide the power
needed by several users. This view is consistent with the observation that
when the new natural-flow theories arrived from England, they were
hardly needed. The disputes were such that natural-flow principles and
prior-use principles seemed to point to the same decision. Settlement and
industrialization leapt across the landscape, and neighboring river sites
were quickly chosen by new arrivals. When these were in conflict, the
downstream party often had the stronger claim. The downstream riparian
could claim actual damage or violation of a prior-use right, or invasion
by the upstream party of a property right to the natural flow. Here is an
1837 Vermont judgment in which prior-use rights and natural-flow
principles are seen to mean much the same thing:
The common law of England seems to be that each land owner,
through whose land a stream of water flows, has a right to the water in
its natural course, and any diversion of the same to his injury, gives him
a right of action . . .Should this principle be adopted here, its effect
would be to let the man who should first erect mills upon a small river
or brook, control the whole and defeat all the mill privileges from his
mills [up to] the source.157
It is striking that such judgments, and later writings, all assume
that if a law or judgment denies water rights to a new use, the use
thereby becomes defeated. Judges wrote that the flowage rights of
riparians to use the water entailed the power to exclude new uses. That
the riparian could then sell or rent a "privilege" is implicitly denied.
Under the powerful stimulus of the growth of textile milling, Horwitz
says the judges believed that economic development embodying
water-powered plants could not proceed without displacing older uses
and so must hurt the users. Indeed, Horwitz apparently accepts their idea
that capitalism offered no alternative but losses to the original owners.
Under this way of thinking only the courts, not the markets, can bring
about the re-allocation of sites to more profitable uses. Horwitz states:

157. Martin v. Bigelow, 2 Aik. 184, 187, (1827). See Horwitz, supra note 139, at 276 (citing
Martin and saying that the mill's right to a natural flow would allow it to interfere with the
natural flow, perhaps to the detriment of those downstream-thus, the natural flow rule
would permit the first mill to control stream use not only up but also down, and so "control
the whole").
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The increasing frequency with which courts appealed to
the idea of damnum abue injuria [damage without legal
injury) seems to have occurred in direct proportion to their
recognition that conflicting and injurious uses of property
were essential to economic improvement.ss
In practice, as in England, prior rights, the right to press nuisance actions,
and the trade in water privileges continued together. As late as 1821, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court clearly adopted a rule of priority of
occupation. Chancellor Kent, although he was very soon after to be the
first to expound the reasonable-use principle, wrote of this decision that
the long-duration aspects of the prior-appropriation principle were
necessary to justify an owners' investing in a (durable) mill."so
Presumably, the late eighteenth century American courts'
veneration of Blackstone would have strengthened their belief in
prior-use water rights,' 6° although this support must have been sorely
tested by the common belief that the priority rule stood in the way of
new industries. We suspect that this belief was publicized by some
demanders to persuade the states or the courts to free them from paying
the price generated in an active water-privileges market.
5. Tyler v. Wilkinson: The Advent of Reasonable-Use;
To finish our discussion of prior-use rights, we should briefly
state that there were cases which foreshadowed their rejection. Maass and
Zobel pinpoint three New York cases that denied a prior occupant of a
water-power site necessarily had a superior right. 6' Both parties were
entitled to the natural flow. This entitlement was referred to in one of
them as a "common right," and doubtless was the first of many cases in
which the American courts were to respond to conflict by increasing the
extent of common use rather than the extent of exclusivity. These cases

158. Horwitz, supra note 139, at 40. Horwitz does not attribute his evidence for this
increasing frequency, although his footnotes show that he has examined numerous cases.
Possibly he deduced it from Joseph K. Angell, author of two editions of Watercourses, in
1824 and 1833. For a later edition see Joseph K. Angell, A Treatise on the Law of
Watercourses (5th ed. 1854).
159. See Horwitz, supra note 139, at 274 (describing how in 1793 a Connecticut court
illustrated the confusion that the "first" user might merely be the user upstream, because
there the flowing water came first). See also Hatch v. Dwight, 17 Mass. 288 (1821), cited in
Horwitz, supra note 139, at 279.
160. For example, prior occupancy by a reasonable-user gives a prior title to such use
against later comers. See, e.g., Cary v. Daniels, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 466 (1844).
161. Maass & Zobel, supra note 9, at 142. The three cases cited are Palmer v. Mulligan, 3
Cai. Cas. 307 (1805), Platt v. Johnson, 15 Johns. R. 213 (1818), and Merritt v. Brinkerhoff, 17
Johns. R. 306 (1820).
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set the course for the reasonable-use criteria to be introduced by Justice
Story in Tyler v. Wilkinson 2 in 1827.
It is difficult to date the advent of the reasonable-use stage in the
United States. Some state courts continued to enforce the old prior-use
and natural-flow principles even after Tyler v. Wilkinson. Indeed, Story's
own 1827 judgment cites approvingly several conflicting cases, such as
Wright v. Howard and Williams v. Moreland. Like Bealey v. Shaw in
England, Tyler v. Wilkinson was later used to support divergent judgments.1" Story's judgment was disseminated the very next year in
James Kent's Commentaries."' American judges, already having some of
the same ideas, began soon to conform. As we have seen, the judgment
made its way with some ten years' lag into English decisions, notably
Embrey v. Owen, which picked up Story's quote of Kent's remark:
"Streams are for the use of man" [and so not to be left in an unused
state]. Nevertheless, it was some time after this that the American
reasonable-use phase began to cast doubts on existing users' individual
water entitlements and privileges.
Tyler v. Wilkinson could as well have been decided on prior-use
or on natural-flow grounds. One party, the plaintiff, had a dam. This did
not divert water, but allowed him to store and release water so as to
create a current for mills further downstream. The defendants had for
some time diverted a certain amount of this released water into their
canal (ditch) just below the dam. The plaintiff sued when the defendants
increased their diversion sharply, so injuring the plaintiff's milling
business. Justice Story found for the plaintiffs. His reasoning has since
proven to be more influential than his finding.
Story rejected the plaintiff's mere priorityof appropriation,which he
distinguished from the more significant priority of occupancy or
possession that in frontier America would justify one's taking empty
unowned land. Water, especially this water-flow, was not unowned,
although the running water itself could not be possessed but only the
channel and the right to enjoy the flow. Since the right to enjoy the flow
in the channel is an incident of the riparian land, every owner of the
riparian land must own a right to use the flow. This is the source of
ownership, rather than prior-use. Ownership of the flow is conceptually
possible only if all riparian owners are considered to own it in common.
Next, Story rejected the idea that either the plaintiff or the
defendant was entitled to the naturalflow of the river. Since any use of
the river entails some degree of retardation, acceleration, or diminution

162. 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
163. See Lauer, supra note 77 (analyzing Story's judgment).
164. James Kent, Commentaries (1st ed. 1828).
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of the flow, to the injury of others, the test must be the extent of injury
that can be tolerated. Story held that the amount of the flow that can be
tolerably diverted or interfered with is an amount that is indispensable
to the general and valuable use of the water; at any rate not diminishing
the value of the common right. A person must not be prevented from
making a valuable good or an enjoyment of the flow merely because of
a trifling cost or inconvenience to another. Thus the "golden rule," sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, applies. To an economist's eyes, Story's
explanation is consistent with a utilitarian "greatest good" maxim. Let
water be used so that each person gains much while imposing little, or
less, injury. Note that following the "golden rule" is a perfect ethical idea.
Following it makes the sum of the gains to public convenience or general
good more than the sum of the inconveniences or losses." s
Story's treatment, almost like an economic analysis, is impressive.
Although writers have often cited isolated passages to suggest that Story
was confusedly supporting all previous authorities and contending
doctrines at once, his development of the above diagnosis clearly
deserved the attention it instantly obtained.
6. Brief Examination of Reasonable-Use Procedurein the United
States;
To conclude this description of the reasonable-use phase in
America, we briefly examine now what went on in an American state
court where a plaintiff sued a defendant for diverting water. Since under
the Story theory, "reasonable" could mean "more productive than the
alternative," both parties' uses came under scrutiny for their legality with
respect to riparian status and over-riding navigability requirements.'"
The plaintiff had to be aggrieved, but his argument need not be
only prior-use rights as in England. It could also be over an apprehension
that his water use would suffer actual damages if the defendant's less
reasonable-use continued. The court determined whether or not the
defendant's use was the cause of the injury, and whether it was justified
by, for example, a prescriptive right validly acquired. Prior use was not
often explicitly accepted as a justification (though Trelease has emphasized that in practice American courts rarely found for a new defendant

165. In our suggested economic argument, it is assumed that Story assumed that private
gain was also a public gain or convenience.
166. The definition of riparian status was the subject of much argument. Reserves and
transfers of water rights to non-riparian parcels or uses had been unfamiliar in English
cases. Also to be settled was whether riparian status required that the claimant owned the
streambed or its bank, Often these had been reserved.
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whose reasonable-use was junior to the plaintiff's prior-use right). 7
The court would also ascertain whether the defendant's use was
preferred to the plaintiff's by reason of being ordinary or natural.
This brings us to the problem of showing that the defendant's use
was unreasonable in the circumstances.
This test committed the
United States courts to examinations of water uses by both parties more
searching (and less predictable) than in England.
In trial courts throughout more than twenty states, different
judges have instructed juries on what a defendant might reasonably do
in the local circumstances. These, mentioned in leading cases in different
states, indicate that reasonableness has been interpreted in many ways.
One example is as follows:
In determining what is a reasonable-use, regard must be had to
the subject-matter of the use; the occasion and manner of its application;
the object, extent, necessity and duration of the use; the nature and size
of the stream; the kind of business to which it is subservient; the

importance and necessity of the use claimed by one party, and the extent
of the injury to the other party; the state of improvement of the country
in regard to mills and machinery, and the use of water as a propelling
power; the general and established usage of the country in similar cases;
and all the other and every-varying circumstances in each particular case,
bearing upon the question of the fitness and propriety of the use of the
water under consideration.lss
The affected United States jurisdictions have accepted and used these
classes or scales of reasonableness, which according to Powell and Hanks
are reducible to four: reasonableness of purpose, destination, quantity
and pollution.'7
7. Balancing of Interests;
Balancing of interests meant something different in America than
in England. Under English procedure the court would more or less have

167. See Frank J. Trelease, Water Law, Cases and Materials 325 (3d. ed. 1979) (saying "in
some of the... cases, the court [used] natural flow language, some [spoke] of reasonable
use and some of non-riparian use, but regardless of the form of statement, the downstream
plaintiff with the priority receives protection.")
168. Surveys have been done to attempt to find the meaning of reasonableness. See
Theodore E. Lauer, Reflections on Riparianismn, 35 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1970) (classifying
meanings of reasonableness).
169. Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, 30 Minn. 24, 15 N.W. 167, 169 (1883). A similar
listing is published in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 41.
170. Richard Powell, Real Property 371-74 (1968); Eva M. Hanks, The Law of Water in New
Jersey, 22 Rutgers L. Rev. 621, 630, reprinted in Charles J. Meyers & A. Dan Tarlock, Water
Resource Management 51 (2d. ed. 1980).
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been conducting a search for evidence of one of several kinds of
unreasonableness in the defendant's use of the natural flow. This
evidence could be the fact that the defendant had caused damage to
another riparian user, that he had prevented an "ordinary user" from
enjoying his domestic uses of the water, or that his use was unreasonable
per se (such as a polluting use), any of which findings would routinely
justify a finding against the defendant. Only now could the English court
exercise discretion in determining what was "reasonable" and in
providing a remedy. To determine whether to exercise the equitable
remedy of an injunction or to merely award damages, it would consider
the interests of both parties, weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
own water uses and behavior in the balance.
In the American procedure, while the remedy would of course be
arrived at in the end, consideration of the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
actions would come much earlier in the proceedings. If both plaintiff and
defendant were found to be acting reasonably and if the plaintiff was
harmed by the defendant's actual or proposed water use, the American
reasonable-use procedure called for a decision that would balance the
gains. It is understood that the plaintiff's injury alone was not sufficient
for. such a finding. In particular, an inquiry essentially comparing the
benefits and costs of acceding to the plaintiff's claims would be made to
determine who should win the case. If paying for compliance would
greatly exceed the plaintiff's injury, then the court would tend to find
that the disputed rights to use the flow belonged to the defendant. The
balance of harm would determine the ownership of the interest in water.
Only then, in determining the remedy to award, could the court,
including a jury, moderate its finding. For example, a court might find
that one party was diverting an unreasonable amount of the stream. It
could then order that the diversion be fixed at a given reasonable
amount.1 7
In this respect the victory of the right of the prior-user in the
United States was less complete during this regime than that of the
prior-user in England. This was to be expected for, as we have just seen,
the reasonable-use principles in the two countries were not the same.
Some American courts held that prior-use was one of the factors but not
the only factor to consider in the court's determination of "reasonableness" as between riparians (other factors were the utility of the use, size
of the river, et cetera). Nevertheless, in almost all states the fact that a
sizable investment in the water-using activity had already been made had
some weight in the determination of reasonableness as between liti-

171. See, e.g., Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549,150 P.2d 405 (1944), discussed in Trelease,
supra note 169, at 312-13.
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gants.'" Furthermore, the American constitutional protection of vested
property rights worked to protect a prior-user. This perhaps explains the
Americans' resort to the courts to determine "reasonableness" on a
piecemeal basis determined by a multitude of factors, only one of which
is prior-use.'73
Another way of explaining the process that courts engaged in
while balancing interests is that they searched for a compromise solution
which would generate the maximum net gain to society. Hence, the result
was rarely one of a party winning or losing the right to the flow, but of
sharingit. This manner of proceeding also gave local courts the advantage
of avoiding alienation of plaintiffs or defendants by unpopular rulings
heavily on one side or the other. 74 Because pollution was not a problem
of the magnitude on the American rivers as it was in England, the
question of "damage" could' be resolved more as a question of allocation
of resources and less as a question of pure compensation. This enabled
the courts to take a conciliatory rather than a fault-seeking approach
towards the parties to an action. The role of the judge was to make peace
on the rivers and at the same time establish the best use for their waters.
A finding for one party alone, in this case, would be an extreme form of
water sharing. From an economic point of view the process did not
constitute a final step in resource allocation. The court's division of
"ownership" merely laid the way open for the litigants to adjust their
respective flow entitlements by contracting with each other.
8. Explaining the Differences between England and the United States;
Why did England and the United States use the reasonable-use
system of water rights differently when the foundations (i.e. rights
derived from riverside land ownership) were the same? We have already
suggested some probable reasons in an earlier part of this discussion.
They include the fact that at this point in history, industrial pollution was
not at such a critical point in the United States as it was in England,
where streamwater was no longer potable nor ecosystems supportable.
Also, uses in the United States tended to be on a larger scale than in
England, and rivers tended to be longer and wider. Population density
was not nearly as high in America, and the problems of providing
drinking water for cities did not have the same magnitude, nor did the

172. The influential case of Cary v. Daniels, Mass. (8 Met.) 466 (1844), favoured the
prior-user or occupant of a river site; but later some state courts began to play down the
role of prior-use in the balancing of factors contributing to reasonableness.
173. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 41.
174. In England, the royal courts were more "distanced" from their subjects and were not
as concerned about the effect of unpopular decisions on the respect of the court.
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problems of sewage disposal. These economic, geographic, and demographic factors explain why pollution was taken so seriously in England,
and hence why the English courts adopted only some elements of the
American "reasonable-use" approach. All of these elements were badly
needed in America, but not in England.
In America, the development of the river valleys had proceeded
very quickly. No sooner was a colony or territory opened to settlement
than local flour and saw mills were being erected. With their attached
dams, canals, ponds and log-driving chutes, the operation of mills
conflicted almost at once with farm and town water systems, with each
other and with navigation and fisheries. As the courts were addressing
such problems the frontier pushed west, and new river valleys calling for
changed technologies led to litigation not fully covered by English or
American precedents. On top of all this hasty original exploitation came,
around 1800, the age of textiles and heavy-industry water power. Waves
of investment re-opened old questions about the water rights in the
original colonies, now with much more at stake.
The courts could not respond to these concerns with the law at
hand. English principles, derisively said to have been forged for bucolic,
seasonal activities, worked less acceptably when applied to highly
capitalized dams, diversion canals, lakes and year-round users. Nor could
American users as easily settle the disputes outside the courts. Rejection
of any system of prior-use rights undermined some private sales, leases
or contracts. This led the owners of the new mills to try to capture the
rights they had so recently established. To do this they relied partially on
the arguments referred to in Justice Story's landmark decision of
1827.1" Many concepts were flung into the cases by litigants, regarding
not only the traditional prior rights/public rights principles established
by Blackstone, but also nuisance law, and natural-flow rights, as well as
Roman and French law. Finally, from negligence law, the standard of "the
reasonable man" was thrown in. In the hands of the American courts it
proved to be familiar enough to be widely applicable, robust enough to
threaten well-entrenched old users, yet flexible enough to be applied
differently in different circumstances. Furthermore, where waterpower
was scarce, it provided for compromise and sharing of the water
resource, and kept the peace.
9. Update:Statutory Permits Superimposed on Riparianism;
East of the 100th parallel the American states and the Canadian

175. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312), discussed supra,
Section V.D.IJ.5.
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provinces have stayed, generally, with the reasonable-use version of
riparian law for over one hundred years. However, it has been changed.
Some states have used their statutory powers to blend the system with
features of western appropriative water rights (see next Section), both
systems working at once on the same river. These have been dubbed the
"hybrid-law" states. Furthermore, all jurisdictions have modified
water-using rights with statutory rules. Many of these are concerned with
determinations of "priority" or other rationing of water when water levels
are low. We shall call these the "permit" jurisdictions. There are about
thirteen of them in the United States as well as the province of Ontario
in Canada.
All accounts agree that American and Canadian water law was
quiescent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In that era
legislatures took some problems away from the courts and the common
law: water-supply, irrigation projects, fishing and pollution. But in their
remaining applications the common law reasonable-use rules, under the
courts, were left undisturbed. To most people "water policy" meant
western streams and big-dam projects, or the equivalent Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) and Ontario Hydro, hotly debated by left and right and
inland and coast. It was apparently not until the 1950s that the riparian-law jurisdictions became aware that their "humid" environments had not
always enough water to go around for small-scale industry and other
local uses. Was this because of the system of water law? Their inspection
of the western states quickly revealed the fragility of provisions for
droughts in riparian law compared to the robust structure of those under
the western appropriative law. When droughts, pollution or dam-building
were issues, reasonable-use riparian law offered users in the Atlantic,
southern and mid-western states no priorities and no flows for public, as
opposed to private, uses. The tangible results of water shortage discussions among states in the 1950s were state decisions to take what they
called a "planning" role in river-basin management. New agencies got
varying powers to deal with water supplies and with pollution. Among
these powers was the introduction of water-taking "permits.' 76

176. This sketch of the history of permit systems is confirmed by research into the history
of the Ontario system. Around 1960 that province was introducing new water institutions
to deal with flooding, with city sewage disposal and with water pollution. There had been
proposals to introduce a type of water-taking permit to reinforce these. But they were
upstaged by the need to deal with a different problem: drought in the tobacco counties of
western Ontario. We hypothesize that this drought led to a very hasty adoption of the
permit system then being installed in neighbouring Ahwerican states. In consequence of the
haste the permit system scarcely fits with other Ontario administrative water systems or
pollution systems. Its administration does provide information, and officials paid to use
their judgment in emergency low-flow rationing. We are grateful to Professor Dan Shrubsole
of the University of Western Ontario for access to his studies of the history of these Ontario
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Under the permit statutes, users were allowed to continue their
use and were provided with permits that limited it to certain sites and
amounts. New users had to apply to an agency under a director, who
commonly also could adjudicate disputes, approve transfers, and cancel
unused or misused permits. Permits had a limited life, but were
renewable. The agency tended to be dominated by riparian law, but was
not limited to reasonable-use criteria, some agencies being given a scale
of priorities for new applicants. Otherwise, prior-uses were respected, as
one would anyway expect in bureaucratic decision-making. Transfers of
water to other locations or river basins were not precluded. Shortages
and droughts were addressed by legislative provisions which, during a
water emergency, the director might invoke to suspend water permits. He
was then supposed to follow a different scale of priorities provided by
legislation, or by the director and commission. The agencies in the humid
east have rarely been called on to make tough decisions on such
matters. 7
Most states exempted domestic and certain other water uses from
permit requirements. From the administrative-cost point of view, this was
sensible, but it deprived those states' agencies of a complete list of water
users. This was serious because at best eastern "permit systems [functioned) less to allocate water than to provide systematic information for
to clarify
state water planning. It is thus not surprising that they" [failed]
8
the status of persons and rights in a time of shortage. '
Most users in the permit states and Ontario have not had their
common law rights extinguished, nor have the legislatures claimed to
have done so. Should water-power or water-supply demands again tax
the capacity of the rivers, it is likely that the present laws and their
bureaucracies will not be robust enough to stand up to all the challenges.
Unless statutes are changed, users are governed by a lumpy mixture of
reasonable-use, natural-flow and administrative rules. Under permanent
increased scarcity, many conflicts will again find their way to the courts
for resolution, and these will continue to generate decisions, precedents
and new characteristics of common law rights. Surely the rights or
permits will be strengthened to allow transfers and contracting.
But these recent permit-state developments are of little consequence to most North American-users of river levels and flows. Since the
middle of the nineteenth century, these users have held their rights under
a radically different system. In the 1850s, when reasonable-use doctrines
were surfacing for,the first time in England, and when variations of them
institutions, and to Professor Bruce Mitchell for comments on the period.
177. There was a tendency to instruct the agency to base its decisions on the public
interest, a directive familiar to public utility and other administrative commissions.
178. See Meyers & Tarlock, supra note 172, at 196-97.
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had been in place for some twenty years in the United States, new rights
had emerged. This development was revolutionary, more dramatic than
any previous change in water titles. In the western states the new rights
were called appropriative rights, and in the next Section we shall call this
new regime the "prior appropriation period." During this period
water-use rights resembled a return to those in the eighteenth century-that is, to personal, individual, use-based rights, and to seniority as
the guiding principle in allocating or distributing rights to streamwater
use.
E. THE PRIOR-APPROPRIATION PHASE: THE UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL AND USE-BASED
WATER RIGHTS IN 1850
1. Introduction and Geography;
The evolution of water rights in the prior-appropriation period
was quite different from the process in England and New England. The
lands and rivers being largely untouched in the western United States,
early developments did not lead to major disputes or conflicts. Consequently, litigation was comparatively rare, and judges were not often
called on to make crucial decisions about water law and individual water
rights. Instead, the water rights were first demanded from what we
called, in an earlier chapter, "customary" procedures. These are something
akin to those medieval procedures from which the rules governing the
holding and use of rights over common land emerged, to be accepted and
reinforced by the royal courts.
However, our description of these informal western procedures
will show important differences from what one supposes were the
leisurely workings of medieval manorial society. First, the processes were
rushed, as they were called on to produce water law for transient gold
miners and impatient settlers. Second, those who participated in the
customary procedures could, and did, back themselves up by demanding
political support; where necessary even inventing jurisdictions, legislatures, administrative bureau and law courts all at once. For many of
them, the shaping of water rights, or Congressional homesteading or
timber policies, was not a major goal. It was only one element in their
tireless promotions of land sales, church and community establishment,
trading-center development or railway financing. Third, the local rules
and rights that these hasty processes prnduced were not left in their
original profusion but were rather quickly made uniform by the forces of
migratory competition among users and by the rationalizing activities of
legislative committees and higher courts.
The results of this hasty improvisation and rationalization are

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 35

visible on an American map. The eastern states have systems of
reasonable-use, riparian water rights, most of these recently supplemented by a system of statutory water permits." The 100th meridian
roughly divides these states from the prior-appropriation states to the
west. Eight of those, the mountain states of Idaho, Montana, Wyoming,
Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona and New Mexico, have only appropriative rights. Nine other western states, on the Pacific Coast or in the Great
Plains (Washington, Oregon, California, North Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas,
Texas and Oklahoma) have "mixed" systems of appropriative and riparian
rights.so Irrigation is the chief explanatory variable. In agriculture in the
high, dry mountain states, irrigation is the rule, even on extensive cattle
ranches, but in the coastal states there are regions where irrigation is not
practiced.
In Canada, the central and eastern provinces have common law,
reasonable-use water rights systems which in Ontario are modified by a
permit system. The Yukon and four western provinces have appropriative-rights systems very similar to those in the United States, although the
users are issued administrative water-use permits rather than holding
property-type rights in water.
All the Australian states have a roughly similarly administered
system. It is built to serve irrigation and has been flushed free of most
riparian-law remnants, but it differs in many details from the North
American systems. 8' New Zealand has a mixed system, some elements
of riparian law having given way before a regional system with
individual quotas like appropriative rights. 2 Both countries use devices
other than seniority as a source of priority or precedence in dry periods.
To follow these developments, we must shift again the location
of our historical study. Eastern United States water law had already left
behind, years in advance of English water law, the long phase of
individual or use-based prior rights and had entered on a water law.

179. Under these systems individuals are given a right to use a set volume of water for
a set purpose for a given period of time. A change in volume required or use will usually
result in the need for a further permit. See our discussion of water permits in Section D.II.9.
180. Which of the seven appropriative states chose "pure" water right systems and which
"administrative" licenses seems to have obeyed no geographic rule. See discussion of
California and Oregon in Section E.5 below.
181. See Alfred L. Birch & R. Bruce MacLock, Water Conservation and Transferable Water
Rights: Australia and Alberta, 17 Canadian Water Resources J. 214 (1992) (describing
Australian rights). See also Clark & Renard, supranote 152; Joseph M. Powell, Environmental
Management in Australia, 1788-1914 (1976); Andrew K. Dragun & Victor Gleeson, From
Water Law to Transferabilityin New South Wales, 29 Nat. Resources J.645 (1989).
182. B.M. Sharp, Tradable Water Permits in New Zealand (1989) (unpublished
manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Auckland). See also N.J. Allison,
Transferable Property Rights to Water. The New Zealand Experience (1988).
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regime recognizing and enforcing the concept of reasonable-use.1 3 By
1850 this was well entrenched, especially in New England, and with the
rest of the common law was filtering westward with the settlers.
It was around this time that prior-appropriation rights began to
be established and enforced in California.'" In many of the states where
prior appropriation later came to be recognized, there was as yet no
prevalent system of water rights in place, either because the newly
created states had not yet formally received the common law of England
as their law or simply because the land alongside rivers had not yet been
acquired by settlers from the federal government. In other states,
prior-appropriation rights were acquired alongside the recognized
riparian rights of individuals to whom government had granted riverside
lands.s As vested property rights, these early riparian water rights
were protected by the United States Constitution. Consequently, early
appropriative rights were subject to them. Although the two systems of
allocation might seem to have been conceptually incompatible, their
co-existence seems not to have created serious conflicts as long as the
rivers were not "fully appropriated."8 6 In mixed-system states prior
appropriators who encroached on common law water users were
protected by state courts,'8 7 but in general, prior appropriation did not
entirely replace riparian law until legislation selected the new system.
Perhaps, however, the choice was in spite of the common law, or in
ignorance of it, because the new system was familiar and worked. The
co-existence of the two systems is the subject of Section E.5.b below.
Why had the tracts of public land alongside western rivers not
yet been alienated? Most were awaiting transfer to individual ownership
by sale, preemption, homesteading or by direct grant via one of the states

183. Recall that Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312) was one
of the first cases to describe "reasonable" riparian rights while its English counterpart,
Embrey v. Owen, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Exch. 1851) was not pronounced until 1851.
184. We shall see this was another individual and use-based system, not one based on
property.
185. The percentage of such land was very small in most of the western states. In some
states (e.g. Idaho and Utah) the Federal Government still owns almost two thirds of the
land, whereas on a country-wide basis, it owns one third of the land.
186. Wells A. Hutchins, The Common Law Riparian Doctrine in Oregon: Legislative and
judicial Modification, 36 Or. L. Rev. 193 (1957). Later, in states where neighbours might hold
rights under different systems of law, terrific political debates and legal battles attempted
to win the rivers for one system or the other. See Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886), where
the Supreme Court of California upheld the riparian rights of downstream users to certain,
natural overflows of the Kern River, as against the statutorily derived appropriative rights
of upstream users. In jurisdictions where water rights had been acquired before 1850 under
common law, champions debated switching the whole state or province over to the newer
system. We discuss the aftermath of this case further in E.2 below.
187. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
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or the land-grant railways. One reason was that settlers had not yet
arrived. More important, much of the land in question was (and remains)
unattractive to settlement, being mountainous and/or dry. Even in
modem Nevada and Utah less than three per cent of the area is
cultivated.I In these regions the first water users were not settlers or
even cattle ranchers but placer miners who, from 1849, worked up the
creeks in search of gold. Many soon rushed off to new discoveries in
Colorado and to Australia in 1851, and Canada (the Fraser River) in
1858-59, when California gold became scarcer. Even if the miners had
wished to settle, they could not have acquired riparian land easily. In the
crucial period in the United States, 1847-49, the western American
resources lay where land-granting offices, courts, assemblies and police
had yet to appear.
2. A Parade of Claimants to PriorAppropriationsof Western Waters
Thus it was that, because settlers and other land users were slow
to arrive, there were no proprietors to claim riparian rights in the western
states. But others did appear, and they did use water and did make
claims to the ownership of rights to it. Historians have looked to three
groups/persons in their search for the true forerunners of the present
water rights holders. The best known are first, the California gold miners
and second, the mountain-state open-country settlers and ranchers. A
third group, related, was land developers and governments, who should
be regarded as regional boosters and promoters-perhaps speculators-rather than as farmers and settlers. Just as they invested in land
and built irrigation systems to attract newcomers, so they also arranged
an appropriate water law for their clientele. Some historians identify, as
a fourth source of water law, the Spanish, Mexican and Indian irrigators
in the southwestern states. All four evidently set the stage for modern
western irrigation farmers in "arid" and."desert" regions. Sometimes the
experts and litigants dealing with modern water law write about these
earlier groups as rivals, for a distinct spirit or purpose in water law can
be attributed to each originating group.
a) Mining Camps in California
A very generally accepted theory about the choice of a prior-appropriation system in the western United States is that it was all a gold
rush "self-help" measure introduced by miners.'"s These, it is said,
188. James H. Backman, Public Land Law Reform-Reflections from Western Water Law, 1
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1982).
189. See Hutchins, supra note 188; Wells A. Hutchins, Water Rights Law in the Nineteen
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assembled in their camps, devised, agreed on, and enforced a new
mining law. Their social contract also included provisions about a new
water-rights system. Because water rights were parallel and incident to
mining claims, they would be implemented and enforced in the same
way: by recognizing seniority of "active" claims and by applying force to
defend them."9° It is widely agreed also that the use of threat or force
was influential in the making of rules by the camps.
These simplifications mask a diversity in water use and water
law. It is doubtful that water rights got established in the first months
of the California boom. At that time the placer miners were few, and they
spread up and down along the creeks. They used the running water for
pans, rockers and long toms or sluice boxes. Their diversions were
therefore small in relation to the flow and did not call for the appropriation of water. Indeed it seems likely that riparian law suited their
needs. 192
It is significant that California took no steps to disavow riparian
law. In 1848 the military authority had ordained that Mexican mining law
did not apply.'93 In 1850 the new legislature embraced common law. It
did not accept common law water rights, which it could easily have
done. In 1854 it enacted a new water code somewhat along the appropriative-rights lines accepted in other irrigation states and territories, referred
to below. But the mining counties were excepted.
Appropriative water law probably was first recognized around
1850, when waves of miners were excluded by the first comers from
creek-side claims. This second group of placer miners took up claims

Western States (1971), [hereinafter Hutchins, Water Rights Law].
190. The leading contemporary source is Shinn, supra note 154. An influential legal study
was Samuel C. Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States (3d ed. 1911). Many histories and
legal treatises enlarge on these. Economists are indebted to papers by Umbeck, supra note
154.

191. The next three paragraphs are much influenced by the rationalization of California
water-rights history by Pisani, especially his refreshing emphasis on the ditch companies.
Donald J.Pisani, Federalism, Water Law, and the American West, 1886-1928, in Perspectives on
Federalism 117 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1986). This group is often neglected in histories of
the mining boom in California and other places, especially by first-hand observers. Laying
emphasis on the miners themselves and their colorful camp life, they included little about
the entrepreneurs whose water use transcended the single camp location. This is also true
of the Yukon gold rush.
192. See also Anthony Scott, British Columbia's Water Rights: Their Impact on the Sustainable
Development of the Fraser Basin, in Perspectives on Sustainable Development in Water
Management 341,355 (A.H.J. Dorcey ed., 1991) (explaining why the first (1859) gold-mining

proclamation in British Columbia referred to water rights in a way that sounds like they
were being assigned to riparian leases).
193. Donald Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West: Water, Law, and Public Policy 1848-1902,
at 13 (1992).
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higher up the banks, called dry diggings. Needing water to wash the
gold out of their dry gravel, they had a choice between taking the gravel
to the water or taking the water to the gravel, by ditching hillside or
mountain sources near their claims. To the extent they chose ditching,
there was a choice between digging their own dams and ditches or taking
water from a ditch company. It seems that the rulings governing these
companies were the ancestors of appropriative water law amongst the
miners.'"
Rulings were necessary not because the miners were illegally
diverting streams and carrying the flows over the heights into other
"watersheds," but of the intensity of the ditch companies competition with
each other. There were problems of definitions of amounts when the
creeks and other sources alternated between flood and drought, their
ditches could carry more water than was available. The rules of seniority
were apparently first applied here.'"
Pisani explains how the ditch companies also conflicted with a
third group of water users: the driers or drainers. Holding claims on and
under the stream, they dried the creek bed by temporarily diverting it
into a flume or ditch. One massive 1850 diversion turned the Feather
River out of its natural channel for forty miles. This called for cooperative
organization, to raise money, get the work done and deal with holdouts
or free riders. These ventures seem to have faded away as sources of
mining law, perhaps to reappear in state laws for dredging creek beds.
But they created a great commotion at the time. Pisani says:
Most of the violence in 1850 arose because miners who turned
streams either deprived other miners of water or gave them
too much [for example, miners were submerged by bursting
flumes]. All too frequently, unsuccessful negotiations, during
which the injured parties were usually asked to join the
company, culminated in attempts to tear down dams and
flumes. Miners disagreed over which water rights were
stronger: those senior in time, those used on land closest to the
water, or those whose holders had invested
the greatest
96
amounts of money developing their claims.
These three classes of water users fought, argued and litigated
until the legislature was ready to pass a law. Only the second, the ditch

194. It is not clear how one mining camp could rule on the priority of a ditch company
that served several camps.
195. See Hutchins, Water Rights Law, supra note 191, at 254 (saying that early rights to
appropriate water in California were derived in part from "local customs formulated and
applied in the mining camps of the Sierra Nevada foothills.") This observation suggests that
water works were staked like mining claims.
196. Pisani, supra note 195, at 19-20.
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companies, would seem to have made urgent use of the prior-appropriation rule. The others needed something else. Anyway, the best evidence
seems to be that7influence of alluvial mining on California's water law
was temporary."
b) Homesteaders
Other modem writers accept the gold miners' role, but credit
current water law to the reaction of early farmers to the mountainous
topography and dry climate of western agricultural lands. These farmers,
to win land under the land laws and Homestead Act, were required to
cultivate it. In many regions, that meant bringing water onto the land.
The water law, therefore, was not sought to provide rules for users
seeking water privileges for a mill or factory, as in the east. Neither
milling, manufacturing, nor even mining were dominant or frequent
water users in the west. Irrigation was to become by far the greatest use
of water. The common law would have allowed only riparians to
withdraw water, in small amounts. It would have denied them rights to
carry water beyond their boundaries, to consume it, and/or to return it
at another point. As few settlers planned to farm beside the high
mountain creeks from which piped water was withdrawn, the law would
not have applied to their water uses anyway.
There was another problem. Even if they had thought the
common law did apply, the settlers could not have turned to it to resolve
disputes about water rights, for common law courts were not available.
It followed that litigation and the common law process could not play a
role in adapting English water law to local circumstances. Instead, like
the miners in other regions, the settlers developed their own rule. Just as
homesteaded land was acquired by the first to claim it, so necessary
amounts of water were assigned to the first to divert them. This, it is
claimed, was the basis of the Mormon "tradition" of enforcing the
exclusive rights of the settlers who found water and first put it to
use.'" The Mormons arrived in Utah just before the gold rush in
California, and were to have great influence in developing irrigation
institutions outside their own communities. From the first, Mormon
institutions tended to divide water equally. As populations slowly

197. But see T.L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West, 18 J.L. & Econ. 163 (1975) (working on this presumption and arguing that
early farmers and ranchers, already investing in water storage and control, borrowed the
miner's water property system).
198. See George Thomas, The Development of Institutions Under Irrigation, with Special
Reference to Early Utah Conditions 29-57, 274 (1920); Robert G. Dunbar, Forging New
Rights in Western Waters 9-17 (1983).
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increased, the amounts available for each holding began to fall. By 1880,
the pressure of the bishops on the legislatures to turn from subsistence
for all to commercial production by a few became irresistible, and a
rough transition to the typical individualistic riparian system of other
states was quickly negotiated.'" At least one Canadian scholar, Percy,
is of the opinion that "no doubt" the Alberta Mormons carried the revised
Utah system to Alberta where it was influential in formulating Canadian
territorial law.
In the other states farmer irrigation developments followed soon
after the miners in the 1850s. Dunbar notes, "the farmers' first ditches
were short and small, constructed to irrigate the bottom lands bordering
the streams. Sometimes they were dug by individual farmers, sometimes
by groups of farmers tending to be "crooked, steep and subject to
erosion.""' These groups may have given way to, or evolved into, the
ditch and canal companies, mutual irrigation companies, and irrigation
districts reviewed in Section E.7 below. Soon they were the most
numerous class of right holders. The essential basis for their rights was
prior-appropriation.
A common theory which attempts to explain why appropriation
rights were introduced stresses the beneficial-use requirement of the
rights, rather than the consumptive use intentions of the farmers. Where
industry and government were both pressing for rapid development in
the face of a relative scarcity of water, a use-based individual right was
more attractive than a land-based right because it gave access to more
potential developers and settlers.
The theory is that developers and promoters exploited the
doctrine for their own gain. They amplified the
appropriative rights
"public outcry"' against the riparian rights system. Note that it was
they, and not actual upland settlers who, it was said, went without water.
Developers and promoters could not dispose of such land without it, and
could not get it without obtaining it from the earlier arriving ranchers,
pre-empters and squatters who had taken all the best locations on the
bottom land along the streams. Instead of contracting with these
first-comers for their land and water, the developers were more likely, in
keeping with their populist practice, to have urged the appropriative
doctrine, coupled with a stringent beneficial-use condition. This would
bring about the intensive land use they desired. In any case, many
argued that a water right with a beneficial-use requirement and easy

199. Arthur Maass & Raymond L.Anderson, ... And the Desert Shall Rejoice: Conflict,
Growth, and Justice in Arid Environments 325 (1978).
200. David Percy, The Framework of Water Rights Legislation in Canada 281 (1988).
201. Dunbar, supra note 200, at 19.

202. Percy, supra note 202.
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marketability was a helpful instrument for dynamic development. It
helped prevent a speculative overhang of unsold land from depressing
land prices. In the process, it created an incentive to obtain water not
fully used.
c) Continuance of older regional water laws
A third theory is that western water users adapted locally-existing customs and traditions until they became modern appropriative law.
For example in 1881 the California Supreme Court declared that the City
of Los Angeles had succeeded to all the rights of the pueblo of Los
Angeles, including those to all the waters of the Los Angeles River,
granted by Spanish royal decree in 1781. Therefore it held that the city
had ". . . the paramount right to the use of the waters of the rivers."'
A pueblo right, according to Wells Hutchins, was a distinct category
under Spanish law, a common property for domestic use, irrigation, and
other purposes under regulations administered by the town officials.N
A modern dispute about entitlement to surplus water turns on whether
the pueblo was entitled to floodwaters.'
Other historians have described instances which appear to lend
credibility to this third theory but Pisani has more recently rejected it
outright.'
These three views of the origin of western United States
appropriative rights may seem to present westerners deliberately turning
from an outdated eastern riparian water right to find a system with better
features. Although vivid, however, the portrayal reflects hindsight
reasoning and ignores the nineteenth century reality. The fact was that

203. William Blomquist, Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern
California 198 (1992).
204. Wells Hutchins, The California Law of Water Rights 67 (1956).
205. Blomquist, supra note 205, at 198.
206. See Johnson & DuMars, supra note 14, at 349 (saying that native Americans dug
community ditches for agricultural purposes, and that some of these ditches were later used
by northern Spanish military outposts and missions). In this sense the Spanish and the
Mexicans in the southwest appeared to be well ahead of American miners, ranchers or
settlers in using a prior-appropriation system for water. See also Trelease, supra note 169, at
22-23 (providing references which suggest that specific legal grants of water diverted onto
lands in Mexican or Spanish territories later ceded to the United States). These grants had
some of the characteristics of appropriative rights. Hutchins, supra note 14, at 261 (also
supporting the above theory); T. Glick, The Old World Background to the Irrigation System
of San Antonio, Texas (1972) (discussing these issues generally); Michael C. Meyer, Water
in the Hispanic Southwest: A Social and Legal History 1550-1850 (1984) (also discussing
these issues generally). But see Pisani, supra note 195, at 39 (stating "[a] few western
historians have mistakenly argued that prior appropriation was a legacy from Mexico.
Nothing could be further than the truth.")
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the common law of water was not outdated. It had been keeping up with
the times, changing very rapidly for at least one hundred years,
remarkably transforming itself from one ruling principle to another.'
But the actual, riparian law of their day, with its frequent changes
brought on by the revolution in milling, textile and metal industries, must
have been utterly unknown to the young pioneers who are now thought
of as the inventors of the prior-appropriation system. As water users they
were merely following a self-help experimental approach in organizing
their respective rights and obligations in a new land as best they could.
Consider the first western politicians to whom the miners, settlers
and irrigators entrusted their immediate property problems. They must
have given little attention to comparing with the older alternative the
long-term merits of the new appropriative water rights system which the
pioneers were implicitly designing. As politicians they were concerned
with law and order, and with the How and Who of public land, mineral
and water disposal. If any had realized that the application of a system
of common law water rights based on riparian land ownership would
have required even more complete and rapid land sales, they would have
been struck by the irrelevance of this circuitous procedure to their
short-term water problems. As newly-arrived placer miners, ranchers on
the open range and irrigators getting along well without occupying much
land, they would have questioned a political requirement that to get
water they must become riparian land owners.
Furthermore, they would have run into an ethical question: should
the first distribution of water be incidental to a prior distribution of land
ownership? The politicians acquiesced in the miners' and ranchers' own
water principles: first-come first-served and use-it-or-lose-it.
d) From California to Colonies
Did the new appropriative system of water rights emerge because
there were no governments to enforce the common law system? This is
a possible explanation, strengthened somewhat by the survival of
common law riparian rights, alongside appropriative rights, wherever in
the western states there were established courts and governments to
enforce them."
The explanation is subjected to a different kind of test in the
British colonies of Victoria and New South Wales, Australia,' and

207. See Pisani, supra note 195, at 24 (saying of Californian miners in 1850 that "riparian
rights were honored in many districts, although they varied from place to place," and
illustrating three kinds of qualified riparian systems).
208. See Section E.5.b.ii below.
209. See Clark & Renard, supra note 152; Sandford D. Clark & Ian A. Renard, The
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British Columbia, Canada.21 These regions were on the frontier of
settlement by Europeans. Their lands were mostly owned by the Crown
or government. They also experienced gold-mining booms in the 1850s,
and they witnessed a rapid progression in agriculture from extensive
grazing and ranching to dry farming and on to intensive irrigation. They
also abandoned the common law rules regarding water, but differently
for, unlike California and Utah, they were not without governments and
courts. They were under tight colonial rein from the beginning, and their
internal affairs were under responsible elected governments from the
1860s or 1870s.
British Columbia, with its 1858 Fraser gold rush, borrowed both
211
the California mining "law"and the California miners' water customs.
However, having a riparian law already in effect on the sister colony of
Vancouver Island, its first "proclamation" in 1859 was ambiguous, linking
water rights to land leases and mining claims, as we have seen happened
in California. But later the same year, the official gold mining ordinance
(codifying some of the California mining rules) set out that ditch or water
privileges could be applied without being on riparian land or appurtenant to any property.212
Water law rules were strictly an extension of Crown mineral
disposal law until 1875. After that, they broadened periodically to
recognize domestic and agricultural uses, and continued to have a
public-lands disposal flavor. In 1892 a government declaration placed all
water under Crown ownership. Licenses that were the lineal descendant
of miners' water rights were to be issued for any use, and some attempt
was made to give administrators a priority ordering. 213 The resulting

Framework of Australian Water Legislation and Private Rights (1972) [hereinafter Clark and
Renard, Framework]; Sandford D. Clark & Ian A. Renard, Constitutional, Legal and
Administrative Problems in The Murray Waters (H. Frith & G. Sawer eds., 1974).
210. See Scott, supra note 194.
211. See id. at 355. See also Percy, supra note 202, at 289.
212. There is much documentation to show that the new British Columbia mining law
was drawn up on Colonial Office advice based on Australian experience, but the parts
dealing with water were confusing, and lacked generality. This suggests to us that neither
the Fraser miners (many from California) nor the Australian law had any clear model of a
water right system in mind. At different places the rules were completely ad hoc and
unsuitable for expansion into water law.
213. See H.W. Grunsky, Water Legislation and Administration in British Columbia, in Report
of the Minister of Lands D117 (1913) (noting that legislation directed to irrigation
arrangements had to wait until the Water Act of 1909). See also Kenneth W. Wilson,
Irrigating the Okanagan: 1860-1920, at 22 (1989) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
British Columbia) (suggesting that irrigation legislation lagged because, compared to mining
and-water works, government received little or no revenue from early irrigation projects).
See also R. Farrow, Water Rights in British Columbia, in Transactions of the Second Resources
Conference 42, 44 (1949). See also Scott, supra note 194.
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system had and has many California-like features: prior appropriation,
seniority, beneficial-use, and effective transferability. Nevertheless it is a
paternalistic administrative system, in some ways more akin to the
rights on Crown land than to California's water
system of tree-cutting
214
property system.
In Australia a system of riparian rights was already applied in
Victoria and New South Wales. It was not abandoned during the gold
rush, though the government did, introduce long-term water licenses
allowing reservoirs and ditches, as well as water to put into them.215 As
soon as the gold rush was over the government dusted off riparian rights;
at the same time it introduced the first of a series of statutes to permit
and regulate city waterworks and mining and agriculture water system.
By 1865 riparian rights still existed, but government-sponsored irrigation
systems were clearly in the ascendant. 2 6 There was no trace of a United
States-style appropriative-rights system.
A commission from Victoria inspected the California system in
1880. It liked its escape from riparian rights but not its legalistic costs and
uncertainties. In 1886 it opted instead for tight state government control
of all water uses and the issuing of non-transferable rights appurtenant
to land, without precedence by seniority.
The Canadian prairie region, while its lands and resources were
still under federal ownership and control, was settled in the 1880s and
early 1890s mostly under riparian water law. In 1892 this system was
hastily dropped, replaced by an administrative license system that
reflected the irrigation-influenced water laws of Utah and the northern
2 17
tier of American states. Australian irrigation law was also considered.
Not until the age of widespread irrigation were the American
states, followed by the British regions, to see individual water rights as
a component in a whole system of procuring, using, sharing, storing and
recycling water. Indeed the Australian states made government storage
and irrigation projects, with equal user rights, central to their irrigation
laws. These were to use the practice of United States irrigation institutions, rather than state laws, as a model. This would have been impossible without strong, well-entrenched governments.
The Canadian prairie provinces' eventual water laws also relied
214. Alastair R. Lucas, Security of Title in Canadian Water Rights (1990).
215. Mining Statute, §§ 5, 25, 36, 71 (Austl. 1865), cited in Clark & Renard, Framework,
supra note 211, at 153.
216. Clark & Renard, supra note 211, at 154, 157.
217. Percy, supra note 202, documents the U.S. influence in the drafting of western
Canadian law. The earlier British Columbia water law was largely ignored. Indeed the
implicit competition between the regions for settlers probably induced British Columbia to
follow Alberta and Saskatchewan in copying features of US. water law suitable for creating
irrigated acreage.
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more heavily on administrators even than American states with administrative appropriative systems. Rules for irrigation institutions were built
right into the law. Although their retention of seniority and beneficial
use, and their willingness to allow transfers of licenses, did mimic the
United States laws, they would seem to have been deliberately shaped by
government, and not developed by users.
e) Debates in the Age of Irrigation
In the 1880s and 1890s, American debates about water law were
not about government licensing versus private rights. Little attention was
paid to this dichotomy. Instead, politicians were subjected to disputes
regarding the virtues of common law water rights versus appropriative
rights. Holders of water rights, fearful of losing them, were subjected to
explanations of what the two systems consisted of. Politicians, like such
scholars as Wiel, held a brief for one of their two
experts and
' To
"schools."218
make their points, writers jobbed backward forty years
or more, imputing their current arguments to the pioneers of the
appropriative system.
In their works, these writers greatly exaggerated the power and
rigidity of any system of water law. They affected to believe that had the
system of appropriative rights not been introduced, western resources
would not have been developed. It was not in their interest to attempt a
balanced with-and-without comparison, in which both systems of law are
seen as capable of change and development as requirements for water
change. Even today some authors writing for law-school books write as
though retention of the common law would have absolutely prevented
the spread of mining and irrigation and the growth of the American west,
western Canada and most of the states of Australia. So what is the
system which was adopted?
3. The OriginalIndividual Prior-AppropriationRight and the Administrative
license
The substance of the individual's water right developed as the
result of the interaction of two main principles of prior appropriation,

218. See Wiel, supra note 192 (providing among the first investigations of the legal origins
of western water law and fiercely propounding Wiel's belief in the appropriative system).
See also Samuel C. Wiel, Originand Comparative Development of the Law of Watercourses in the
Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 Cal. L. Rev. 245 (1918); Samuel C. Wiel, Waters American
Law and French Authority, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 133 (1919); Samuel C. Wiel, Fifty Years of Water
Law, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 252 (1936) (in this last title, taking a more neutral position). See also
Maass & Zobel, supra note 9 (referring several times to Wiel's work).
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namely seniority and beneficial-use, and the idea of location and its
changeability.
a) Seniority
Priority or precedence by seniority meant that whoever had used
the water first had the better title. 1' Any member of the public could
appropriate water in this sense. Subsequent appropriators acquired
"junior" rights subject to existing "senior"rights.
While seniority had been only implicit in the prior-use regime
discussed earlier, it was magnified to the status of a basic principle after
1850 in appropriative-rights jurisdictions. In the absence of government
regulation, the holder of a water right was protected against the claim or
suit of another so long as he could show that his use was the earlier use,
and that it was beneficial. As such rights became increasingly transferable, priority or seniority drifted from the holder to his right. The original
diversion and its date became irrelevant as only a matter of history for
the current right-holder.
As regards the origin of seniority, we suggest that the earliest
miners and settlers could easily have gotten the idea of seniority as a
criterion for the better title from existing water law. For example, as we
shall see below, it was implicit in much of the common law of water as
well as being a principle of Mexican, Spanish and earlier Roman law. It
may also have been transferred from frontier land law. For example, the
rules for acquiring public preemption and homesteading holdings gave
preference to the first comer. The new mining laws, and traditional forest
licensing laws, also favored the first user.
Moreover, when government water-use regulation and ownership
became widespread, seniority was retained. In the American southwest,
there was never any doubt that seniority was to be central to the system.
So far as we have been able to tell, no other concept was ever entertained.
This was natural, for, as just mentioned, governments were already
presiding over several systems of resource alienation in which seniority
played a major role. This was particularly important when scarce water
was to be allocated in dry periods. Had they not been able to allocate
water according to seniority, officials would have had to invent and
enforce some other basis of sharing-that is, of wealth distribution. We
believe this task would have been so far beyond their powers that the
legislatures would never have consented to the idea of administrative
water rights.

219. The Latin maxim which explained the new system was "qui prior est in tempore, potior
est in jure" (the person first in time is the stronger in law).
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b) Beneficial Use
The principle of beneficial use meant that the right was good only
as long as the water was in continuous use. Typically the beneficial uses
were specified, such as domestic, irrigation or mining. The two principles
together meant that rights to use the flow of water in a stream were
quantitative. In times of normal flow they did not conflict, but were
mutually exclusive.
c) Location and Changeability
Another important principle had to do with location and its
changeability. Unlike a riparian right, an appropriative right allowed its
holder to take water from a stream and carry it anywhere. However, each
right had two addresses: the specific location of the intake on a specific
stream (necessary to establish the seniority in the order of precedence)
and very often the specific place of use to which the water was carried,
or to which it was "appurtenant."' 0 With approval, both of these points
could be changed.
To enforce his right the holder initiated court action, claiming
that the other user had a right that was not "senior" to his, that he was
using a volume of water that he was not entitled to, or that he was not
using the water beneficially. His own seniority was established by proof,
as originally there was no register of water rights apart from court
records. The volume of his entitlement was also established by proof,
often relying on the user's irrigable acreage. That his use was beneficial
was established by determination of the court, often relying on evidence
of his expenditure on diversions or ditches.
In the twentieth century, in many American jurisdictions, the
original appropriative right has become an administrative permit. Where
previously the holder held his water right, like his right to his farm, as
an interest good against the government and all the world, he now held
it of an administrative agency on behalf of the government, which
typically claimed powers to control rights of ownership over all waters
in its jurisdiction. The Australian and Canadian governments had worked
on this theory from the 1850s on, and on the new American states'
systems. Usually there is a Water Act and a senior controller or engineer
heading an agency that awards permits or licenses, records them, and
attempts to keep track of seniority, volumes appropriated, flows yet

220. However, an appropriative right is not "appurtenant" as firmly as, under the
common law, an easement is annexed to a piece of land. A water right was attached to one
piece of land until it was attached to another.
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unappropriated, and beneficial use."
In some of these jurisdictions the licenses are as exclusive,
transferable and secure as under the original system. But in others the
licensee's entitlement is subject to discretionary interpretation. Protection,
approval and enforcement of rights is largely transferred from the courts
and made subject to administrative rulings, with appeals to quasi-judicial
committees, boards and tribunals.' In all except the Australian system,
the principles of seniority and beneficial use have been continued from
the original system and applied similarly.
4. Economic CharacteristicsUnderlying the Appropriative System
We have just seen that the new system had three features not
found in the earlier common law system: precedence by seniority; the
requirement of beneficial use; and a locational arrangement which was
conducive to transferability. In this section we associate each of these
three features with one of the fundamental "characteristics" of any
property right. We shall associate seniority with the exclusivity characteristic; beneficial use with the quality of title or security characteristic; and
the transferability feature with the transferability characteristic. The
mapping is not perfect, for the seniority feature provides security of title
as well as exclusivity; the transferability feature provides both transferability and divisibility; and the details of the beneficial-use feature
determine both duration and flexibility of title. Nevertheless, it is a fair
association, considering that a water right, merely an interest in using a
flowing liquid in a common pool, is quite unlike the right to possess and
hold rural land from which our system of property rights has emerged.

221. Some of the Acts and the agencies are also responsible for ground water licensing.
Their regimes differ widely. Some are confined to surface water.
222. See Trelease, supra note 196, at 401-15 (comparing American states). See also Victor
S. Clark, History of Manufactures in the United States (1916); David H. Getches, Water Law
in a Nutshell (1984). See Birch & MacLock, supra note 183 (comparing American states with
Canadian provinces). See also Martin Zimmerman, Inter-ProvincialWater Use Law in Canada:
Suggestions and Comparisons,in 2 Constitutional Aspects of Waste Management (D. Gibson
ed., 1969); Scott, supra note 194. See W.H. Ellis, Legal Constraints on Alberta Water
Management (1914) (giving sketches of Canadian water right systems). See also Gerard V.
LaForest, Water Law in Canada-The Atlantic Provinces (1973); Lucas, supra note 216; 2
Alberta Department of Environment, Water Resources in Alberta Vol. 2: Water Rights 1-24
(1991); Percy, supra note 202. See Birch & Maclock, supra note 182 (describing Australian
water rights). See also Clark & Renard, supra note 152; Powell, supra note 183; Dragun &
Gleeson, supra note 183; A. Ian Randall, Property Entitlements and Pricing Policies for a
Maturing Water Economy, 25 Australian J. Agric. Econ. 195 (1981). See Sharp, supra note 184
(describing New Zealand water rights). See also Allison, supra note 184.
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a) Beneficial use and quality of title
Once the new holder of a water right had complied with the rules
of acquisition and registry, and had established the seniority of his right,
the continuance or security of his entitlement within the system,
depended only on the continuance of his beneficial use of the water. It
could not otherwise be forfeited or declared abandoned, although in
times of water scarcity it might not be fulfilled. Lack of water did not
mean the unused right would be deemed abandoned.
The requirement has two kinds of effect. The intended effect was
that underemployed water would pass towards higher and more
productive employment. The unintended effect is that water is put to
work too early on too lavish a scale. The law compels a water right
holder to use the water beneficially, but not as efficiently as possible. 4
The market did the rest.
How intensively the water was used depended on how the state
courts of the day defined "beneficial." Originally their interpretations
differed widely, much as the common law courts were differing on the
meaning of "reasonable-use." Later, consistent definitions were introduced
by higher courts, legislation, and the license-issuing administrative
agencies. These typically relied on the premise that to make beneficial use
of irrigation water the right holder should have made an expenditure on
diversion and delivery works, and should subsequently maintain them
so that all corners of the appurtenant area could be irrigated.
But this was not good enough to many. That a farmer was visibly
using his water did not prove that he was not, like many others, merely
going through the motions, marking time, his real purpose being not to
produce but to hold his right speculatively for an increase in its
value.' An obsolete irrigation enterprise would actually tend to
increase the amount he claimed. 6 The opportunity and cash costs of
taking it would be small. In other words the enforcement of the
beneficial-use requirement was just as likely to induce waste as to

223. It might be challenged from outside the system, by claimants of riparian rights and
of rights of foreigners or aboriginal peoples.
224. This remark of Mason Gaffney is said to be in Mason Gaffney, Water Law and
Economic Transfers of Water: A Reply, 44 J. Farm Econ. 427 (1968), but we cannot find the
precise citation. The user is said, in effect, to be stockpiling as much as the law will allow
of his ownership of a property-like asset that is increasing in value without carrying costs.
225. See Mason Gaffney, Economic Aspects of Water Resource Policy, 28 Am. J.Econ. & Soc.
131 (1969) (discussing this and criticism of the opponents of speculation). See also Mason
Gaffney, The Taxable Surplus in Water Resources, 10 Contemp. Pol'y issues, 74-82 (1992).
226. Until recently, the irrigator's quantitative claim to water would be expressed in terms
of the number of acres of a certain crop. This custom tended to induce the irrigator to
exaggerate the necessary amount of water per acre (duty of water) for his enterprise.
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prevent it.
This somewhat theoretical allocation complaint was aggravated
in actual disputes between applicants for water rights. A party would
argue that his adversary's proposed water use did not come within the
current definition of "beneficial." 7 One author cites a recent illustration
in which a Colorado water judge ruled that using water for dust control
or land reclamation would not be beneficial, using it for cooling might be
beneficial, and using it for slurry in pipelines would be beneficial.'
To deal with the conflicts exacerbated by these ambiguities, some
legislatures augmented the benefit requirement with a preference ordering.
This upset the original requirement by recognizing that all users were not
making equally beneficial use of water, and by actually suggesting that
in cases of conflict, some should yield water to others. A typical ordering
might run down from most-preferred home and farm uses, through
manufacturing, to power and mining uses. Compared to precedence by
seniority, however, precedence by preference ordering has had few effects
on the water rights system. It had tended to strengthen the claim of
domestic users, with or without rights or permits. It has been available
to help resolve rare disputes between new applicants for permits with the
same seniority.'m And it, or a special version of it, can serve as the
basis for expropriating old low-value use rights to make way for new
higher-value uses,- or to return water to a river to encourage in-stream
uses of the kinds discussed in a later section."
These extensions of the beneficial-use requirement do augment
the flexibility characteristics in the system, but at the price of reducing
the quality of title and exclusivity it offers to a right-holder. On balance,
it seems likely that quality of title has been weakened. As water has
become valuable, it has become less costly for challengers to directly
attack existing titles in the courts and tribunals and indirectly in
legislative committees and administrative agencies. Users are now

227. Definitions are arbitrary. Nevada and Utah treated conserved or stored water as
"unappropriated." But California classifies storage as a beneficial use.
228. T.D. Tregarthen, Water in Colorado: Fear and Loathing of the Market Place, in Water

Rights: Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy, and the Environment 119, 124 (Terry L.
Anderson ed., 1983). The author cites Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District
v. Huston, 593 P. 2d, 1347 (Colo. 1979).

229. See Lucas, supra note 216 (describing this phenomenon in four Canadian provinces).
230. See Trelease, supra note 169, at 221-22 (noting that the legislature may have to juggle

the state preference ordering to empower a new user (city or utility) to take water from old
agricultural uses).
231. See Johnson and DuMars, supra note 14, at 356-61 (describing typical legislation).
Granting a permit in "the public interest" as determined by a continued pre-existing
preference ordering, however, is probably an infrequent approach to catering to demands
for instream water, which we discuss in Section F.4.
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vulnerable to legal reductions in their entitlement which would have been
unthinkable in the past.
b)Seniority and exclusivity
Seniority constrains a water-user's rights more than the flexible
beneficial-use principle. It is most in evidence where stream flows are
widely variable, and even normally compatible water rights come, under
dryer conditions, into conflict. A sharp-edged rule, ranking the quality of
rights' titles by their dates of issue, it prevents disputes and reduces
bargaining costs drastically by saying the most senior user gets all his
water before the next gets any. Consequently, the more junior a holder's
right, the longer the expected periods without any water, the more
uncertainty about when these periods will occur, and the lower the
market value of the right.
As water rights become divisible and marketable, having a junior
right need not bring unavoidable hardship. A user can now ideally
combine fractions of cheaper, riskier, low-flow junior rights with dearer,
safer, high-flow senior rights to create a "portfolio" that is just as optimal
for him as an investor's portfolio of securities. His success depends on
the transaction costs of trading in rights of different seniorities. However,
such costs will be too high for the small-scale water user holding only a
junior right. In default of assembling a "portfolio" of seniorities, the
small-scale user has three less attractive recourses: go in for dry farming
or ranching; invest in water storage; sell out altogether and/or buy a
more senior right. 2
Another track for users who seek a larger share or their "full
entitlement" in dry periods has been to demand relief from the seniority
principle in new legislation. For example, where a senior raises an
injunctive action, a court may qualify the injunctive, permitting the junior
to continue its use while providing practical protection for the plaintiff
seniors. As the costs of accommodation are placed on the junior, the
process amounts to a compulsory transfer, part sale and part gift. Or, the
government can force a senior user to make a transfer to a junior. For
example, as seen above, New Mexico's administrative law gives a junior
user a "right of replacement" to expropriate part or all of a senior right
if the junior's proposed use is preferred to that now made by the
senior.' Most forced exchanges do not involve such a permanent and
232. See Pisani, supra note 193, at 12 (saying that miners and small "user-companies" in
Placer County, California elected this latter option, and discussing how these groups "sold
out to rival [water] companies far more than they took their grievances to court" because
of the "mere threat" of lengthy lawsuits and bankruptcy).
233. William C. Schaab, PriorAppropriation, Impairment,Replacements, Models and Markets,.
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drastic transfer of rights. Information is skimpy but it seems that under
practices in some American states shortages are shared proportionately
and even low-preference users are entitled to some water.2m In most of
the administered water systems of the Australian states, equal sharing is
the rule, with sometimes an extra apportionment being made to water
users with the most water-sensitive crops.' In Alberta and probably
other Canadian provinces, shortages are shared equally according to a
negotiated procedure, even though it "... is not in accordance with the
Alberta Water Resources Act and thus leaves the government open to
legal challenge. " '
Other relief is possible. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that
everywhere senior rights are still in a strong position. Most governments
usually will not actually do much for junior rights-holders in times of
shortage, except assist in procedures by which they can gain recourse to
the market, buy senior rights and so indemnify their owners. The water
shortage sharing procedures in American riparian-law states 7 have no
equivalent in appropriative-rights jurisdictions. Even in the worst water
shortages, in terms of acre-feet of water diverted, they do almost nothing
to force holders of senior rights to share with junior holders.
The seniority principle is an ingenious way of giving high
exclusivity to some rights holders even when water availability fluctuates
widely. The resolute retention of this principle in rights systems means
that the exclusivity characteristic has not declined. Indeed, rights may be
more exclusive and secure than originally. This is because stream-adjudication procedures, flow records, and seniority registrations have made
each right increasingly quantitatively specific. Consequently, in spite of
more serious variability in climate and natural flows, each holder is
increasingly independent of the decisions or actions of other users.

23 Nat. Resources J.41 (1983). The word "replacement" refers to a computer simulation of
water availability and net expected withdrawals. The junior's proposed withdrawals replace
the senior's. This compulsory-purchase procedure can lead to the same result as
reasonable-use procedure. Id. at 42.
234. See Maass & Anderson, supra note 201, at 337 (mentioning Utah). Jack Hirschleifer
et al., Water Supply, 236 (1960)(mentioning Colorado, Idaho and Nebraska as states where
in dry seasons domestic and farm uses are preferred but low preference users must be
"accommodated").
235. Randall, supra note 224. See also Dep't of Water Resources, Water L. Rev. 22-24 (1986)
(Victoria); Dep't of Water Resources, Water Law and the Individual (1986) (Victoria); Birch
& MacLock, supra note 183.
236. Birch & MacLock, supra note 183, at 221. But cf. Percy, supra note 202 (not mentioning
the existence of this discretionary practice in Alberta). See also Lucas, supra note 216.
237. See Section D.1I.
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c) Transferabilityof prior-appropriationrights
Since water is a standard chemical compound and since
appropriative rights are quantitative and exclusive, we would expect to
find water being traded between rights-holders. One incentive is the
profit margin between the worth of the water to the seller and its worth
to the buyer. Another is the pressure from the beneficial-use requirement.
And there are indeed many recorded transfers, particularly where water
is valuable. According to a 1986 survey by the Western States Water
Council, "[viery few transfers of appropriative rights occur in North
Dakota, Alaska, Nebraska and South Dakota. At the other extreme, water
rights are bought and sold frequently in other states. Colorado, Idaho,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Washington and Wyoming reported that 50
or more transfers occur annually. Colorado, Nevada and Utah reported
that more than 300 transfers occur each year. " ' In these latter three
states and in California this transferability allows water-rights holders to
participate in organized water markets. These markets are by no means
perfect, the lots of water on offer being restricted in various ways by
duration, security, seniority, region and quality. Nevertheless arbitrage
and speculation tend to cause divergent local prices to converge, and
local markets to coalesce into one wider regional water market3 9 But
in the other mountain and south west states water transfers, sales and
exchanges are more fragmented, so that a single market-wide price does
not exist.
Nevertheless, sales of water rights separately from the land to
which they have been appurtenant are less frequent relative to holdings
than, say, the sales of used cars. There are obvious reasons. Owners who
sell water lose the value of improvements they have made in their real
estate. As well, they may find physical transfer is costly, or impractical.
Finally, they may be holding on for the capital gain implicit in rising
water prices. The importance of these is hard to evaluate. In addition to
them, there are at least three explicit obstacles to owners' water sales that
demand separate attention.
(i) Legal protection of third parties.The chief reason for the scarcity
of complete or partial transfers is that they are discouraged by the law
and by procedures. Transfers require the approval of a court or a
government agency. The procedure is usually relatively simple if the
transfer is to keep the water appurtenant to the same land, or if it is

238. Johnson & DuMars, supra note 14, at 373. How much was transferred is another
question.
239. See Steven J. Shupe et at., Western Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation, 29 Nat.
Resources J. 414 (1989) (surveying these markets from a water-broker's point of view).
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temporary, as with a lease or rental.2' But if the transferred water is to
be appurtenant to a new location, or/and diverted at a new point, the
administrative agency or the court must usually consider the extent to
which the transfer injures third-party water users, and hear their protests.
If the water right corresponds to a share in an irrigation company, the
transfer may be simple, but for large or distant transfers both the
company and the government may have to agree. 24'
What third-party injuries are caused by transfers? One group may
be called extra social or community costs. These arise because a long-distance water transfer can take families and business activities away from
a community. Then the remaining population in irrigation districts, water
companies and local municipalities lose scale economies and tax bases,
not to mention social cohesion, political viability and culture. Such
districts and communities have complained. In sympathy, politicians have
reduced the transferability of water rights, 2 and have supported
irrigation companies that have resisted the transferability of their shares.
A second group of injuries is caused by water-right spillovers.
They arise because a water transfer can reduce external economies, such
as downstream water-taking from return flows or water tables. Then
downstream users and rights holders suffer loss of income and property
value. These third parties have also vigorously opposed water transfers
and induced politicians and administrators to institute procedures to
preserve the quality of their water title. 243
A third group of injuries is caused by any water expropriation or
transfer that reduces stream flows and so damages public uses, such as
navigation, recreation, wildlife habitat or water quality. These effects are
inducing politicians to act directly by setting standards that transfer-approving procedures must respect. They are also inducing interest groups
and organizations to seek standing before the courts and hearings in
order to oppose transfers and to protect or enhance public water uses. 2"

240. Some large users, such as cities, may assemble a portfolio of permanent and
temporary water rights, from different sources. Id. at 417-22 (providing a revealing
American survey).
241. See Michael Rosen, The Political Economy of Water Markets, AERE Newsletter 10-14
(Nov. 1990) (reporting on the incentive by members of irrigation districts to approve capital
expenditures rather than the internal redistribution of water).
242. Maass & Anderson, supra note 201.

243. See George A. Gould, Transfer of Water Rights, 29 Nat. Resources J.457 (1989).
244. See Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 257 (1990) (describing how the American states these groups have argued that
the government must play a formal "public trust" role under the constitution to protect
navigable waters). See also Joseph L. Sax & Robert H. Abrams, Legal Control of Water
Resources (1986). Such public uses are protected in Canada and Australia by statutory
arrangements that over-ride individual licenses.
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The procedures and rules introduced to slow down transfers are
aimed at verifying and reducing or removing these sources of injury. In
some jurisdictions the courts may, after a painstaking hearing, enjoin the
holder from transferring the water right. In most jurisdictions, the courts
have been replaced by agencies which more informally hear applications
for an administrative transfer of the water right or license. The court or
the agency may refuse consent; may attach conditions; may require that
a part of the volume of water in the right not be transferred, or may
insist on a settlement or compensation. But financial compensation is not
an infallible remedy. True, it can win the consent of objecting groups. But
the price or settlement they demand may capture all the seller's profits,
and more. Furthermore, their consent may be contractual and temporary,
requiring costly renewal if the water is to be transferred again.
The traditional remedy for this has been compulsory purchase of
third parties' rights, as was discussed earlier. 5 There we saw that
under the regime of prior-use rights the English parliamentary canal
charters assigned rights to divert water compulsorily to canals, and the
Massachusetts mill acts assigned water flooding privileges to mills, in
return for court-awarded payments. Analogous procedures are used to
transfer water under the current appropriative-rights regime. Holders of
key water rights may be compelled to sell not only to irrigation and ditch
projects, but also to favored manufacturing.
(ii) Transaction costs as obstacles. The payment for third parties'
consent is only part of the expense of making a water transfer. On top of
it, perhaps exceeding it, is the cost of undertaking the settlement or
conveyance by industries. But such compulsory procedures can hardly
form the basis for an active market in water rights. Informal committee-like procedures are more likely to loosen up water rights now tied down
to their original appurtenances.
Transaction costs include negotiation, contracting, bargaining,
litigation, mediation, political action and rent-seeking. These can consume
what the literature refers to as the time and trouble of the "obstacles" or
"difficulties" of transfer. In general, incurring transaction costs also means
spending money for the information on which transactions can be based
and for after-transaction monitoring, verification and enforcement
activities. Of all these, the information costs can be the most serious.
Information may be needed with respect to the following
questions: First, what is the hydrology of the river and what facilities are
available to transfer water? Second, who is a possible trading partner and
what is the best strategy of dealing with him? Third, is the quality of title
adequate? What is its seniority or priority? Fourth, who might protest

245. See Section E.4(b).
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and how are they affected by a transfer with a change of diversion?
The hydrology of the river may be a matter of public record, or
available from an administrative agency. Otherwise, the parties will have
to invest in their own studies. It is an error to believe that large investors
now depend entirely on government studies.
Finding and selecting a trading partner has not been easy, and
especially if the proposed transfer is over a long distance, may require
advertising and a real-estate-agent-like intermediary. Organized water
exchanges are now reducing some of the costs.
Third, determining whether the seller's quality of title is adequate
could be the source of some long-run real cost. This is because agency
informality and discretion (that Howe et al found reduced information
costs in New Mexico)' is made possible by keeping legislation permissive and general. Hence, as Lucas found in western Canada, licenses (to
large industrial water users) may be granted on conditions that were not
specifically provided for in an Act.247 If these licenses were to be
transferred again later, the agency's decision about whether to transfer
the non-statutory conditions could be a source of later costs for renewed
bargaining, serious contention, litigation and/or political action.
Finally, finding who might protest and studying the validity of
their claims is the most costly of the four information procedures. In
some American states litigating parties must go through a judge's
adjudication of the rights at all sites along a stretch of the river.2' In
places with administrative water systems (such as New Mexico, the
Canadian provinces and the Australian states) an official routine may be
easier. But there are inevitable costs, which the agencies do not handle for
nothing, especially if the parties do not accept the data from the agencies'
initial investigations. 9
In summary, the transferability characteristic to be found in an
appropriative right has probably increased. When water was less
valuable, there were fewer channels for profitable trade. Few agricultural
water users were disposed to sell any part of their water separately from
the land they had developed, and to which it was regarded as being
firmly appurtenant. The lack of pipelines and other means of transportation also reduced general interest in water trading.

246. See Charles W. Howe et al., Transaction Costs as Determinantsof Water Transfers, 61 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 393 (1990) (finding reduced information costs in New Mexico).
247. See Lucas, supra note 216 at 61-91 (providing Alberta case studies).
248. See Victor Brajer et al., The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water Markets as they Affect
Water Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West, 29 Nat. Resources J. 489, 502 (1989)
(analyzing litigation costs).
249. See Howe et al., supra note 248 at 20 (analyzing costs under administrative agencies).
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The increase in the value of water has uncovered economies of
in
the transferability characteristic. The laws have been tested in
scale
detail in the courts and many routes to water sale discovered. At the
same time, politicians see themselves less in the roles of protectors of
existing uses and communities and more as activists in the search for
new water sources, including transfers from old uses. The result is that
there are fewer legal obstacles and more ways to transfer and divide
water: short-term, long-term and so on.
Transaction costs are potentially lower too, especially in the fields
of enforcement and information. But it must be admitted that some
transfers which would have been simple and informal before--especially
contractual and temporary divisions and rentals-have become more
complicated, calling on more experts and lawyers to handle the protests
of interests potentially harmed by changes in diversions and appurtenances. These professionals have become well versed in blocking
procedures, and versatile in combining activities in the media and
legislatures with procedures in the courts and administrative agencies.
d) Flexibility of appropriativerights
The flexibility of a water right is measured by the extent to which
it can continue to give a holder a secure and transferable interest in water
use even when the economy has changed the kind of use that is in
demand. For example, common law land-based rights showed themselves
to be fairly flexible when there was a technical changeover from
run-of-the-river flour milling to river-obstructing water storage and
release for large-scale textile mills.
Have appropriative rights been flexible in this sense? The answer
must be yes, if the user is regarded as seeking only to divert water. Water
can be diverted and stored for almost any purpose, proving that the right
that was developed for mining and ranching can remain as a robust legal
interest for city water supply, electric power development, and even
long-distance water imports or exports.
However, if a new user wishes to make other uses, especially
those in-stream uses that call for security in the river's depth, quality or
rate of flow, the appropriative right is turning out to be less flexible. It
may be too specialized to resolve conflicts among different types of use,
and in more populated regions it would seem to be inappropriate for
non-diversion uses, a matter we discuss further below.
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5. The Legal Basis of the Prior-AppropriationRight: Comparison of
the English Prior-useRegime with the New World
Prior-AppropriationRegime
There is a debate about the legal basis of appropriative rights, just
as there was with the rights held by users in the tort-law phase. We have
referred to appropriative rights as the latest in the succession of
use-based legal regimes, likening them to their seventeenth and eighteenth century forerunners. But this view has been contested. As we
stated in the Introduction to this essay, Maass and Zobel were particularly influential in rejecting the notion that there ever was a phase when
English water law was based solely on seniority of use.' Such denial
echoes similar contentions in early nineteenth century judgments. In
introducing the natural-flow theory, and ushering out the prior-use
regime, the English courts had asserted that to be a property right in
water, an entitlement must trace its roots back to some grant of ownership. They said it was not enough to show that the prior-use right arose
from some tort-law-begotten factual ability to continue some water use
or action immune to legal challenge
In this Section we shall take this matter up by examining directly
the legitimacy of American appropriative rights. Following this discussion
we examine challenges to this legitimacy in states where two systems
have survived together. Two other challenges to the water right are its
relationship to ownerships and quotas within an irrigation organization,
and its capacity to cater to demands for in-stream and non-diversionary
water uses. We discuss these as items (c) and (d) below.
(a) The Legitimacy of American Appropriative Rights
The concept of an original land grant as the basis for water rights
raises questions about the legitimacy of American appropriative systems.
It emerged at a time and place in which, as we have said earlier, there
was a pronounced "absence of land ownership." So where was the legal
basis for a prior appropriative right? Was it enough for the new
legislatures to legitimize the appropriative procedure, or could a root or
connection to earlier land and water ownership be found? For example,
was it satisfactory to explain that the original landowner-the federal
government-severed its riparian water rights from its treaty-derived
land rights and granted or transferred them to whoever claimed by
appropriation? It could be argued that, although unformed or undocu-

250. Maass & Zobel, supra, note 9.
251. See generally Mason v. Hill, 110 Eng. Rep. 692 (K.B. 1833).
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mented in the early nineteenth century, such a partial transfer with
implicit retention of land rights must have taken place. Otherwise,
according to this legal way of thinking, appropriative rights would have
no original owner and so would be illegitimate or invalid.
While a rationalization of ownership is conceptually satisfying,
envisaging an original holder of each property right in order to establish
a legal root for it is not necessary for our description or comparison of
systems of rights. In both the prior-use regime and in the system of
prior-appropriation rights (the two systems based on actual use), rights
were implicitly recognized by their enforceability and transferability,
regardless of whether one could identify original ownership of the water
within the original land-based system. They were usufructuary, 'belonging" or attributed to individuals. Today's lawyers would call them
"personal" rights in the same way that economists oriented toward legal
foundations of markets would call them "property" rights, the designation
they give to contractual rights. Regardless of the nomenclature, they are
rights to water.
Does our analysis stop here? Not really. We must recall from the
Introduction, the eighteenth century case of Ashby v. White. 2 This is
known for an often quoted concept in law: there is no right without a
remedy.' When there is no legal means of enforcing a "property right,"
there is no right in law. Ability to defend and enforce rights is the measure
of rights. Applying this reasoning, riparian rights which could not be
enforced after the medieval period ceased to be rights. A lawyer might
conclude, strictly, that our "twists and turns" sequence should contain a
long gap from this period until prior-use doctrine was reaffirmed by the
courts. But, as prior-use rights remainedenforceable throughout this period,
such a conclusion would be mistaken.
Prior-use and appropriative rights could be enforced in a
common law "private river" (meaning, in England, beyond the influence
of the tide and, in the United States, not navigable) whether the banks of
the river were publicly owned or whether they were privately owned by
a different person. Ownership of the river banks was irrelevant, since
legal access to the river was considered a different matter from water
rights.' Public ownership of the banks in both the prior-use and
appropriative systems, therefore, merely facilitated river access and
blurred the old distinction between common law "private" and "public"
rivers. It has even been used in Australia and Canada to prevent riparian
252. Ashbey v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (K.B. 1904).
253. Id.
254. In the English prior-use phase, the land on both sides of the river was privately
owned by individuals. In the prior-appropriation phase, much of it was still in the
government's hands as "public land."
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rights from ever being claimed. Availability of legal enforcement
mechanisms directly between de facto usufructuary "property" rights in
the users obviated the necessity to search for a "transfer" from private
riparian rights as a legal basis, as in the western United States
Courts in nineteenth century England were not prepared,
however, to make this argument. While Lord Denman recognized in
Mason v. Hill that damage law had always been the law of England, he
vehemently denied that senior users had a right to damage junior users'
entitlements simply because the juniors could not enforce their entitlements against seniors.' Those who followed in his footsteps said that the
seniority system alone did not constitute a legal basis for a water right,
and turned first to natural-flow theory and later to reasonable-use theory
as the English law of water.
American courts, faced with the similar problem of tracing a legal
foundation for the miners' and settlers' prior-appropriation system,
settled the problem a different way: by protecting the new system. They
turned to the legislature for statutory recognition of prior-appropriation
rights. The English courts could have taken a similar path in 1851, but
instead reached back to the past to salvage the old feudal system of law
without its hierarchical trappings.' Then they provided new mechanisms for its enforcement in the doctrines of reasonable-use.
(b) Co-existence, or repugnance, between appropriativeand riparianrights
systems?
Which differences between common law, land-based riparian and
appropriative rights are important? The approach we have taken so far,
followed in law journals, has dwelt on the differences which first
surfaced in the excitement of litigation and lobbying in California during
the late nineteenth century. There, holders of rights under the two
contending systems battled to see their own rights prevail. In later waves
the same battle spread to other American states and sympathetic battles
were fought abroad. While the comparisons then made shed much light
on the two systems, they were sometimes distorted by the rent-seekers'
needs to support one system on an all-or-nothing basis.
Our approach in this section will examine what happens when
the two systems exist in the same conditions. In particular, we will ask
what happens when the same jurisdictionhas both kinds of rights? When
water is scarce there is a serious likelihood that a claim for flows made
by a holder under riparian law will clash with claims to the same water
255. Mason v. Hill, 110 Eng. Rep. 692 (K.B. 1833).
256. See Lucas, supra note 216 (making similar remarks, about the opportunity missed).
See also Clark & Renard, supra note 211, at 82.
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by holders under the appropriation system. Is it true that riparianism
cannot tolerate such a clash and must fade away?
i) Canadaand Australia
In western Canada and the Australian states the lesson has been
that, given the historical circumstances of the two areas, riparianism may
well survive but can also be contained. It is difficult for parliamentary
drafts persons to foresee every new situation that may provide an entry
for a riparian argument.
A potentially serious clash occurred in British Columbia. By 1897
all Crown-granted riparian common law rights had been effectively
transferred back to the Crown, clearing the way for the Province's system
of administrative water licenses.' 7 These did not apply in the "railway
belt," however, where the Dominion supported instead the riparian rights
of loggers to whom timber berths had been issued.' Pursuant to an
inter-governmental agreement, a Board spent a decade reconciling the
riparian rights of some users with the recorded water licenses of
others.2- As in many North American jurisdictions, no limitation had
been placed on the number of licenses issued, the seniority system being
relied on to sort out conflicts. This was not the case, however, for riparian
rights. Somehow the Board muddled through the inconsistency and gave
precedence and appurtenancy to new licenses issued to the former
riparian rights holders.2
This crisis, combined with irrigators' fears that riparian rights
would call for water to be prorated during low-flow seasons, induced all
western Canadian legislatures to improve users' quality of title. Surviving
riparian rights had to be terminated and the appropriative system had to
become universal3"

257. See Cook v. Vancouver Corporation, A.C. 1077 (P.C. 1914) (appeal taken from B.C.);
Pasco v. Canadian National Railway Co., 34 B.C.L.R. 2d 344 (1989) (considering Cook, id.).
258. These riparian rights were confirmed by the Privy Council in 1911 in Burrard Power
Co. v. R., A.C. 87 (P.C. 1910) (appeal taken from Can.). See also Robert E. Cail, Land, Man,
and the Law 116-24 (1974); Scott, supra note 194, at 357-58.
259. Cail, supra note 260.
260. We believe the reconciliation worked because the riparians were loggers with
temporary berths who, moving on, lost interest in their water rights.
261. See Lucas, supra note 216, at 92 (noting the irrigators' fear of prorating). Riparian
rights could be eliminated more easily here than in the American states because property
is not protected under the Canadian Constitution. The provinces could take all private water
rights by merely passing legislation to that effect. Provinces had the jurisdiction under the
Federal/provincial division of powers in the Constitution to legislate over property
regulation, civil rights, and lands.
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But there have been several survivors of riparianism. Legislators
have been unwilling to impose a license requirement on domestic and
stock users.' The acts and their administration in all western provinces
allow such users, usually small farmers, to take water even in time of
drought.' This survival has not created serious disputes.' Perhaps
the explanation is that nearly all western Canadian streamflows are
divided so slackly that the small volumes taken by this class of user are
not politically significant. The practice worries some legal scholars,
however, because it constitutes an admission that the riparian ideology
is still acceptable modem water law.*
Another survivor is a common law right to water quality.? The
natural-flow version of the right of downstream riparians to receive water
undiminished in quality still exists. A downstream victim's natural-flow
rights to quality do not depend on "use," and therefore are independent
of his water license, if any. They are similar to his rights not to be injured
or hindered in his use or enjoyment of land, which are enforceable by the
law of nuisance. However, all provinces and the federal government have
water pollution legislation that since the 1960s has dominated individual
attempts to rely on either riparian law or nuisance law. 7
In Australia the early co-existence of common law rights and
statutory rights has been well chronicled by Clark and Renard.'
Although, as we have mentioned, in the gold rush water had come under
an administrative licensing system, riparian rights continued to be
respected in urban and rural areas.' Subsequent legislation providing
for waterworks, sewage, and irrigation districts did not change this, for
262. See Water Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 429, § 42(2) (Can. 1979) (making specific provision for
domestic uses, even in British Columbia where it has been said that riparianism has been
completely extinguished: "It is not an offense for a person to divert unrecorded water for
domestic purpose or for prospecting for minerals but in a prosecution under this Act the
person diverting the water must prove that the water is unrecorded."). See also Zimmerman,

supra note 224.
263. Percy, supra note 202, at 17-19; Lucas, supra note 216, at 21-22. In British Columbia
prospectors have also been able to divert without a license.
264. See Johnson v. Anderson, 1 W.W.R. 245 (OB.C.S.C. 1937) (holding that a dispute
having arisen-the right to use water for domestic and stock purposes still existed and still
gave right to a remedy against unlawful diversions).

265. See Lucas, supra note 216, at 49-51; Percy, supra note 202, at 17-22.
266. See Lucas, supra note 216, at 52 (commenting that Canadian water rights systems still
have scope for common law rights with respect to (a) the drainage of riparian properties

and (b) groundwater). Id.
267. See M.T. Rankin, Despoilinga River: Can the Law Help to Sustain the Fraser River?, in
Perspectives on Sustainable Development in Water Management (A.H.J. Dorcey ed., 1991)
(discussing alternative statutory approaches but failing, surprisingly, to mention possible
common law approaches).
268. See Clark &Renard, supra note 211, at 140-271 (concentrating on the state of Victoria).
269. Id. at 163.
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it provided for injured riparians to be compensated. Not until 1886, with
Alfred Deakin's Irrigation Act,' was the right to the use of all water
vested in the Crown, new riparian rights forestalled, and the possibility
of obtaining permanent water rights by prescription removed.
By then a significant group of riparian owners existed. Clark and
Renard claim that after 1905 the "vast majority" of users held licenses.m
This was partly because the Lands Offices had reserved stream-side strips
of land for the Crown to forestall settlers' grants from being, technically,
riparian properties. However, many lands evidently held under grants
made before this policy began often sub-divided, and remain as an
irritant in the universality of the system in Victoria.
Deakin and his Australian contemporaries were religiously
converted to state provision of irrigation works. Why were they so
determined to stamp out riparian rights? To an outsider, it seems that
they could have co-existed. Perhaps social class came in: old riparian
rights were held by the wealthy "squatters" with their huge holdings,
while irrigation was to bring water to a new class of smaller farmers.
Clark and Renard provide a more technical explanation. They
remark:
it seemed to be the opinion of Deakin that, in order both to confer
adequate powers on government, and, at the same time, to discourage the
wasteful private litigation which plagued the Western United States, it
was necessary to abolish all private rights to water. To his mind, the
concept of administrative apportionment of resources was mutually
inconsistent with the continued existence of private rights of action
between individual water users. This attitude persists...
The phrase "apportionment of resources" is not quite accurate:
state irrigation policy increasingly committed the state to providing water
to everyone in selected state irrigation regions. The water legislation,
therefore, was framed to bring about an administrative apportionment of
the benefits of public investments.

270. Irrigation Act, (Vict. 1886).
271. Clark & Renard, supra note 211, at 186.
272. Clark & Renard, supra note 211, 196-97. Deakin was not yet thirty when the
legislation was introduced. He was immensely influential in Victoria, bringing in such social
legislation as the factory and arbitration acts. In the 1890s he devoted himself to the
federation of the colonies, and became second prime minister in 1903. C.M. H. Clark, A
Short History of Australia 179 (1979). All Deakin's delegation and other Australian visitors
to the United States seem to have been over-impressed by the volume of litigation,
especially in Colorado. Later Victoria governments brought Elwood Mead, designer of the
Wyoming version of the irrigation district to design legislation. The resulting legislation
reinforced the water-sharing idea instead of seniority, an idea Mead had pushed within
irrigation districts. Powell, supra note 183 at 135-40.
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ii) American states
In the American states where the two systems of water right
coexist, riparianism is on the decline. This is in spite of the Constitutional
guarantee to property, and the historical precedence, in some states, of
riparian law.
In the mixed-system statesm the following question has arisen:
if the Constitution's protection of property prevented riparian users from
being evicted, could it tolerate a change of system wherein their use and
volume became accountable to the community of water takers, rather
than to the community of riparians? How did the appropriative system
win the day?274
Oregon
In Oregon, the trick was accomplished in the courts through the
judicial reinterpretation of old statutes, and legislation grandfathering
riparian rights in place prior to the statute while qualifying newer rights
under the guise of regulation. In Hough v. Porter75 the Oregon Supreme
Court interpreted the federal Desert Land Act of 1877 as meaning that the
federal government had dedicated to the public all of the waters then in
the public domain, thereby abrogating riparian rights on lands settled
afterwards. This interpretation considerably reduced the number of
riparian rights holders.276
The Oregon water code of 1909 went farther. While recognizing

273. We will look specifically at two mixed-system states, namely Oregon and California.
Both of the water law systems of these states are modelled after the "California doctrine,"
whereas the exclusively appropriative systems of other states are modelled after what is
called the "Colorado doctrine." See Pisani, supra note 195, at 35 (further elaborating on this
distinction).
274. Our skeptical tone here arises from our belief that the informed few who advocated
appropriative rights did not admit to ranchers and politicians that alternatives existed. There
was an exaggeration of the gains and losses to be derived from the opposing systems
because of the polarization of views arising from the upset of Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal.
1886). Even today most American law histories read as though the system of common law
could not conceivably have been further modified to encourage consumptive or inland
water use. In doing this they deny the facts of development of older water-using industries
in the United States and England. Of course transactions costs under an adapted riparian
system could have been higher than under most appropriative rights systems. But that is
a subject few historians and law professors have explored or mentioned. Pisani, supra note
195, does address this idea, specifically with respect to 19th century Western U.S. water law.
Others write as though they believed that common law would have prevented today's
irrigation, surely an effect beyond the power of any property-right variant in western
society.
275. 98 P. 1083 (Or. 1909).
276. A federal court case which adopted "beneficial-use" as the test of the riparian right
was Eastern Oregon Land Co. v. Willow River Land and Irrigation Co., 187 F. 466 (D. Or.
1910).
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old riparian rights, it limited them to those under which beneficial use
had been made of the water prior to the passage of the legislation, and
to the quantity of water beneficially used. It also provided for stream
adjudications to determine the relative rights of claimants to water. In
California-OregonPower Co.v. Beaver PortlandCement Co., the majority of
the United States 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutional
validity of the legislation, maintaining that the water code did not
destroy the usufructuary privileges of riparians, but only changed the
conditions under which they could be exercised.' In other words, it confirmed the idea that even vested rights are subject to reasonable
regulation by the state. '
Those riparian land owners who also held some appropriative
rights to the same water could not assert both riparian and appropriative
rights, hoping to get "the best of both worlds."' The court held that
such owners must choose which right to claim and must forfeit the other.
If they attempted to assert both, the court would choose for them from
the language of their claim. Any mention of specific quantities of water
would result in a deeming that they had elected to hold only an
appropriative right.
This judicial and legislative onslaught failed to remove totally
remove the advantages of holding on to riparian rights to water. In
particular, in a conflict with another holder of riparian rights, a user
might be better off with a riparian than with an appropriative right.
Another advantage would be that a riparian owner's "ordinary" uses of
water for stock and domestic purposes would be completely protected.
Finally, a right holder might find a postponed future use better protected
by a riparian right because of the possibility of obtaining, on request,
declaratory judgments or decrees.'
California

277. See California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d 555, 568-69
(9th Cir. 1934). See Hutchins, supra note 188, at 210. The effect of the U.S. Court of Appeals
decision in California-Oregon Power Co. was also to uphold the interpretation given to the
water code by the majority of the Oregon Supreme Court in In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065
(Or. 1924). See also Hutchins, supra note 188, at 207 (footnote omitted) (stating that "the
Oregon Supreme Court ... construed the water code as having validly abrogated the
common-law riparian rule as to the 'continuous flow' of a stream except where the water
had been actually applied to beneficial use").
hs was also the earlier view of the Oregon Supreme Court in In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505
(Ore. 1914). See also Hutchins, supra note 188, at 206. Exception was made in the 1909 water
code for those with works in progress, the amount of the right being limited to the quantity
of water used a reasonable time after the passage of the act.
279. For example, an appropriator, unlike a riparian, has no right to surplus water.
280. In Washington and other states, however, the riparian must prove he will use water
within a reasonable time.
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Unlike Oregon's drastic curtailing of riparian rights, California
upheld riparian rights which had been claimed even after the Desert Land
Act and even where they conflicted with appropriative rights. 1 Appropriative rights were limited to public lands not federally reserved. This
decision had the effect of reintroducing a system of water rights believed
by many to be inappropriate for California's dry, mountainous land and
reducing the scope of the system that had worked.
The constitutional rights of the riparians prevented the legislature
from taking the kind of action we have seen in Australia, replacing the
riparian system with an administrative system. There were fears that
riparians, by exercising a kind of natural-flow right, would now prevent
any water from reaching the state's irrigated fields away from the
streams. The courts too would be powerless to protect the appropriative
system. Their role would be narrowed to the application of reasonable-use law among disputing riparian proprietors.
In desperation, the legislature began to encourage holders of
appropriative rights to take up prescriptive rights. Statutes shortened the
prescriptive period to a mere five years. The courts helped this by
process so as
interpreting the "adverse" requirements of the prescriptive
2
to burden riparian owners not yet using the water.
This was helpful in creating new rights, because often "large
diversions in rivers were made near the point of emergence of the
streams from the mountains. The riparian lands that would be seriously
affected were so far downstream that the diversions frequently provoked
no immediate opposition, and sometimes they ripened into prescriptive
rights before they were opposed."'
Once obtained, the Californian prescriptive right was very similar
to its common law cousins in other jurisdictions. A "hybrid," partly
land-based, partly use-based, it become a third type of water right and
a corrective force in a state where withholding of water could quickly
result in a desert.'

281. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886).
282. Adverse use" was held to mean use of which the riparian (who, if not using the
water, would not be otherwise "adversely" affected) had the means of knowing. See Maass
& Anderson, supra note 201, at 229 (stating "[tlhe courts held that the actual appropriation
of water, followed by open, continuous and exclusive possession for the prescriptive term,
gave the right").
283. Id. at 229.
284. See id. at 227 quoting T.S. Harding, who gives an account of the Anti-Riparian
Organization of California, eloquently making the case for appropriative rights in the
preamble to its articles:
"Whereas, attempts are now being made to resurrect the English common
law doctrine of riparian rights from the grave to which the will of the
people long since consigned it, and to impress it upon the jurisprudence
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Another way California mitigated the impact of riparian rights
was to allow, by legislation, the transfer of water out of the "riparian
tenement," although not out of the watershed. This modification of the
riparian system detached the water right from the riparian land yet
recognized the principle of not depriving other riparians in the basin of
continuing flows. It had the unexpected effect of allowing upstream
irrigators, albeit at the increased cost of pumping and long diversions, to
use water from downstream locations without harming riparians along
the way.2
iii) Conflict of law
Another type of mixed system is found in boundary streams
where users in the two jurisdictions hold rights under different governments or courts. Are either riparian or appropriative rights good against
users in the other jurisdiction? What happens when the other jurisdiction
has the opposite system of water rights? These boundary questions crop
up in the law of nations and also in the laws governing federal states.'
It would seem that, in principle, a boundary would provide few
problems for the recognition of riparian rights. Each riparian's water
rights stem from his land proprietorship. Riparians still have the same
rights and responsibilities as members of the "community of the river" as
judged on either the natural-flow or the reasonable-use theory. These
rights and responsibilities are not created by governments and need not
terninate at frontiers.

of the State; and, Whereas, such attempts if successful, mean the desolation
of thousands of homes; mean [sic] the desert shall invade vineyard,
orchard and field; that the grape shall parch upon the vine, the fruit wither
on the tree, and the meadow be cursed with drought; mean that silence
shall fall upon our busy colonies, and their people shall flee from the
thirsty and unwatered lands; mean [sic] that the cities built upon commerce irrigation has created, shall decay, and that in all this region the
pillars of civilization shall fall, and the unprofitable flocks and herds shall
graze the scant herbiage where once there was a land of corn and wine,
flowing with milk and honey...."
285. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 Stan. L.
Rev. 1529 (1989) (showing his gratitude for such features of the riparian system in action).
286. We distinguish between cross-boundary water disputes among governments and
those among individuals. The former are concerned with the international and constitutional
law, the latter with the conflict of law. See Anthony Scott, Individual Water Rights in an
International Water Market, in Water Export: Should Canada's Water Be Sold? 141-81 (J.
Windsor, ed. 1993). See also Joel A. Gallob, Birth of the North American Environmental
Transboundary Plaintiff, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 85 (1991); Managing Natural Resources in
a Federal State (John Owen Saunders, ed. 1986); Pisani, supra note 195.
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What the frontier does terminate is the jurisdiction of the
complainant's court. Enforcement now requires either inter-state
agreements about court jurisdiction or an appeal procedure to a tougher
federal court. In a 1931 case an upstream state, Massachusetts, threatened
to divert water that would otherwise flow by riparian lands in Connecticut.' The latter sought an injunction from the United States Supreme
Court. The court did mention the downstream state's claim to an
uninterrupted flow but, in the absence of evidence of actual damage or
of detriment to navigation, it refused to act. It preferred a reasonable-use
criterion to a primitive natural-flow right.' The Court stuck to land-based riparian law and demonstrated how what is "reasonable" depends
on the bench from which the alternatives are viewed. A Connecticut court
applying reasonable-use theory probably would have given Connecticut
its injunction.
In an appropriative rights regime, when a river is entirely within
one state, a user's right stems from prior appropriation, recognized by
custom and validated by state legislation. When the river flows between
states, will a user's right be recognized across the frontier? Answering
this question takes us back to the legal basis of the appropriative right,
as discussed above.
One theory is that a user's right is merely a regulatory permit.
Hence its validity runs only where the province or state's legislation is'
enforceable. That is to say, it is a property right only because the state
sees to its enforcement.' If so, it is obvious that the answer to the
question, "Is the use-based right granted or issued in one state robust
enough to be enforceable in another?" will be no. Absent reciprocal
inter-state legislation, a right will not be respected in the adjoining state.

287. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669-70 (1931).
288. Id. See also New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931). "Reasonable-use" is our
terminology. In the United States (in default of a contract or compact or agreement.between
the states) a dividing of water by the Supreme Court is referred to as application of the
principle of "equitable apportionment."
Increasingly the Court has balanced the benefits or damages in alternative schemes of
division, leading to recent decisions to allow old uses to be replaced by new uses of higher
value. In our discussion of the reasonable-use phase of water rights we identified this kind
of balancing as a process of utilitarian maximization of benefits from a given river. Our
interpretation coincides with that in Richard A. Simms, Equitable Apportionment-Priorities
and New Users, 29 Nat. Resources J. 549, 550 (1989). See George W. Sherb, Equitable
Apportionment after Vermejo: The Demise of a Doctrine, 29 Nat. Resources J.565 (1989) (giving
a recent chronology of equitable apportionment cases). See also Helsinki Rules on the Uses
of the Waters of International Rivers, art. 4 (1967) (showing, through widespread acceptance,
the presence of this principle in international law).
289. A complication is that appropriative rights do not remove some riparian rights to
sue when injured by pollution.

Fall 1995]

EVOLUTION OF WATER RIGHTS

The above theory blends in with a second one-namely, that a
user's water right is based on the states' and provinces' declarations that
all rights to use flows of water are vested in the people, the Crown or the
government. These rights would otherwise belong to others; to riparians,
in fact.
The results of this approach in the United States differ from those
in Canada and Australia. Most American courts treat water rights, even
those issued as "permits" by administrators, as transferable property,
usually real property rights. State declarations of vesting or ownership
had long been discounted, and in 1982 they were described by the United
States Supreme Court as a fiction: in inter-state commerce, water rights
were likened to a commodity.' This judgment did not pronounce on
the basis of individual rights except to recognize that they existed. As the
states were not the ultimate owners the rights were not merely administrative devices. On this basis, individual water rights should be respected
outside the state and individuals can trade them up and down the river,
subject to legitimate state aims."'
In Canada the provinces' claims to ownership or possessory
rights have been more successful. The provinces' rights stemming from
their original land ownership, their vesting in the provincial Crown of
"property" and of various riparian rights, their further constitutional
rights to make laws concerning their public lands, and concerning
property and civil rights generally have all tended to deprive any Federal
(formerly Exchequer) court of any role at all in connection with the
allocation of water or recognition of individual provincial water rights.
The conclusion for Canada is a complicated one. The users hold
water rights issued by the province. Their permits are not necessarily
compatible in volume, benefit or seniority. The same water may easily be
appropriated in two or more provinces. Hence, interference with or lack
of recognition of a water right outside a province requires reconciliation
or adjudication, not individual litigation.
Taking a larger perspective gives the following analysis: the
vesting of water rights in the provincial Crown is a form of riparian
ownership, m because it is confined to watercourses and also because it
was created by abolishing and taking individual riparian rights.
Therefore, the relationship of the provinces to one another are those of
adjoining riparians.

290. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 at 181 (1982). See also A. Dan Tarlock, The
Law of Equitable Apportionment Revised, Updated and Restated, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 381 (1985).
291. Richard Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for Reform, 24 Win.
& Mary L. Rev. 547 (1983).
292. In contrast to the appropriative rights of the actual users.
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There is no scope for the Federal or Supreme Court of Canada to
deal with riparian law, damages or interference as between the provinces.
Hence there is no scope for a federal court to become involved in making
judgments where the concepts of reasonable-use or equitable apportionment would lead to the maximization of benefit from a river from a
national point of view. The provinces' points of view are all that matter.
Consequently, various authorities have urged that the provinces proceed
by negotiated "cooperative" management 3 and have pronounced or
predicted that the final basis for litigation or for mediation across
provincial boundaries is common law.' All these conditions are
internal to each province's system of water licensing. And, so far as we
are aware, no interprovincial cases have yet arisen.
In Australia the best known instance of conflict of rights or of
ownership is that in what is now the Murray-Darling system. The River
Murray Agreement between three states and the new Commonwealth
(1915), which among other goals reconciled navigation with irrigation,
was settled by joint developments of storage, locks, weirs and the
provisions in dividing irrigation waters. No other interstate stream has
comparable importance.' This engineering approach to conflict has
been said to be a forerunner of the TVA and the St. Lawrence waterway
schemes, and a few other "whole-basin-planning" examples.
(c) Water storage organizations
Water law and water rights have been modified to accommodate
irrigation organizations from whom most farmers now obtain irrigation
water. Since in dry regions wet-season water must be carried and stored,
the capital expense proved to be more than the typical irrigating farmer
could handle alone. The first settlers chose stream-side locations where
rough diversions would be adequate. Riparian law could have been
tailored to suit the needs of many of them. But higher and remoter
benches required dams and canals, as well as constant maintenance. The

293. See, e.g., Barry Barton, Cooperative Management of Interprovincial Water Resources, in
Managing Natural Resources in a Federal State 235 (John Owen Saunders, ed. 1986). See also
Water Law and Policy Issues in Canada (H.R. Thompson, eds. 1984) (writing that Canadian
courts would not substitute their own opinions for the negotiated agreements between the
provinces).
294. See, e.g., Percy, supranote 202 (suggesting that the Supreme Court will eventually be
faced with suits on a sort of interprovincial riparian right to clean water). See Zimmerman,
supra note 224 (predicting that common law riparian rules will govern in interprovincial
affairs). But see Dale Gibson, The ConstitutionalContext of Canadian Water Planning,7 Alta. L.
Rev. 77 (1968-69) (favouring federal jurisdiction over interprovincial waters). See also Barton,
supra note 296, at 236 (describing the legal uncertainty in the area).
295. Powell, supra note 183, at 139-40.
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Mormons showed the way, with their cooperative colonies of water users.
Some later settlers followed them, but most became the customers of
commercial ditch and canal companies. Not a few of these were linked
to land-development companies, who promised water to potential
suppliers. As a result, many users found themselves tied by geographical
isolation, as well as by lease or contract, to monopoly sellers who could
be predicted to seek to capture the rents of water use. Disputes over
quantities and price were a commonplace.
There resulted three institutional forms. First, in the courts and
the legislature the farmers sought to prevent the ditch companies from
obtaining title to the water. For example, some states had decided that
water left in storage was being used "beneficially." This had helped the
irrigation firms.' Now some states decided that water was not used
"beneficially" until it was distributed to the fields-hence the ditch
company could not appropriate it before the farmer. As well, it was
decided that a water right must be appurtenant to the farmer's address,
not to the ditch company's point of diversion.'
Second, the farmers tended to take over from the ditch companies. This was partly because of the new rules (above) but mainly because
there was little money to be made in many locations. The companies'
assets wound up in the farmers' hands, the favored institutional form
being the cooperative or the mutual irrigation company. It was essentially
a non-profit partnership. Each share gave the member a unit water
entitlement, and also a share in expenses, work and debt. There was no
volume charge, but a member could sell or rent water to a fellow
member. In the United States these organizations eventually gained
complete tax exemption from all levels of government.'
Third, around the turn of the century, a move toward public
irrigation districts began to dominate. These had similarities to local
government organizations. Each acre (not each share) gave a unit water
entitlement. Expenses were not divided evenly among shares but split
between a property tax (an acreage charge) and a water charge. Economic
analysis suggests that in a district created out of a mutual company, the
power to finance by a property tax will result in intensive water users
getting a water-price subsidy from their neighbors.' The district
provided a useful vehicle for distribution of water from senior govern-

296. Stephen F. Williams, The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste in Water
Resources Development, 23 Nat. Resources J. 7 (1983).
297. Dunbar, supra note 200, at 103-5.
298. Maass & Anderson, supra note 201.
299. Rodney T. Smith, The Economic Determinants and Consequences of Privateand Public
Oumership of Local Irrigation Facilities, in Water Rights, Scarce Resource Allocation,
Bureaucracy, and the Environment (T.L. Anderson ed., 1983).
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ments' high-dam projects, in the United States, Canada and Australia."
Whether water is distributed by the gallon, the share purchase or
the acre-unit, all users are essentially being provided with a fixed
percentage share of the total amount available to the organization in a
given period, this total amount being based on one or more appropriative
water rights, senior or junior, held by the organization for its members."0

Are the members' entitlements equivalent to a water right? They
depend on overall compliance with an irrigation-organization law, not
water law. They are perhaps less secure than a water permit or right, for
the organization can fail financially. The entitlements' individual
transferability depends on the legislation, and also on the decisions or
by-laws of the particular organization. At one extreme there are
organizations where memberships and/or acres can be sold to anyone so
that the attached water rights can be transferred outside to another user
whose position can be compared to that of the non-resident holder of a
commoner's right in an English manor. The right was tangible enough
but the manor, or water district, was being deserted. At the other extreme
are organizations whose original formation wiped out any idea of further
transferability. The water was dedicated to the area of the irrigation
organization in perpetuity. In between are organizations where the
member cannot sell his water right or share of stock but can sell his
water for a season or less.3
If these semi-transferable shares are regarded as a kind of water
right, the question of the origin of water rights becomes a question about
300. See Clark & Renard, supra note 152, at 164-69 (describing how the first Australian
equivalent to districts were trusts which were given ownership of whole streams with the
purpose of providing for their proper administration, and which were then replaced by a
water commission which oversaw all the trusts).
301. See E. Schlager et al., Mobile Flows, Storage,and Self-Organized Institutionsfor Governing
Common-Pool Resources, in 70 Land Economics 22-33 (1994) (organizing their research into
the institutional implications of storage for certain kinds of common-pool resources, and
concluding that users "ofcell 1 types of resources [fisheries with no storage, some irrigation
systems with no storage], in many instances, do not attempt to directly manage the mobile
flows, since such flows are often unpredictable, and what benefits users would produce may
be captured by others who also have access to those flows. Users of cell 2 [grazing areas
with no storage], 3 [some irrigation systems with storage], and 4 [groundwater basins with
storage] types of resources, because of storage and/or stationary flows, however, can exert
direct control over the flow units, and do, as is exhibited by the types of allocation rules that
such users adopt. Instead of allocating access to flow units through time slots, access may
be achieved by granting fixed or proportionate shares of the flow units to each resource
user. For instance, in each of the California groundwater basins examined, except for one,
pumpers owned transferable shares of water"). See also Maass & Anderson, supra note 201,
at 379-81 (providing for the value of storage in all sharing systems).
302. Frank J.Trelease, Trelease, the Model Water Code, the Wise Administratorand the Goddam
Bureaucrat,14 Nat. Resources J. 207 (1974).
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the origin of irrigation organizations. Is there a general model explaining
how these get started? This question has fascinated many historians and
social scientists. To the anthropologist Wittfogel, the creation of irrigation
organizations led to the development of different types of political
systems.' To the irrigation enthusiast Elwood Mead, irrigation districts
should be regarded as though built out of the pooling of existing water
rights.' To Eleanor Ostrom, water district organization is a form of
common-pool resource management that precedes and explains collective
management and may even explain the appearance of government
itself.' Beyond mentioning the breadth of these approaches, the details
of the connection of water organization of larger institutions are too
complex to be taken up here. The story is bypassed in much of the
property law literature because the share is not, legally, a water right.'
It is important to us here because increasing water scarcity is leading to
increasing investment in storage and delivery systems. Thus an increasing
proportion of water users hold water contracts, leases or shares issued by
an organization rather than official water rights. Lawyers neglect this
because the shares are not legal rights, but we should note it because it
may point to a future reshaping of appropriative rights. Note that, as
with Australia's state systems, these storage organization rights dispense
with the idea of seniority or precedence. In general, all users share
surpluses or shortages equally.'
(d) In-stream Uses: Appropriative vs. Riparian
The question of difference between appropriation and riparian
rights systems arises again when one considers in-stream uses. The laws
of most states and provinces using the appropriative system require a
diversion as a condition for obtaining and keeping a water license. This
requirement has incidental administrative advantages: the diversion
works show that the applicant or appropriator is serious, and it serves to
provide a measurement of the volume being appropriated.
The total utility of a stream is much more, however, than the sum
of the individual diversions or abstractions along its banks. For example,
a navigable stream provides a multitude of more general uses besides

303. Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (1957).
304. Elwood Mead, Irrigation Institutions (1903). On Mead see James R. Kluger, Turning
Water with a Shovel: The Career of Elwood Mead (1992), especially pages 21-22.
305. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action (1990).
306. See Trelease, supra note 169, at 603-6.
307. See Maass & Anderson, supra note 201, at 375-79 (showing that actually there are
seven systems available, of which equal sharing is only one).
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navigation: drainage, transportation, wildlife habitat, fish habitat and
migration, fishing, recreation and water quality, together with the
converse use of monitored water pollution. To these are added more
abstract uses having to do with protection of the ecological chain and
biological diversity, conservation and restoration of the natural environment of the watercourse and the landscape through which it threads.
These tie in with the goals of global sustainable development of water as
a resource. All of the above uses of the river have in common that they
rely on a required level of water being left in the stream. They are the
"in-stream" or "natural-state' uses.
Formally, rights under the appropriative system can be used to
allocate water for such purposes. Legislation and regulations do make
provision for issuing regular permits or rights so that the water would
be appropriated by being left in the stream. Some have done so to a
greater extent than others., An alternative is to place an in-stream flow
requirement or reserve on the conditions of other diversion or consumption licenses. However, in-stream purposes are almost universally served
instead by customary, constitutional or statutory regulations, some
imposed and administered under the powers of a senior or federal
government, others under the powers of provincial or state politicians
and their agencies.
While such applications of appropriative rights to stream levels
may begin with a formal application, or in older jurisdictions with the
market purchase of a diversion right, they are never treated as routine
transfers. In some jurisdictions they are handled entirely administratively,
and in the rest there are procedures and guidelines that give little scope
to market-wide trading. These modifications reflect a political reluctance,
almost unwillingness, to see water taken from "productive" uses. This is
not surprising, for the original idea in many users' and politicians' minds,
as evidenced by seniority and beneficial use principles, was that all the
water in a stream ought to be diverted to irrigation or other uses such as
mining, without "waste." Allocating it now to in-stream uses represents
an almost shocking reversal of that original attitude.
In our opinion, the trend since the 1970s to providing appropriated water for in-stream uses signifies more than an evolutionary replacement of an old by a new beneficial use. The old uses remain, and water
is in simultaneous demand for stocks and flows for an increasing number

308. "Natural state" is the expression that appears in the Alberta Water Resources Act,
R.S.A., ch. W-5 (Can. 1980).
309. See Johnson & DuMars, supra note 14, at 361-67 (neatly summarizing American
procedures). See also Water Resources Act § 11()(c), (authorizing the issuing of a water
license for conservation, recreation or the propagation of fish or wildlife or any like

purpose).
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of uses. Hence, the provinces' and states' machinery for transferring
appropriative rights have come under pressure to deal with multiple
purposes through the exchange and marketing of transferable rights,
raising questions about whether the appropriative right will ultimately
prove to be an appropriate interest in using streams and watercourses.
Even with the greatest of flexibility in the transferability, divisibility and
modification of diversion rights, a pure appropriative rights system may
be inadequate to accommodate increasing demands for in-stream or
natural uses in its portfolio of water applications, because the primary
focus of the appropriative rights system, from its very origins, is on
"actual use."
Can a riparian system cope with multiple use? To the extent that
in-stream uses take priority over diversion to consumptive uses, a
riparian rights system might actually provide a more efficient method of
stream management. The reader will recall that the nineteenth century
system of land-based rights took as one of its points of departure the
legal obligation of each riparian user to maintain the level and flow of the
stream, providing "natural" flow, "natural" quality, et cetera, to the other
riparians.310 This concept could be revived and restructured or redefined, as once happened in California and Oregon, to provide now for
"natural state" as one of its multiple uses."'
Although the natural level and flow concept could protect the
non-exploitation of a river by subjecting all uses to level and flow
maintenance, riparian rights are limited by awkwardness and impreciseness regarding the more active river uses, in particular their transferability, divisibility and certainty. With increasing world populations, and
increasing demands for water, non-use of the rivers cannot just take
precedence over use. What will be important is a system which best
allows for the increasingly difficult act of balancing the two.

310. To the extent that statutory flow laws rather than individual rights are providing for
instream uses, the new approach represents a reappearance of mixed systems where water
must again flow in its "accustomed channel." See Dunbar, supra note 200, at 217 (providing
references).
311. American streams fall into two legal categories. Those that are not navigable are
subject to state water law. Those that are navigable are subject to federal powers to regulate
commerce, but nevertheless the title to the bed of federal streams passes to the state.
Typically, if the stream was navigable, a state and not the riparian owner or the water
appropriator continued to hold the bed. The state could not and cannot easily grant the bed
for a private use, for since 1892 the courts have held that it is owned subject to a public
trust to use the river for public purposes. At one time the main public purpose was
navigation. But today, decisions such as National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of
Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), call on states to exercise the trust in their
administration of prior-appropriative rights to assure instream flows for what are essentially
environmental purposes.
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6. Recap
The prior appropriation systems we have described above can be
summarized as follows. There are two versions: the first is strictly in
accordance with principles of seniority and beneficial-use and is enforced
in the courts; the second incorporates other statutory refinements and is
enforced by administrative agencies.
The original version appeared in California as a by-product of the
system of mining rights developed at the same time; and in other states
as a means of allotting water in dry-land ranching and perhaps irrigation.
The second version, which appeared later in various American jurisdictions, has not been explained. Its appearance in Canada and Australia is
a direct result of the decisions of colonial officials coping with spillovers
of the gold rush; its changes in form are due to its use by governments
as an instrument to assist and promote development.
In its original, court-enforced version, the appropriative rights
system had the following features:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

f)
g)
h)
i)
j)
k)

Persons acquire a right to use or divert the flow of the
stream by the act of doing so;
The right is to a specific volume of water taken at a
specific location on the stream, but is not appurtenant to
the land;
The right is not dependent on the user owning land on
a stream;
Stream adjudications are often made of all rights on a
stream;
Appropriative rights can coexist on streams with riparian
rights, with help from legislation and administrators,
provided there is plenty of water for all rights to be
satisfied. Administrative ordering between various rights
establishes seniority between them;
In principle, appropriative rights are highly transferable.
Legislation and administrative procedures restrict this to
protect return-flow users and for other policy reasons;
The right is subject to the right of prior-users on the
stream. A right's seniority is established by the date at
which a recognized use begins;
In times of water shortage, the senior quotas are fully
satisfied before juniors are allowed any water at all;
A senior user can enforce his right against a junior right
by proving seniority of use;
A junior user can establish his use against a senior user
by showing that the senior user is not making beneficial
use of the water;
The right is deemed abandoned if the user fails to
continuously make "beneficial use" of the amount of
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water he is entitled. to use or divert;
Damage suits are not used to enforce either seniority or
beneficial use;
Storage of water was not originally considered a 'beneficial use." Members of storage and irrigation organizations pool their rights and by formula share the organizations' total available water. A share is not a divided
appropriative right, but may be regarded as one;
Appropriative rights were originally held only for water
diversion. Now some are being acquired for in-stream or
natural state purposes. In administrative systems licenses
or permits can be issued for water power storage and
other interferences with flow;
Pollution matters and groundwater allocation are handled outside the system by statutory systems, or, in
mixed systems, by riparian rights law.

The changing economic characteristics of the system cannot be so
briefly outlined:
p)
q)

r)

s)

t)

The duration of a water right, in both the original and
the administrative system, remains long, or perpetual in
most places;
The flexibility of the system to accommodate new uses is
coming under stress. When all "uses" were diversions,
appropriative rights were adequate. Now, with multiple
purposes for stream management, they seem too rigid;
The quality of title or security of the system seems as
good as ever. In many American jurisdictions there is
much talk of compensation of users from whom administrative permits are taken-that is, of permits being a real
property right, with values based on market prospects
for water. Statutory provision for expropriation with
compensation is a common feature. In Canada and
Australia, too, water rights are at least as secure as ever,
but there is little understanding that for permits to be
marketable they must take on the characteristics of real
property;
The exclusivity of appropriative rights for diversionary
uses is as good as at the outset. However, when water
rights are devoted to in-stream levels or natural states,
the various uses can be superimposed, in conflict and not
exclusive. Water law probably cannot resolve this;
Transaction costs and transport costs previously exceeded water values, so transferability was not highly sought
after. Today, market innovations are eroding barriers to
transferability and new procedures and laws make
short-term or partial transferability--divisibility--commonplace. Since about 1900 in the United States, Canada
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and Australia, the development of water rights has been
only one of several goals of water users. For example,
instead of relying on litigation to improve users' security
and exclusivity in their water rights, they have looked to
government to amend water laws, including water rights'
systems, by legislation. Even this has been of less significance than the campaigning by political "elites" to get
government directly into the water business. Many of the
changes in western and appropriative water rights
mentioned in this part were by-products of these larger
campaigns, which can only be listed here;
Pressure groups of all political shades have coalesced to
create public water-supply and storage organizations and
make them major holders of water rights. With water
being diverted, stored and transported long distances by
"big-dam" entities, with distribution handled, especially
after 1902, by compulsory-membership water districts,
and with an increasing majority of irrigators relying on
public water provision, the changing characteristics of
water rights became a matter for large enterprises and
governments;
Shares in irrigation organizations and contracts with
irrigation companies and public districts have been
increasingly taking on the exclusivity characteristics of
water rights;
Many of the demanders of greater transferability of
water rights have been "urban elites," concerned to melt
the iron control of farmer groups over captured irrigation
water for non-farm uses;
These elites and pressure groups have played leading
roles in policy battles concerning water rights which
cross jurisdictional boundaries, water projects which
involve more than one government, and water rights
held in both riparian and appropriative systems. Winning these battles has promised more additional water
than revising water rights.

In the sections ahead we will be designing a system of water
allocation having features which we predict will be adopted to handle
stream water management. We believe that a combined system would
effectively allocate, balance, protect and enhance both out-of-stream and
in-stream uses. As our point of departure, we have chosen an appropriative-rights system. We have attempted to overcome its obvious limitations
in the face of in-stream use by adding "institutions" within the system,
such as a market for trading rights, the "water trust" and the "water
corporation." The trust is an organization aimed at acquiring water for an
in-stream use of a river. Its activities will help make rights commensurable with and therefore weighed against rights held for out-of-stream uses.
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Competition between the various demands will bring about, for each
stream, a multiple-use combination of diversions and natural states. The
corporation is aimed at restoring the riparian rights concept of the
"community of the river," wherein parties are accountable to each other.
The "corporation" would be enlarged from the community, however, to
include not only water users owning land by the river, but all those
others holding appropriative rights in the valley or watershed, especially
those who would be most directly affected by a shift in the balance
between use and non-use: the "stakeholders" in the river's flow. We see
the corporation acting more extensively in flow and level management,
and possibly in water quality and groundwater management, than do
today's irrigation organizations.
IV. THE DEMAND FOR STABILITY: PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS
1. Introduction
While formal common law water rights would have seemed to
have been the subject of war-like advances and withdrawals on the part
of riparian owners and actual users, the battle was moderated by the
permanent influence of the principle of seniority. This has been amply
illustrated in Section E of the last Part. Another source of stability was
the "ideal" of prescriptive rights, which has prevailed for centuries, and
which has provided a basis for compromise between common law and
appropriative rights in California. What is interesting about prescriptive
rights is why they existed: why an institution different from riparian
ownership was embraced and nourished within the common law.
2. The Demand for Prescription:Opponents and Proponents
A concession of prescriptive rights gave some users certain,
secure, enforceable, exclusive and transferable rights, at the expense not
only of landowners but also of both other users and potential users. We
have seen that in England, legislators actually passed a statute that made
obtaining prescriptive rights easier and retaining them more probable. To
whose pressure were they responding? Little has been written about this.
It is obvious that the English Parliament was long influenced by
landowners, often impoverished aristocrats. These owners would likely
have been hostile to the concept of another acquiring permanent rights
over their land by mere occupancy, and logically, they would have
brought some pressure to bear on government to bring an end to
prescription. As against this pressure, however, we found that in many
if not most of the recorded water-rights cases in nineteenth century
England, one of the parties relied on a prescriptive easement; and that
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party was generally an industrialist. The industrialists' pressure on
Parliament to retain and facilitate the system of prescription must have
been even more decisive than that of the landed aristocracy or establishment.
In New England, it appears that such industry lobbying was
reinforced by promoters of town or local industrialization. Thus one
could deduce that the legislatures believed that prescription would favor
industrial development. Yet some modem writers insist that the
32
continuation of old prescriptive rights retarded new development.
Why then did the process continue and why did the law develop so as
to increase the number of water users who held such rights? In what
follows we classify water users into groups according to their positions:
(a) opponents: those whose interests would be harmed by someone's
exercising prescriptive rights against them; and (b) proponents: those
whose interests were improved by prescription-including both old and
new users.
i) Opponents of Prescription:
There were two types of opponents of prescription. The first were
a more-or-less organized interest group, the promoters and land developers
who believed that the existence of prescriptive rights to water turned
investors and industries away. Their criticism, recently revived by
Horwitz and Lauer,31 would have been that this way of acquiring and
holding water rights tied up land and water and prevented new uses,
immigration, settlement, industrialization and growth. Horwitz and Lauer
suggest further that it hampered the progress of the Industrial Revolution
in England and New England by allowing prescriptive users to obstruct
the increasing numbers of manufacturers and other industrialists,
especially in the textile industry, who wished to use the stream.
Any economist would agree that these are possible results. An
owner by prescription might refuse to part with his easement, and
industry would go elsewhere. Yet the literature and the cases present no
hard evidence. We do know that the number of prescriptive titles to
water increased with time.314 It seems likely that some of the new
holders were industries. We suspect that the literature reflects the
discontent of some expanding users that, instead of getting water power
sites for nothing, they were having to pay holders of old prescriptive
titles for their rights.
In other words, this group should not be seen as favoring growth
312. Lauer, supra note 170; Horwitz, supra note 139.
313. Horwitz, supra note 139; Lauer, supra note 170.
314. See Section III.C. above.
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and development, but as having a distributive concern. If their demand
had succeeded, their goal would not have been to deprive new users of
the opportunity to obtain prescriptive rights, but to deprive existing
rights holders of the opportunity to capture rents from the new users.
The second type of opponent might be represented by an
individual who felt he had been harmed by the working of the prescriptive process, in that he had failed to forestall a neighbor from obtaining
prescriptive rights on a stretch of the river, and was now forced either to
endure the effects of the new use or to pay to regain rights which once
were his.
This situation was most acute in the phase of law where property
rights were enforced by nuisance law alone. The person accumulating
prescriptive rights would in most cases have been using the streamflow
first. As a result, our individual would be unable to claim in court that
his neighbor had caused him actual damage, in order to cause the
"prescription clock" to stop ticking by registering his disapproval. If he
was a newcomer, he might not even have been aware of how close his
neighbor was to fulfilling the time requirements of adverse use.
In the transition period to the nineteenth century land-based
water rights, this particular problem was alleviated somewhat by the
courts' easing up on damage requirements where prescription would
otherwise accrue. 315 Later, in the phase of land-based rights, a similarly-situated individual who was not using the water would be able to sue
to protect his riparian right to the unaltered flow, but would only do so
if he knew the length of time of the "adverse use," and since there would
be many other users on the river, the cost and difficulty of obtaining the
necessary information might put such exploration out of reach. 316 In
brief, when sites were scarce, landowners were forced to allow their
neighbors' industrial claims to mature into prescriptive rights because of
court procedures, the substantive law and non-existent information
systems.
The manner of pleading also helped the claimant to prove
prescriptive rights and frustrated his opponents' attempts in the courts
to balk him. Parties who challenged a prescriptive claim had to rebut the
presumption that they had implicitly authorized a diversion, while the
diverter had only to establish uninterrupted use for the legal period, say
20 years. The challenger then had the costly and technically difficult task
of refuting the "facts" of non-interruption over 20 years. There was no
registration of title. Witnesses died. Often legal action was simply not
worthwhile.

315. See generally Bower v. Hill, 131 Eng. Rep. 1229 (C.P. 1835).
316. See McLaren, supra note 137.
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It might seem, therefore, that a smart strategy for the opponent
would be to publicly consent to or openly "license" the intending
prescriber. Then the latter's claim would be knocked out, for if he had
been given "consent" to divert water, he could not later claim he had
made "adverse" use by impeding another diverter.3 7 Licensing a
neighbor, however, would mean allowing him to go ahead with the very
projects that opposing prior-users aimed to prevent. We feel this would
have prevented opponents from trying the licensing strategy. By giving
the "prescriber" consent or a license, an opponent who was a prior-user
would run a risk that turned out to be unacceptable to many: that of
being deemed to have abandoned his priority vis-a-vis other users on the
river.
In brief, the procedure was surprisingly favorable to the idea of
a user obtaining a prescriptive title, good against his neighbors and
which would exclude them from getting a right of the same value. It is
likely that landowners who had been or feared being hurt by this process
would have supported other demanders who were attempting to get the
prescriptive process narrowed or abolished altogether. But the transaction
costs of lobbying to change the law may have been sufficient to deter
them from proceeding against more wealthy opponents who were
holders of the rights.
b) Proponents of Prescription:
Would one expect those already holding rights such as
easements or prior rights to support those seeking to abolish the
privilege of obtaining prescriptive rights? Our answer is, of
course, no. The reason is easy to see. Prescriptive rights were
more valuable than rights acquired between two parties such
as formal easements or grants, and more certain than unwritten "prior-use rights." They were more valuable because they
were valid not only against the party granting the easement
but against all of the water users on the river. They were more
certain than prior use rights because they were definitive for
all time, once proven in court against a single party, if only
through failure of challenge over the required period. Prior
use rights were subject to challenge at any time, the shorter
the period of time dividing a supposed prior-user from the
start-up dates of others on the stream, the greater being the
possibility of challenges. It is obvious that water users who
317. See Webb v. Paternoster, 79 Eng. Rep. 1250, sub nom. Plummer v. Webb, 74 Eng. Rep.
1064, sub nom. Webb and Paternoster's case, 78 Eng. Rep. 165 (1620). Licenses were revocable
up to the 19th century but if the licensee had made improvements on the land or had given
consideration for a contract Equity would restrain revocation.
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had obtained and defended these rights would wish the
system to continue. So would those users who were on their
way to achieving the same status.
What would be demanded by newcomers? The literature often
describes them as new industries. They are said to be opposed to
prescriptive rights, which prevent them from wresting streamflows from
the old rights holders. But such opposition would not be rational. Further
thought suggests that, under these circumstances, newcomers would be
mad to acquire a mill on a stream without at the same time acquiring the
very protection they were said to be criticizing in others: an unassailable
right to divert water. This protection could be acquired merely by
purchasing the right at a high enough price, from the prescriptive holder.
We conclude, therefore, that newcomers would not, as a class, have
sought the abolition of the very rights which would suit them best.
c) Demand and Supply of Prescription
To summarize these points, we translate the above scenarios into
demands for retaining, and simplifying, the process of getting prescriptive rights to streamflows. We examined the benefits or costs to various
classes of users. Owners of ancient mills would wish to retain their
prescriptive rights, and subsequent owners of existing mills would gain
little from denying them the benefits of maturing their prior rights into
prescriptive rights. Some newcomers planning potential new mills might
wish to see a particular prescriptive right swept away, or made available
to them for nothing, or they might wish to buy it. As a class, however,
these newcomers would not invest much in new mills unless their
interest in water had adequate amounts of characteristics such as quality
of title, specificity, transferability and divisibility. These were offered by
prescriptive titles. In short, it appears that from the demand side, all
classes of water power users would either favor or would not strongly
resist the perpetuation and reform of prescriptive rights, and would act
to obtain laws to facilitate the prescriptive process. This explains why the
courts and government ("suppliers" of prescription) acted in facilitating
the development during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
If we glance, however, at non-users attempting to influence the
suppliers, we observe forces which we might expect to provide opposition to the prescriptive process. Mid-Victorian England was abandoning
its Benthamite approval of any law that appeared to encourage private
enterprise at the expense of society as a whole. For example, in land uses,
private encroachment on common lands was being discouraged and
public footpaths and public easements were being revived. In water
matters, Parliament was supplanting the private sector in such fields as
public health, sanitation and water supply, and the courts were adapting
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public nuisance law to deal with private pollution and waste disposal
through the mechanism of the injunction. As late as 1832, judges and
members of Parliament may have been willing to maintain the prescriptive process as a means of allocating water uses within the private sector,
but not much longer. In New England and other water-using American
regions, prescriptive owners were already likened to "monopolists" and
"conservative interests," opposed to development and economic progress.
They were threatened by land developers and municipalities who had
some success in inducing state legislatures to make prescriptive titles a
little more difficult to obtain. As for the west, the old process of acquiring
prescriptive rights was scarcely compatible with the new prior appropriation systems. In states such as California- 8 where the common law was
still recognized, the incompatibility was resolved by shortening the
required period of continuous use to five years until it came close to
resembling an appropriative right, while in the pure prior appropriation
states, the prescriptive right was abolished by statute.
Thus by the mid-1800s both English and American support for
extended private water rights was on the wane. Neither country was to
depend longer, primarily, on the common law for further management
of its rivers, and prescriptive and prior rights were to yield to statutory
processes on the one hand and to discretionary, flexible judicial "reasonableness" doctrines on the other.
3. The Stability of Possession
We have stressed that water use was continuous and stable. We
believe that for the most part changes in the bases of water rights
followed, and did not lead, changes in water uses or users. These changes
were not trivial, for those who mounted damage suits or pressed for
political action were prepared to spend their time and money to obtain
them. Nevertheless, our reading of the economic history of water use
suggests that those who might have suffered from the changes were able
to keep going. In this respect the changes, unlike the English enclosures
of common land and the Scottish clearances, did not dispossess
many-perhaps any-users.
First, those who acquired prescriptive rights kept them, regardless of the phase of water law. Second, the various principles of seniority
or priority seem to have remained valid from phase to phase. "Ordinary"
users were increasingly invulnerable to encroachments on the water they
had customarily used. The holders of "senior" or "prior" rights, even
318. Trelease, supra note 169, at 426-427. See also id. at 201-2 (providing an excerpt from
Hammond v. Johnson, 66 P. 2d 894 (Utah 1937) which shows that in Utah, the period was
seven years).
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without prescriptive rights, also seemed to lead a charmed existence,
beyond the reach of revivals of natural-flow theory or of the actual
workings of reasonable-use and prior-appropriation laws unless their use
was clearly unreasonable. In our discussion surrounding Holker v.
Porrit"' we suggested that the record shows that the judges rarely, if
ever, deprived a person who could be said to be "in possession" of a flow
of water, of a title that he previously was believed to have enjoyed by
actual use. As with a man's home, so with his mill; it was his castle, and
the water was his moat!
We must add to prescriptive title and possessory or senior title
a third source of stability in the law governing water use. This was that
both aspects of water law, giving relied-on title to rights-holders, also
helped give stable and secure contractual rights to actual users. Holders
were in a better position to transfer their water to non-holders when their
own rights were secure and enforceable than when they were in doubt,
and the transferees acquired that security through the contract.
4. Prospect
We can gain further perspective on these sources of stability by
testing them in a hypothetical future. Will they survive to give users
stability in the next "phase," or decade, or water use?
First, we think that seniority in the sense of "first appropriator or
user" will become increasingly unimportant. With scarcity there will be
little scope for laws and statutes laying out how water grants can be
acquired from the government or a large private landholder by simply
beginning to take water. Thus the differences between the successors in
title of original, prior, or first users and other users will become
increasingly remote and incongruous for settling disputes in water rights.
But this may make little difference. Future users who hold their rights by
descent from the actions or priorities of the original holders need not
depend on the original arguments or reasons for favoring seniority. If
titles become transferable or divisible, a right will be simply a right,
however it was first established.
Similarly, we believe that prescription as a process, like appropriation, will vanish altogether. The processes by which inactive holders can
be induced or tempted to release their water entitlements will be
adequate. The holder's fear of losing water to squatters will become
merely a source of irritation, serving no efficient purpose. The stability
given to the whole system by prescription will be lost.
Third, we believe that stability will instead be given to the system

319. 10 Exch. 59 (Eng. 1875), discussed supra notes 121, 149.
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of water rights by water's increasing value, and by the increasing
tendency of all users to see the system of water licenses, permits, riparian
rights and appropriative rights as an integral part of the system of rights
to land and forest. To use water profitably tomorrow will involve even
greater investment in capital goods and labor than in the past.'" All
who benefit from it will insist that governments refrain from unsettling
the security that such investments demand. This demand will take a
political form, from cottagers, farmers and other small users, as well as
from grant industries and municipal utilities. It will prevent fluctuations
in the basis of water rights from appearing, and make unnecessary the
deliberate continuance of seniority and prescription as sources of stability
in water rights.
PART V. THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE: CIRCUMSTANCES AT
EACH POINT OF CHANGE
A. Introduction
Why did water rights twist and turn? Much of the detailed
explanation found throughout our essay implies that we do not argue
that one mechanism explains both timing and content of each phase. In
this section we recapitulate and explore the twists and turns more
thoroughly, in search for a theory of the mechanics of alternation.
B. Reminder; Circumstancesat Each Point of Change
(a) Medieval to Prior-UseTurning Point:The early 1600s saw the beginning
of what would become the Industrial Revolution in England. The number
of users of the river increased dramatically from one year to the next, but
the principal use of the water was the same throughout: power to turn
mills. The technological processes involved were often mechanical ones:
fulling corn, weaving and spinning textiles, and grinding ores. The
non-tidal rivers in England were largely not navigable. It was not
necessary to ensure that the water in the rivers flowed continuously at
every point or that levels remained constant. Canals, then railways,
ensured transportation within the country. The opportunity existed for
commerce to use the rivers to their capacity.
Yet in spite of the huge increase in demand for water power, land
holdings along many rivers remained in large blocks, in the hands of
aristocrats who did not wish to divide and sell them amongst would-be
users, but who were too poor in capital to develop them themselves.

320. Also required will be investment in pollution prevention technologies.
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Their answer was to lease the riparian land to a large number of
prospective users. Hence, the growth in the number of lessee water users.
(b) Prior-Use to Reasonable-Use Turning Point: The first half of the
nineteenth century was dominated by the invention of the steam engine
which created a change in the type of technological processes and
services demanded from the river. Mills became larger and spaced further
apart and were sometimes located back from the river. They employed
many more workers. Processes now returned to the stream not just water
but h~eat, chemicals and organic wastes. Population growth exploded.
Industrial centers gave rise to important municipalities.
A new dimension to the rivers became apparent: water quality.
Pollution, both chemical and thermal, became a major problem, especially
as municipalities required clean drinking water. These requirements were
translated into a demand for the rivers to be allowed to flow in a more
natural state than the ink-black and foul-smelling state which had
,haracterized rivers in the early to mid-nineteenth century. Obtaining this
new quality attribute of the rivers became more important than maximizing the number of users of the flow.
(c) Reasonable-Use to Appropriative Rights. In the developing American
west, rivers were flumes. Economics and topography called for many
rivers to be emptied while still running in mountain ravines. There were
scant riparian populations, for the downstream watercourses were
canyons to be bridged as often as they were valleys to be farmed. To the
scattered miners and ranchers the rivers' potentials for navigation,
log-running and milling were not important, nor were their freshets and
floods regarded as serious problems. Ditches moved waters across miles
of sloping hillsides to mines and settlements. Below the intakes, the
depleted stream was of little importance to anyone.
Water users were engaged in the few economically important
activities of mining, ranching and irrigation. They were in agreement
about water rights for, although far apart in their technologies, all users
needed only the freedom to bring water to their operations and to put it
to a consumptive use. They supported a water law that gave attention to
diversion, not to the river. And, in districts where development was in
progress, rights holders wanted to be able to transfer water to "higher
and better" uses quickly and frequently. They promoted the exclusivity
and quality of title that would protect their heavy capital investments in
mine capital and land improvements. In short, it was not important to
specify the use of water; all uses required diversion. What was important
was the priority of diversion, and for this the concepts of appropriation
and seniority fitted the situation perfectly.
C. The Alternation of the Periods Between Land and Use-Based
Rights: Theories
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Why did each crisis result in a shift towards the opposite basis
of water law? For the sake of simplification, one might argue that there
are only two types of water law systems: those based on land rights and
those based on personal rights, and any shift would have to be in the
opposite direction, resulting in an undulating curve as history unfolds
itself. Yet many modifications could have been made within the existing
basis of the law which would have met changing demands.
Several possible theories come to mind to explain the shift in the
whole system as a response to the above types of circumstances. The first
four that we advance are theories which we feel do not adequately
explain the reasons for change. We propose them only to reject them. A
fifth, which concerns the changing "composition of demand," goes farther
than the others in reflecting the realities of each shift.
(a)

A Change in the Capacity of the Courts: This theory says
that the courts, as suppliers of water rights, brought
about changes in the types of rights. Three examples
would appear to be on point:
The development in the seventeenth century
of the damage action: the personal action
which enabled use-based rights to be enforced. At this time, the Kings' courts were
competing for power and money with the old
feudal courts, by providing better services to
more people. The services included faster and
cheaper kinds of court action and more effective remedies combining the elements of
deterrence, protection and compensation. Did
this competition between courts bring about
change that enhanced the capacity to supply
characteristics of interests in water law?
The trend away from a law bound by process
and procedure, as emphasized in the courts
up to the nineteenth century, and towards a
discretionary role for judges in some areas,
e.g. through the flexible definition of "reasonableness." This new trend first arose in applications of the law of negligence in transportation cases, and with it came the concept of
the "reasonable man." Then it spread to other
areas of the law. In the context of water law,
"reasonableness" as a basis for litigation gave
a great deal of scope to enforcement of water
level and quality maintenance by riparians,
both users and non-users of the system.
The development of self-help mechanisms of
law and speedy resolution of disputes (Ap-
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propriative period).
We do not deny that changes in the type of enforcement of water
rights, provided by the courts, were present and facilitated at each point
of change. Our position, however, is that they did not constitute the
driving force for change in the type of rights created.
(b) Increase in Demand for the Water: Throughout most of the
phases, with the exception of the Appropriative phase,
there has been an overall increase in population and in
population growth. With this has come an increase in the
cumulative demand for all of the river attributes. We do
not feel that increased overall demand is of itself the
reason for water rights to change their basis. It alone
cannot explain the change which took place in the
Appropriative phase, nor why change would take place
at uneven intervals and in the opposing directions of our
"twists and turns."
(c) Increase or Change in Technology: In the shift from PriorUse to Reasonable-Use, technological change was surely
a factor. It is certain that changes in technology create
new types of demand for water, and that new demand
cannot be ignored as a factor motivating change in rights.
But it is not the only factor. In fact, in some stages, such
as during the Appropriative regime, it was irrelevant to
the change in water rights. And there is no reason why
a change in technology alone would cause the basis of
rights to shift in the opposite direction.
(d) Self-Correction of Extremes: This theory would imply that
the law creating rights is progressive and ever changing,
and that when it arrives at an extreme (however defined), the process of evolution reverses itself and heads
in the opposite direction to "self correct" within the
bounds of moderation. We do not agree that change is
inherent in the law. Our position is that change may
occur at certain points in history, but it is brought about
by external factors rather than by an internal, dynamic
process. We put forward this theory, but cannot support
it.
(e) Change in the Composition of Demand: The theory which
we feel best explains the shift from land-based to use-based water rights and vice versa is that of the changing
composition or "mix" of types of demand for water. In
the use-based phases of water rights, demand was
typically based on one overriding "attribute"--either
abstraction/diversion of the flow, maintenance of water
levels (e.g. for navigation and fishing), or maintenance of
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water quality-to the near exclusion of all others.n3 We
see this during the Prior-Use regime, where water power
was clearly the dominant form of demand, and throughout the Appropriative regime where irrigation needs
eclipsed all others. In the land-based phases, there was
no single, dominant use. This was the essence of the
matter. When uses were in conflict, water law retreated
to a basis in land. In the medieval phase, mills were
ubiquitous but they did not monopolize water use.
Fishing and navigation were also strong claimants.
Again, during the reasonable-use regime, the attributes
of water meant it was in demand for a number of
frequently-contending uses: urban water supply, industrial raw material, hydro-electric power, steam power,
waste disposal and cooling. And, as the scale of establishments and projects for these newer uses increased,
they came into renewed conflict with navigation, fisheries and recreation.
Where demand for river water is comprised of one dominant
attribute, and where there is a need for maximum exploitation of a scarce
river resource (because of dry climate or dense population), a use-based
system of rights has been shown to be more efficient than a land-based
system. The transactions in the one attribute that take place can be
measured quickly and inexpensively in quantifiable amounts of water
and in comparable units. Divisibility and transferability of the units are
also easy and inexpensive. Other transaction costs are low. We say that
units of water are highly "commensurable" with each other. The system
is therefore more specialized than is a land-based system; it caters to
maximum intensity of water use. Since marking water level and water
quality are less important than water flow, "using up the stream"
beneficially is preferable to letting it go to commercial "waste" by
non-use. Finding the highest and best use of the resource in terms of
efficiency and profit is achieved through the market. Since there is little
concern inherent in the system for the river ecosystem, water may be
transported out of the watershed.
Where demand is based on more than one attribute (e.g. where
pollution and in-stream uses, or concerns for water quality and level, are
as important as allocation of the flow), there can no longer be a single,
unitary system of measurement. Use may be negative or it may be
positive, and one "attribute" is not directly transferable to another. Units
are not quantifiable. The riparian right is to a "reasonable" use of the

321. See Lauer, supra note 170 (citing this as the reason for changes in the doctrine of
riparian rights).
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water, but what is reasonable is not defined and what is defined can
change according to circumstances of demand and supply. Determining
a ranking among the attributes rather than determining and maximizing
the highest use of a single attribute is what is required. For this, the
market does not provide all the answers.
Who better to be in control of such decisions than the person who
is most likely to benefit by the wisest decision? In the reasonable-use
period, this was the landowner of the stream. He was entitled to a share
in the river which was defined only in relation to other proprietors.
Therefore, one landowner alone making decisions about the priorities of
the system made little sense. The system of riparian rights implied an
inter-relationship of owners along the stream. Judges refer to this as the
"community of the river," an institution which should temper the might
of the market in allocating water. In thus respecting the integrity of the
river system, it tended to control the pace of development. It is important
to note, however, that in all areas and times where a land-based system
worked well, water was plentiful.
D. Where do the Twists and Turns Take Us Today?
In the common law countries of the world today, water systems
are divided between riparian and appropriative systems. Both are
modified to a great extent by statutory law. Both appear to be working
reasonably well in their particular circumstances. Does this mean that we
are no longer on the undulating curve between use-based and land-based
rights, and are now on a straight line, as it were, between the two? More
important, if this is the case, have we nothing to learn from the patterns
of the past?
As global populations increase and the water resources world-wide become increasingly scarce, a new tension has been introduced into
the mechanisms of water allocation. On one side are environmentalists
who look to future generations and stress the importance of water
quality, maintenance of water levels and respect for the river ecosystems.
On the other side are those who stress that water must be used for
industry in order to feed the people and maintain a standard of
living.3
Neither system, by itself, can answer both sets of demands. Both
may be modified, however, with these demands in view. The question is
no longer "which system" is best, but how can a system, land or
use-based, best respond to the new, compound demand. Water use today

322. This could include selling it on an interbasin or international market, to reap local
profits.
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must be mean and lean as well as innovative and dynamic. It must give
individual users opportunities for making the best use of the water. Yet
the welfare of the river ecosystem is at risk.
Inherent in the appropriative system is rapid and cheap allocation
and redistribution of the flow through the market system; inherent in the
riparian rights system is community control of quality and levels. The
system we propose for the future incorporates elements of the best of
both, while avoiding their defects.
The main defect in the riparian system is its inability to quantify
the water right, leading to uncertainty in the quality of title, a disincentive to investment and difficulties in transferring or modifying rights. The
main defect of the appropriative system is its indifference to river
attributes other than the flow and its user group which "floats" without
specified location or long-term direction. This latter defect can be
remedied somewhat by making appropriative rights appurtenant to land.
The disadvantage of a system geared towards allocation of a single river
attribute can be remedied by the use of "trusts" to protect various
in-stream uses, by statutory control, and by a delineation of a community
of users which we shall call a "water corporation," to regulate and
monitor water quality, balance uses and develop water policy. The defect
of impreciseness in the riparian system, however, cannot be remedied,
because riparian rights by their very nature are not quantifiable, but
relative.'
We suggest, therefore, as a basis for a modern system which best
responds to the challenges of tension between development and
conservation, personal, use-based appropriative rights rather than
riparian rights. They are more amenable to modification in order to
remedy their deficiencies.
Where this projects us on the twisting and turning pattern of
water law is to a place where water use is the starting point in the
definition of rights, rather than ownership of riverside land. If enough
modifications can be made to the system to address the demands of
multiple uses and non-uses, the "twists and turns" will have shown us
the way, but can now be relegated to the past.

323. See Hirschleifer, supra note 230, at 237 (discussing the problems of defining what is
reasonable both in terms of adequate rainfall or in times of drought).
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PART VI. FUTURE WATER RIGHTS: IMPLICATIONS
FROM THE PAST
A. Introduction:Future needs and problems.
In this Part we attempt an application of the previous Parts to the
future. We begin with a very brief prediction of future demands or needs.
Then we work out how water rights might be adapted and combined to
handle the situations encountered in the rivers.
Our prediction here is that in most river valleys the demand for
water will change its nature. It will be less dominated by one overwhelming use, as for irrigation or water power. Instead rivers and their water
will be in demand for all their attributes. The result will be that the
system of water rights will increasingly be called on to bring order to
conflicts among quite different kinds of users. The problem has been
glimpsed in the past, and has led to large water projects being made
more versatile, such as by redesigning power dams to add more flood
control, irrigation and recreation benefits. But this approach seems only
to involve the public sector. The question of how to make private
right-holding users able to contribute to multiple purpose flexibility,
transferability and versatility has hardly been considered.
We expect to see today's main private uses derived from demand
for domestic water supply, food, fiber, power, drainage and the thousands of processes in which water is an input continuing in future
combinations of uses. But the relative composition of the demand will
change. Among the new demands most upsetting to the established
sharing will be those for in-stream purposes. Many of these will be for
a resumption of water regimes that are more natural, not only in average
quality and quantity but in their seasonal and slow fluctuations in depth,
width, current and temperature. Other in-stream demands will be quite
contrary to these natural uses and will call for the streams to be tamed,
redirected or managed to enhance sport and commercial fisheries, water
sports, landscape, navigation and so on. Such demands are already being
made and met, for example in elaborate fish ladders and spawning beds,
and in rapids for kayakers.' 4
With so many purposes, and with new ones emerging, each
river's own combination of uses usually will be in the process of change,
and the changes may well be more frequent than in the past. In the
earlier phases, diversions for water-powered milling peaked but later

324. We would point out here that many of these produce private goods or services,
available only to a few. Their characteristics are not inherently public, except in the
important detail of the cost or difficulty, so far, of excluding non-payers.
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faded. After a while other products and technologies raised water
demand for new predominating uses. As well, particular streams were
subjected to sudden dominating water demands for local processes such
as electric power and gold dredging.
Such new demands will occur more frequently, so that the
intervals between predominating uses will be shorter and successive uses
will overlap and compete. They will be compressed into a steadier and
heavier demand in which the percentages dedicated to particular uses are
in continuous flux. Therefore we foresee demand becoming more
complex as users requiring new types of use are intermixed with existing
users and uses.
Each of the interdependent physical attributes of streamflows will
become economically more scarce. In the absence of enforced rationing,
or voluntary mutual forbearance, we foresee conditions recognized and
described elsewhere as overlap, congestion, conflict, competition, multiple
use and external diseconomies among private and public, individual and
collective, in-stream and diversionary uses.'
Future society will not be helpless in the face of these conflicts.
As in the past, rivers will somehow be managed or allocated. Indeed,
increasing scarcity will exert increasing pressure on society to adapt its
water institutions and to use them to manage, plan, ration, share, divide
and allocate so users can divert, apply, consume, store and/or preserve
water and the watercourse.
Such pressures may well call for the coexistence of several kinds
of water-use institutions, public or private. In the following analysis our
subject will be only one of these: the evolution of the present systems of
individual water rights to serve as the basis for a system that can cope
with the future conflicts sketched above. We go on to consider the
markets in which water rights will be traded.' We suggest two
innovations that would complement these markets. Space limitations
preclude a comparison with evolving alternatives such as .government
agencies and their own instruments.327 We simply extend into the future
our study of the past development of individual rights.

325. Peter H. Pearse et al., Currents of Change: Final Report, Inquiry on Federal Water
Policy (1985).
326. We will not consider water rights that can be traded across the frontier. See Anthony
Scott, Individual Water Rights in an International Water Market, in Water Export 141 (1993)
(initiating discussion of the problem of water exports).
327. An example is the employment of financial measures such as charges, taxes,
subsidies and grants.

EVOLUTION OF WATER RIGHTS

Fall 19951

B. FOUR STEPS IN REFORMING FUTURE INDIVIDUAL WATER
RIGHTS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
1. Step One: Reforming today's appropriativerights.
Earlier we raised the question of whether the historical twists and
turns of water right bases would turn water law back to a new land
based right. We will explain why this is not likely to happen.
First, however, we examine several well-known limitations to
appropriative rights as they work today. The system has been refined so
that the rights are particularly useful for dividing the waters of a stream
when all the rights holders make the same use of the rights: diverting water
for irrigation, urban consumption, and industry. Each limitation will be
dealt with on its own merits.
Exclusive ownership of return flows
Whatever diverted water a right holder does not consume may
become a return flow, at once, the next day, or later.' Under most
current arrangements one or more users downstream get a right to use
this return flow by appropriating it. But, in deciding on his irrigation
works and practices, and implicitly on the volume of his return flow, the
upstream party is not obliged to release any particular volume.329 He
is offered no incentive to take the downstream users into account.330 In
this case economic theory would predict that his spending on preventing
return flows will be larger, and accordingly his return flows will be
smaller, than if he had a right to the return flow or its value.
Information and transaction costs aside, economic efficiency in
water use would call for the upstream appropriator to pay for the
amount he withdraws and to be paid for the amount he returns. In a
sense he already pays for the amount he withdraws, at least if water
rights are easily transferable," for typically the law of appropriative

328. At once, if the water merely runs over the dam and through a mill; later if it is
ponded and released periodically; later still if it flows back from irrigation or a city water

supply.
329. Here "release" means "add to return flow." American state politics are torn on this
question. In some, the rule stated in the text, which follows from the original logic of prior
appropriation, prevails. In others, the upstream party may not take any of the water
conserved or released. In yet others, he gets a prescribed percentage (75% in Oregon). See
Maass & Anderson, supra note 201.
330. Id. at 138-42.
331. Even in administrative systems where the appropriator has to pay for a license, the
cost of the license is not normally based on the value of the amount diverted or the return
flow.
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rights does not allow him to be regarded as the seller of the return
flow. m In the case of the downstream user who need not pay the
upstream party for the volume released, neither the first nor the second
part of the efficiency condition is met.
Worse, as we saw earlier, in systems of administrative water
rights the administrators tend to shave applications to transfer water so
as to reduce the associated injurious loss represented by return flows.
Thus the greater each transferor's return flow, the less water he is
allowed to sell, and so the greater the expected loss of transfer revenue.
That is, the smaller his present return flow, the smaller his future loss on
a transfer. His recognition of this gives him an additional incentive to
disregard the value of re-use of water downstream.
Put in characteristic terms, both users' rights lack exclusivity.p
More exclusivity will give rise to a promise of less water consumption
and, probably, of more return flow.' The upstream user will gain the
ownership of his return flow.
Our prediction is that as water value rises the combined
efficiency gains will induce upstream-downstream pairs of parties to
bargain on the amount the owner is to release. The mere fact of the
bargaining will reinforce the exclusivity to the appropriative right of the
upstream party. Furthermore, their agreement will be equivalent to
defining their rights in terms of net rather than gross volumes; in terms
of the amount each consumed rather than the amount each takes. This
return will not be easy for there will be serious measurement difficulties.' We also expect that wherever measuring costs can be reduced,' the advantages of defining rights by net volumes will spread

332. This is the general rule, especially in administrative systems. However, some
jurisdictions, in processing applications for water transfers, do give appropriator-diverters
credit for the amounts they return to the river or other users. See generally Micha Gisser &
Ronald N. Johnson, Institutional Restrictions on the Transfer of a Water Right and the Survival
ofAn Agency, in Water Rights: Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy and the Environment
137 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983); Tregarthen, supra note 230.
333. That is, the upstream user is not fully compensated for costs incurred returning
water to the system by preventing water from leaking into the river basins, losing altitude,
evaporating, or sinking into the soil.
334. It would also move the system farther from the riparian system that it is at present.
335. There are other difficulties, too, arising from the fact that what is important is the
value, not the volume of the return flow. This, however, is a difficulty chiefly for a claim
that a law which would freely allow transfers denominated in net amounts would
automatically end third-party effects of water transfers. Gould, supra note 245, at 466-67,
gives instances where such transfers would not leave third parties unimpaired. Our
prediction is based on this claim. We simply believe that the advantages of measuring rights
by volume consumed will make this more common and eventually universal.
336. Measurement problems include the difficulties of widespread measurement of
changes in water quality, location and elevation.
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the practice from pairwise bargaining to all appropriations and transfers.
Seniority
We predict that today's system of giving priorities over scarce
flows to those holding senior rights will continue. We admit that this is
a curious arrangement. Indeed it seems obvious that if two users could
freely contract to share unknown future water flows, they would think
of something better than giving one almost complete certainty and the
other all the risk. 7
It must be acknowledged, however, that for most users in a
general system of water law, the transition to any other way of sharing
would be very costly. When the senior appropriator has complete
precedence to use, the measurement and monitoring costs of the parties
are minimized.This curious arrangement is made tolerable by trading. The
holder of a junior right must carry the burden of insecurity but as
compensation his right is relatively inexpensive. He can therefore
assemble a portfolio of junior and senior rights and irrigation shares. And
he can buy water short-term, on option or in other complicated ways. 9
These can give him as much water security as he wishes to buy.
Our prediction, therefore, is that greater divisibility will convey
the advantages of these opportunities to blend security and risk to users
in more jurisdictions. Some of them will become more available as
pipelines and other facilities allow more water to be moved greater
distances. Water clearing houses will reduce the volumes that must
actually move. Many such changes are dependent simply on small
changes in political willingness to amend present prohibitions. If our
prediction is correct, we expect therefore that many water rights will
remain clearly distinguished by their seniority.

337. For example, if water values can cover the added transactions costs, each right can
be changed to entitle its holder to a specified amount, plus or minus an agreed percentage
of the net flow deficiency. More elaborate arrangements might call for a different percentage
sharing each season or under each contingency.
338. In Australia, where water rights have the same systems of continuous sharing as are
common elsewhere within local 'irrigation districts and companies, much of the burden is
placed on a government agency.
339. See Shupe et al., supra note 241 (providing an inventory of the bewildering variety
of available water transfer mechanisms and rights); see also Bonnie G. Colby, Economic
Impacts of Water Law-State Law and Water Market Development in the Southwest, 28 Nat.
Resources J. 721, 728 (1988) (describing the "market for reliability").
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Beneficial use
Even without attempting to reform water rights so they can
allocate water among multiple uses, we expect that beneficial-use
provisions will continue to fade away. The concept may have been
ethically necessary when water was originally being appropriated, but
that need has passed. As we have seen, loading it onto the holding of an
appropriative right has stood in the way of allocating water to creating
reserves, irrigation and urban storage, and hydro power. To overcome
such problems, the doctrine has already been relaxed by statutes and
stretched by court interpretations. But, as the beneficial-use requirement
does reduce bargaining and enforcement costs, we predict that in
irrigation districts it will not vanish quickly. In many such districts, early
farmers' water entitlements were set by, in effect, multiplying the
individual farmer's irrigated average by a standard water-per-acre factor.
This factor, widely accepted in each district, is referred to as the local
"Duty of Water." It is acceptable in part as being consistent with the ideas
of no waste and good practice-that is, beneficial use. Hence, in such
districts, to scrap the beneficial use requirement would entail the conflicts
and costs of making apportionments on some new basis. We predict,
therefore, that farmers will wish to retain the beneficial use requirement
for some time.
2. Step Two: Reforming rights and markets for multiple use
Our predictions above were based on the temporary assumption
that streams would continue to be mainly channels for getting scarce
water to diverters, so that markets would have a somewhat homogeneous
commodity to allocate. Though engineers talk about stream levels and
flows, we have thought of the traditional water market as trading only
flows. We expect, however, that levels and all the final services which
depend on them will also become scarce and valuable. Hence future
markets may also be called on to handle demands for particular levels on
particular stretches. If so, today's appropriative rights are being refined
just when water allocation demands are under transformation. Usufructuary rights will not be based uniquely on diverted flows for much longer.
Instead, we anticipate the changes outlined below.
In-stream use rights
We expect that in the allocation of water, there will be greater
demand for streamflows to remain running in the watercourse. The
resulting increase in in-stream uses is equivalent to the expansion of the
public uses that we have referred to in earlier Parts. The increase is being,
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and will be, accomplished by a reduction in the amounts which may be
diverted under today's present appropriative rights.
A voluminous American literature" on the legal aspects of
such reallocation has made clear that there are many kinds of policy,
involving constitutional interpretation, Indian rights, navigation, fisheries,
statutory amendment, regulatory orders and individual water rights
which can be combined to increase in-stream uses. Rather than survey
this literature, we merely mention three implications.
The first is connected to the requirement for beneficial use. Even
if we were correct in predicting that the beneficial-use condition will
continue to apply to irrigation rights-holders on certain streams, we
would predict that governments will neutralize their tendency to prevent
allocations for in-stream uses. They may do this in either of two ways.
They may choose to by-pass the beneficial-use barrier by simply reducing
the amount that license holders as a group may divert. We expect this to
happen where administrative agencies have become highly specialized in
allocating water to irrigators: governments will try to keep their licensing
system intact and to provide for in-stream uses through other laws or.
institutions, probably without markets.
Alternatively, governments may choose to allow the water right
to be re-defined and broadened. Instead of entitling the holder to divert
water and requiring him to use it beneficially, it will allow him to apply
the entitlement to both out-of-stream or in-stream uses. This way of
proceeding will give more potentiality to water-rights markets. If so, the
beneficial-use condition must be completely reconsidered."'
The second has to do with transaction costs. A right to divert a
given flow for a period does not easily translate into a right to a certain
depth at a certain location. The multipliers needed to convert the flow
into the stream depth or level will vary from place to place and season
to season, and so forth. Consequently, a competitive water-rights market
cannot easily deal in both depths and individual diversions: the
information costs would be prohibitive. We believe, therefore, that there
will be no such thing as a formal transferable right to a depth or level.
Parties who demand stream depth will have to make their own conversions.
The third has to do with our classification of water rights
according to whether they are use-based or land-based. Although setting

340. See, e.g., Craig Bennion, New Protectionfor California Instream Water Uses, 3 Stan. Envtl.
L. J.58 (1981); Paul R. Williams & Stephen J. McHugh, Water Marketing and Instream Flow:
The Next Step in Protecting California's Instrean Values, 9 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 132 (1990).
341. See Bonnie G. Colby, Mitigating Environmental Externalities Through Voluntary and
Involuntary Water Reallocation: Nevada's Truckee-Carson River Basin, 31 Nat. Resources J.
757, 779 (1991) (describing Nevada's action on this).
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up in-stream rights is a break with traditional appropriative rights, it
does not constitute a return to land-based rights. It is true that the
in-stream use of water is tied to a location on the watercourse and is in
this sense more similar than a diversion right is to a riparian, land-based
right. An in-stream water use can hardly be transferred to another place.
Nevertheless, technically, the legal basis of the right is the use to which
it is to be put, not the location of the riparian land, or any other land for
that matter. An in-stream right is inherently no more appurtenant to a
point than is any right of diversion.
3. Step 3-Trusts: New market entities to hold levels as well as flows.
In this section we shall sketch new "trusts" which we predict will be
active in acquiring and holding appropriative rights. They will be able to
protect and enhance in-stream levels and depths, and, perhaps, to
manage the surrounding environment at particular places on certain
rivers.
What is the deficiency in the present system that such trusts will
remedy? It is that present-day water rights do not give their holders
powers to exclude "users" from the various ways in which a protected
river can be enjoyed. In the economist's technical sense, such enjoyment
inevitably is partly or entirely "free-riding." It cannot be refused, therefore
it cannot be a basis for a charge or payment.
For example, persons who might provide river levels by buying
water rights from diverters cannot recover their costs from "consumers."'M They cannot find the actual and potential consumers, some of
whom live at great distances and rarely or never visit the river. Some of
these would even be able to continue their remote and vicarious
enjoyment of the existence of the river's attributes and amenities even if
a (prohibitively expensive) fence were somehow built around it to
support a toll gate or ticket window.
Recognizing this source of market failure, the law has intervened
historically 3 with rules that override individual diversion rights and

342. Here we use the word "levels" instead of the word "attributes" to summarize those
river conditions that are in demand for public uses. For the sake of brevity we ignore the
value that both the level of and the altitude of water can give to private users and diverters.
Examples of government rules to protect levels include the blanket provision in Magna
Carta forbidding the blocking of certain streams by fishing weirs. Equally constitutional and
inflexible have been the statutes and judgments that create the category of "navigable"
streams where certain public uses are give absolute priority over diverting or obstructing
uses.
343. See Frank A. Sharman, River Improvement Law in the Early Seventeenth Century, 30
Legal Hist. 222 ( 1980) for an account of the closing of the era of battles between navigation,
promoters and riparian owners.
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insist on levels and other stream conditions for "public" stream uses, such
as salmon migration and navigation. These laws usually go too far,
however, because they are arbitrary and inflexible. They treat other
stream users as potential criminals.' They stand in the way of any
compromise or trade between persons for whom levels for public uses
have been provided and other persons, especially those holding water
flow rights for individual uses. Actually, these laws are capable of great
improvement,"5 but in what follows we shall investigate the marketable-individual-right alternative to public intervention.
The problem with using the market for many, perhaps most,
services of in-stream uses is not just that the services cannot be marketed
to consumers. That difficulty is compounded by another. Most products
of such in-stream attributes as depth and water quality are public
goods.' Their consumers and immediate users are not rivals, for their
enjoyment of a water level does not leave less for others. In short many
final consumers can't be excluded and many direct users can be "free
riders" on levels or depths that are provided to others. For example, a
boat owner who improves a channel has no powers to exclude other
owners from taking a free ride. Knowing this, he will not seek to buy the
water right that could provide the needed level. For this reason the
market fails to allocate water to public navigation use.
These problems of private provision suggest how the market and
its participants may be improved. 7 Following the lead of organizations
like Ducks Unlimited and Nature Conservancy, or a Heritage old-building preservation trust, the rights-holders will now include "trusts."04
They will be non-profit agencies or boards. Each will be set up with
terms of reference that instruct them to preserve and protect a certain

344. Like the criminal law, the public use laws must either be enforced, or discretely
disregarded.
345. For example, allowing scales or auctions of licenses to do the things that are now
absolutely forbidden or by publishing a list of penalties (prices) for various amounts of
forbidden behaviour.
346. See Ostrom, supra note 308, at chs. 2, 3 (pointing out that common-pool resources
have separable consumption while public goods have joint consumption, and providing an
extensive bibliography).
See alsoGlenn G. Stevenson, Common Property Economics, ch. 3 (1991); Thrafnn Eggertsson,
Analyzing Institutional Successes and Failures: A Millennium of Common Mountain Pastures in
Iceland, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 423 (1992).
347. They do not, however, affect the nature of the water right.
348. Our use of the word "trust" to baptize this institution has nothing to do with the
American doctrine that the states should perform a "public trust" function in providing
water uses for all citizens. See Scott, supra note 194 (discussing "trusts" in the sense in which
we mean the word here). See also Roderick E. Walston, The Public Trust Doctrinein the Water
Rights Context, 29 Nat. Resources J.585 (1989) (providing a recent update on the public trust
doctrine).
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cluster of in-stream activities throughout the state or province. To do this,
they will acquire water rights and other real estate as their finances
permit. Thus several state-wide trusts might be concerned with in-stream
conditions in one river: one for fish migration, one for wilderness, one for
recreation, swimming and boating et cetera. When their needs coincide
or overlap, they will cooperate in bidding for rights to serve all their
purposes. Elsewhere, however, they may go their own way. Since their
chief means of providing in-stream services would be the acquiring and
holding of transferable appropriative rights, the water rights market can
be identified as the means of allocating places and attributes of each river
to serve demands for private goods and public services.
Having such non-commercial organizations buy and hold
in-stream licenses is already a reality. u9 What we predict is that these
bodies will become increasingly formalized, and increasingly detached
from both the government agency that now oversees the water right
system and the non-government action groups that now press to preserve
rivers and the environment. The former will enforce the licenses held by
trusts. The latter will try to influence, not supplant, the trusts.
The extent to which each trust could provide more water for its
public purpose in competition with private diverters would depend on
its finances. Indeed, we need to ask, what resources will it have? First, it
may produce some services that could be individually enjoyed or
consumed. If it had exclusive rights to market these services it would
obtain monopoly-like sole-owner revenues, including spectator, hiking,
camping, fishing and boating charges.3' This source would be very

349. Johnson and DuMars, supra note 14.
350. Note that a trust would control public access only to the one amenity or service that
it has an exclusive right to provide, on all rivers in the jurisdiction of the government that
chartered it. Earlier single-purpose organizations differed from ours in that each river had
its own trust or company. For a discussion of how these organizations used compensation
to overcome local landowner resistance to navigation companies, see Sharman, supra note
346 on river improvement law. In Adam Smith's day river navigation and canal companies
flourished. The market was not used to allocate the watercourse between them and
individual users on the river banks. Instead, expropriation procedures had given them all
or nothing. As franchised or chartered joint-stock monopolies they received exclusive rights.
Their revenue came from charges. For example, some chartered English navigation
companies (who each improved one river channel, before the age of canals) and canal
companies had the power to run canal boats but sold access to other boat owners or
collected tolls from them. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations Vol.13 (Edwin Cannan ed.,
1976) (1776). Such exclusive powers permitted discriminatory monopoly pricing, but Smith
felt this preferable to the Crown providing free canal services to everyone. Another example
is the river companies in Ontario, described by Benidickson, supra note 157. These were
eventually subject to enfranchisement by government order. They improved rivers for log
floating and driving and boom sliding. The monopoly toll they levied was regulated by an
early public-utility procedure.
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important for some of the trusts, negligible for others. Most trusts would
rely on a second, voluntary, source of revenue; including bequests, gifts,
and perhaps profits from selling or renting water from their initial
endowment of water rights.
The third source for each trust will be government grants. These
will be liquid, and spendable at the trust's discretion."5 Thus the
future's market-oriented approach river management will not escape
today's reliance on politics, public choice procedures and public finance.
The main difference will be that the conflict or competition for water and
sites will be resolved in the market, with each service or use ultimately
determined or limited by the amount of a legislature's grant. This will not
be a wholly new management. One of the jobs of politicians today is to
translate diffuse political currents and pressures into concrete support for
museums, orchestras and research institutes. In many governments this
is done by setting up non-political councils who do the actual supporting,
granting and spending. These are the forerunners of our trusts. Note that
they do not save politicians from having to scratch their heads over the
amount of each annual grant to each council. So it will be with the
river-use trusts. Governments, besieged by interest groups and advisors,
will continue to make financial decisions about how much to give each
trust, and each trust will carry out the specific goals in its terms of
reference by acquiring and holding rights to enhance and protect
in-stream conditions on various rivers.5 2
4. Step 4: The Corporation and the Community of the River
What it will be
In the first step we sketched how we think individual appropriative rights will evolve to do their present job better. In the second step we
sketched how new trusts would acquire and hold appropriative rights
that would enable them to act in the market to protect and enhance and
perhaps manage water levels and depths at particular places on certain
rivers. These two steps will enable individual ownership of transferable
water rights to provide, through the market, more of the uses and

351. There may also be grants in kind of water rights, land rights or money. This entails
the existing water levels, as originally enforced by government regulation for public stream
uses, being converted into transferable rights. This could be a slow and painful business.
See Williams & McHugh, supra note 343, at 195-97 (very hesitantly recommending public
grants).
352. Each trust would have membership'drawn from its government's entire jurisdiction:
nation, state or province. Partly appointed, partly elected, rotated, and so on. We expect
they would be empowered to hold land adjacent to their in-stream water rights.
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attributes of the river. The role of government agencies would be
narrowed to provision of stream flow data and to superintendence of
firms such as trusts.
We believe, however, that there will be further change related to
changing demand and technology in river basins. Because of this the
unassisted market will run into information problems which in turn will
reduce its allocation effectiveness. We suggest, as a third step, the kind
of institutional innovation' expected to emerge as a remedy for this
problem. Our expectation is that it can offer efficiency in providing
certain river services to rights holders individually, while assuring that
the holders collectively have a voice in the remaining aspects of overall
stream management.
We will call this institution a river corporation.' When a river
or stretch of a river is designated by the government, a corporation for
that place will come into being. It will, to the fullest extent possible, own
or beneficially hold the usufruct of a river by virtue of holding all
appropriative rights to that stream's uses. These will include diversion
rights, in-stream rights held by trusts to maintain levels, emission rights,
where these exist, and possibly groundwater rights.
The corporation will be started on government initiative.
Members' and corporate duties and rights, and procedures, will be
spelled out in a statute and in by-laws. These will require rights-holders
to convene, incorporate, and assemble their water rights. The appropriative diversion water rights contributed by each member will continue to
be for his exclusive use. The rights contributed by each trust will
continue to serve that trust's public and social purposes. Further water
rights, along with land and other assets, can also be acquired by the
corporation as a body.'
What it will do
We start with the information problem that occurs when rights
are to be transferred or uses changed, or when holders dispute their
respective entitlements along a certain stream.' How can all the parties
353. Of course, irrigation and drainage districts and similar cooperatives and/or
self-governing entities already exist. See Ostrom, supra note 308, at ch. 3 (giving an account
of "long-enduring, self-organized and self-governed common-pool resources." See alsoMaass
& Anderson, supra note 201 (a revealing discussion and description of the scheme to pool
water over a long stretch of a river (the Upper Basin of the Colorado), leasing it back to its
owners and exporting the surplus).
354. Another possible name would be "cooperative".
355. These may include pollution rights or emission rights, and groundwater rights. We
discuss the corporation's use of these below.
356. In what follows we assume that water management and water transfers cover an
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to a transfer inexpensively agree on the dimensions of the flow and the
return flow? Under some adversarial regimes today each party must go
to the expense of preparing estimates and measurements for submission
to court-like adjudicative proceedings. This has been a costly undertaking.
a burdensome aspect of the protection of individual property rights in
water3 7 But it may soon become a thing of the past. As we have
shown, in many jurisdictions, as water becomes more valuable and more
frequently transferred, administrative proceedings, which produce
decisions and agreements on level and flow data more rapidly and
cheaply, have taken the place of judicial proceedings.
But what, precisely, is the essence of these "administrative
proceedings?" What sort of institution is needed to provide them?
Surveying this question, we have isolated two kinds. The first has been
the conventional government water-resources department. The second has
been the public authority, a non-political corporation or management
agency having a semi-independent role as a player in holding and
transferring water and emission rights.' Both kinds exist and flourish.
What they have in common is that they are instruments of government
policy, channels for discretionary official control over individual water
rights, disputes and transfers. As institutions they overlap, and ultimately
override, the kind of market allocation of individual rights that is the
subject of this paper.
For this reason we turn from them to the contrasting characteristics of the river corporation. The river corporation can deal with disputes
and transfers. If necessary, it can commission professionals to make the
same formal surveys of the ownership of levels and flows that are
utilized by the two kinds of dispute-resolution institution mentioned
above.' But in addition, the river corporation can augment these
procedures by utilizing the knowledge of its own members. Their

entire river basin. However, we recognize that it may easily make political, legal,
hydrological and economic sense to divide the basin. If so, what we suggest in the text
applies only to the market unit: one valley or one stretch of a river.
357. See Howe et al., supra note 248.
358. A greatly-expanded agency could also be the seller or lessor of the water rights and
the emission rights. Since 1989 the UK has had a similar National Rivers Authority. It has
somewhat autonomous regional units. On each river a unit grants water permits and
releases or holds back water from its own reserves. The province of Saskatchewan, too, has
such an organization covering all the province's rivers. Percy, supra note 202 at 36-43.
However, both organizations' pollution instruments are routine command-and-control
regulations. One that dealt in both quality and quantity rights could enforce the former with
the threat of cutting off the latter. These would become compound Quantitative Water and
Emission Rights (QWERs) tried out in a few jurisdictions. See Scott, supra note 194.
359. Such surveys are nearly always ad hoc and cost about the same, whomever they are
made for.
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experience and familiarity with the river, sharpened by their sense of
place, of proprietorship and of community, makes the corporation's own
members good sources. The river corporation can also provide mediators
and arbitrators, who will know about local sources of information, and
whose compromises and adjustments may be more easily reached where
the corporation exists to monitor and enforce their provisions.
Short-term transfers
Another function of the corporation will be to act as a clearing
house for short-term transfers. Whether or not permanent diversion rights
transfers over long distances become more costly and difficult to arrange,
we can expect to see an increase in short-term exchanges. Users will find
that short-term water contracts pay easements, sales, rentals, swaps, and
future transactions and options. These already exist in some jurisdictions.
Such water fluctuates in price, but is usually cheaper than the water
acquired with long-duration rights. This can be explained by the extra
expense of constant renewal costs for those who depend on short-term
rights. Another source of expense is in the risk of default, for short-term
users and sellers have only contracts, not property rights, to protect them.
Such extra costs of short-term markets can be greatly reduced by the
corporation. Finding a trading partner, getting information and enforcing
all become internalized within a group of repeat traders.
Discharge permits
From the corporation's capacity to produce and digest the
information required to settle disputes and approve transfers we turn to
its roles with respect to water quality. To be symmetrical with what we
have predicted about the members' pooling of their water rights, we
should predict that they will pool their waste discharge rights. But, like
most schemes that would integrate water and pollution rights, such
symmetry is elusive.' We cannot assume that, in the initial period,
anything as formal, secure or transferable as a pollution discharge permit
0 ' Instead,
or right of the kind outlined by John Dales will even exist.

360. See Scott, supra note 194 (giving references).
361. John H. Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices: An Essay in Policy-Making and
Economics (1968). Rejecting pollution regulation and charges, Dales recommended that a
permissible total amount of waste discharge be determined for each river or lake. This total
would be divided into quotas, rights to which would be held by each polluter. He predicted
that those who could most cheaply or easily abate pollution would do so, selling their rights
to those for whom abatement would be most costly. In this way society would limit
pollution to that tolerable at least total cost. Id. at 77-100.
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politicians may continue to favor today's regime of command-and-control
instruments and regulations, administered by government departments
or agencies, and enforced by the courts.' In all probability this cumbersome regime of unintegrated controls cannot be treated as a whole, to
be subdivided and handed to the river corporations for continuation,
revision and enforcement. The main reason for this is that the component
statutes and regulations have been introduced precisely because they are
nationally or provincially uniform. Their level of intensity may have
nothing to do with a particular river. If so, their revision and even their
enforcement cannot be handled with energy or conviction by members
of a localized river corporation, unless the corporation is to be a mere
local police force enforcing laws made elsewhere.
Our conclusion about the less uniform, price-based pollution-control instruments such as charges or subsidies on volumes of pollution
discharge' is somewhat different due to the fact that members of local
governments, drainage and water districts, school boards and so on have
shown a remarkable capacity to tax and charge each other. One example
of this is local assessment and taxation of real estate. Another is the
setting of sewage charges. These charges are rarely set with the precision
of discrimination that would characterize the economists' ideal pollution
charge; indeed they usually have revenue and not deterrence as their
purpose. Nevertheless, they support our opinion that if water pollution
charges were introduced, they would be just as effectively assessed and
administered by our corporation or its members as if administered by a
more senior government agency.
As an alternative, politicians may overcome their original distaste
for water pollution rights (discharge permits). The recent American
introduction of tradable rights to emit fixed amounts of "greenhouse" and
acid rain gases points to a belated political acceptance of this kind of air
pollution control instrument. It could also lead to the gradual annual
reduction of their entitlements. Political opposition, however, is not the
only barrier to the arrival of tradable rights. The administration and
transaction costs of any system of pollution regulation or rights can be
very high, especially for the information required to transfer a right. The
institution must have the capacity to determine the difference, if any,
between the effect on the ambient water condition when the permit, and
so the pollution source, is moved. This capacity enables all the parties to
verify that a transfer, with all the conditions that may be imposed, is

362. See Rankin, supra note 269 (providing a recent legal survey of the spectrum of such
regulations).
363. This option seems so far from being adopted by politicians that it is hardly worth
discussing.
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acceptable.3"
The corporation will have some of this capacity, for within its
membership it can muster knowledge of flows, level, diversions and
return flows. What it will lack is standard-setting capacity (although its
trust members will often have their own standards, higher than those of
the government or of any external pollution "victim.") We imagine,
therefore, that the government will have to continue to set ambient or
receptor standards, especially those beyond the stretch of water for which
the corporation has become responsible. Within that stretch the corporation can be regarded as overseeing a pollution "bubble," to which the
government assigns a total waste-discharge quota for each pollutant.'
It appears that for many pollutants, probably including those originating
in non-point sources, the corporation will be better at surveillance,
enforcement, verification and monitoring than government agencies as
they now exist. By the same token it will be better at overseeing transfers
of pollution sources.
We certainly expect that as river corporations are assigned
responsibilities for water pollution, the discharge-permit instrument will
be more politically successful than if it is assigned to the present
province- or state-wide agencies.
C. Who will gain, who will lose?
Reliance on markets means consumer sovereignty slanted in favor
of those who can cast the most dollar votes. That this should give the
future rich more water to drink, as well as more voice in water allocation
generally, is upsetting even to people who are' not worried that future
markets for other commodities will also favor the wealthy.
If so, they may find our "trusts" even more disturbing. We believe
these will be financed, in part at least, by private donations. This means
that the private distribution of economic power will have some influence
on the amount and division of support for public, in-stream, uses.
But we foresee that in the future the trusts and the corporation
will moderate the naked power of private single-purpose users in the
allocation of water. No longer will miners, irrigators, mill owners, electric
utilities or water-transport lines dictate levels, flows and quality. Instead,
the trusts will provide a market presence for those who enjoy rivers for

364. See Esther Bartfield, Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost
Savings, 23 Envtl. L. 43 (1993) (providing a striking example of how a group of water users
can trade while meeting an overall discharge target into a river).
365. This total would be derived as the sum of the emitter's actual permitted discharges
in the historic period before the corporation was set up, for each pollutant. If quantitative
discharge permits already existed, the total would be the sum of the members' permits.
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recreation, for aesthetic purposes or for sustainable-development motives.
Financed by public and private sources, probably guided by hearings,
interest groups and other public-participation instruments, the trusts will
vastly improve the water market's allocations brought about by a trade
in private appropriative rights.
Those who believe "global sustainable development begins at
home" will find the trusts' presence in water markets helpful only if they
can be financed. Such persons will be called on to engage in political
action to make sure the appropriate trusts are given cash support by the
governments to match their declarations and statements. At the very least
the opportunity to support the trusts can make government participation
tangible, and its lack of support visible. For example, a trust will not be
able to bring about the preservation of a wild watercourse much better
than today's agencies unless politicians give it financial power or unless,
as with today's nature trusts and heritage trusts, such institutions find
other sources from whom to collect funds.
As for undue enrichment from holding a marketable water right,
there is no doubt that the existence of a property right has been a
necessary condition for many persons' wealth, and that this has been just
as true for persons in water-using activities as in any other industry.
Indeed it is bound to be true unless the state siphons off the rent or
surplus. The modern state has rarely done this, being content instead to
let water values get capitalized randomly into the values of the land
served by the water use. The politician can easily give an efficiency
justification for this inactivity, for if the rent is not taxed the right-holder
is left with a healthy incentive to put the water to its socially best use.
Furthermore, because the rent of unpriced water accrues to the poor as
well as to the wealthy, the politician is bound to pay more attention to
leveling down high incomes from all sources than to chasing the
water-rent element in everyone's income.
If, however, social pressures do force the politician to confiscate
some fraction of the scarcity-rent element in water use, marketable rights
would make his task much easier. Each rise in their value reflects a rise
in scarcity, and little else. The politician can follow the existing model of
taxes and charges on crude petroleum-another fluid resource subject to
a kind of appropriative right-which has been justified on the grounds
of distribution fairness. In brief, we do not believe that the development
of a market in water rights must create new problems of unequal or
unfair distribution beyond the reach of government policy.
This leads to another question. Will reliance on the trusts and on
water corporations leave too many borderline water and watercourse
issues to market forces? In particular, will the degree of dependence of
the trusts on outside donors mean that the influence of low-income
citizens on the provision of in-stream uses will diminish? We cannot
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predict the outcome. We agree it is possible, however, that the net effect
may be to reduce water use by the industrial employers of the poor in
order to provide more of the in-stream uses favored by the middle class.
In theory, this could be corrected by subsidizing the employers
or other water users. But governments are generally also committed to
more in-stream uses, in the name of environmentalism and sustainable
development. No matter how they pursue these aims, by leaving them to
trusts in the market or by their own direct administrative action,
governments cannot avoid hurting those whose jobs depend on water.
Either way, less water gets allocated to industry and irrigation.
D. Will the water right continue its twists and turns, back to a basis
in land?
In this section we pick up a question left hanging in Part IV. Will the
twisting and turning of titles to water continue? Will western users' titles
become less use-based, and more land-based? Basing our opinion on our
predictions in Sections A to C, we believe that (a) for water consumers
and diverters, water rights will continue to be use-based and individualbased. However, (b) for purposes of holding rights to water quality and
to specific in-stream uses, the immobility of those rights may cause the
whole system to increase slightly its resemblance to a system of riparian
rights. These points are developed below.
(a) Continuing the use-based right
The increasing scarcity of water suggests that water users will
find it increasingly rewarding to allocate water, and re-allocate it,
towards its most valuable uses. Thus a quantitative, transferable,
usufructuary interest in water will be needed. This is already provided
by the western water right or water permit, and we believe it will
continue. For this reason we predict that the future water right, to the
extent it is held by water-diverters and consumers as at present, will be
use-based. There will be no twist or turn toward a land-based riparian,
natural-flow or even reasonable-use water right.
Of course, its characteristics will be changed. To become more
marketable, many of today's government and administrative barriers will
be lowered, giving the right more transferability. As the discretionary
powers of administrators are relaxed, we will see an increase in quality
of title and security. Its exclusivity will probably change, to the extent that
the senior-junior all-or-nothing system of precedence will be modified.
And its flexibility may be increased by the acceptance 'of more uses as
equally "beneficial."
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(b) How rights to use water will become more closely tied to the adjoining
land
We do not expect that the ownership of a right to use or have a
stream used or occupied in a particular way at a particular point will
even become a right that is appurtenant to the ownership of the land at
that point. Hence the future system of individual rights will not become
'land-based" in the sense of our twists-and-turns classification.
Note, however, two exceptions. First, we expect that the present
right of riparians to consume water for ordinary or domestic purposes
will continue. This is a land-based privilege. Second, we expect that
native Indian land claims, if successful, will bring with them incidental
or appurtenant water rights.' These too will spring directly from
native rights to land. Thus many individual appropriative right systems
will contain an increasing number of land-based claims.
These exceptions aside, we foresee the appropriative water right
surviving for many years, altered slowly perhaps, but not becoming a
near-relation of the land-based right. However, we do expect that in the
future the conditions, specification and rules that make up each user's
bundle of rights and duties will "have an address." They will "go with"
the point of intake (and discharge) just as much as they are appurtenant
to the land which they serve. Just as a water user in the early 18th
century was under orders from the court not to change the stream's
levels and flows in such a way as would harm his particular riparian
neighbors in that particularstream, so we foresee that the future appropriative right user will have his discretion in water use circumscribed by
rules, by-laws, contracts and easements made by himself and his fellow
rights' holders who have a sense of place and a membership in the
community of that particular stream. A user on another stream whose
lands and individual water rights are otherwise identical to his may
nevertheless have different rights and obligations. No lawyer would say
that this difference actually makes the respective entitlements of the two
users "land-based." In this, economists would likely agree. However, we
believe that the new system of trusts and corporations will force the
right-holder to behave within his "community" as he would behave in a
modified system of land-based uses.

366. Native land claims have already done so in the United States and New Zealand,
regardless of the prevailing system of water rights.

